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ABSTRACT




Co-Chairs: Jeffrey A. Smith and Brian P. McCall
This dissertation focuses on the role of high school mathematics credits on shaping
college access and graduation as well as future earnings. In the first chapter, I exploit
state and time variation in shocks to teachers’ labor supply to identify the effect
of high school mathematics credits on education and labor market outcomes. The
results indicate that, on average, each additional year of math increases yearly labor
income by about 3%. Other results show that math credits during high school also
increase the probability of college attendance and bachelors’ degree completion.
In the second chapter, I estimate marginal treatment effects of advanced high
school mathematics credits on total labor income at age 28. The results indicate
that the average gain from obtaining advanced math credits during high school for
a randomly selected individual is about 4%. For people who already enrolled in
advanced math credits the gain from another year of math is smaller of about 2.45%
whereas that for individuals who never obtained mathematics credits the potential
increase is the highest of about 7.39%. To this date, this is the first study of marginal
treatment effects in the literature of the impact of high school math credits on labor
xii
market outcomes.
Finally, in the third chapter, I describe the process to obtain a national data
set of state-sponsored financial incentives utilized to recruit and retain teachers in
STEM fields. Between 1983 and 2016, 41 states implemented 87 unique financial
programs aimed at increasing the supply of teachers, especially in shortage subject
and geographic areas. The data generated in this chapter helped me to identify and
estimate different program evaluation parameters such as the weighted Local Average
Treatment Effect in chapter 1, and, in chapter 2, the Average Treatment Effect (ATE),
the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (TT), the Average Treatment Effect on
the Untreated (TUT) and, the Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE).
xiii
CHAPTER I
The Impact of High School Mathematics Credits
on Earnings: Evidence from Shocks to Teachers’
Labor Supply
1.1 Introduction
Examining the benefits derived from high school math credits is important for
numerous reasons. First, the amount of mathematics credits students earn during
high school is a strong predictor of college readiness and success (Adelman 1999,
2006; Long, Iatarola, and Conger, 2009). Furthermore, mathematics and science test
scores of young individuals, which in turn are correlated with the number of math
and science credits earned during high school, have been linked not only to economic
benefits to individuals (Mitra, 2002) but also to society (Hanushek and Woessmann,
2010; 2012).
Despite the efforts made by state governments and school districts to increase
student achievement of college-bound students, some scholars argue that many recent
high school graduates are not only unprepared for a college education but also for the
workforce (McCormick & Lucas, 2011). For instance, for the class of 2016, 52 percent
of all ACT test-takers did not attain college ready status (ACT, 2016). Additionally,
some economists claim that the relative position of the US in international assessment
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tests (e.g., PISA) is problematic. In 2009, compared to other developed nations, in
science the US ranked in the middle, and, below the middle in math (Moretti, 2012).
The number of mathematics credits that high school students obtain is an im-
portant policy vehicle that could help state governments and school districts to im-
prove, among other outcomes, college readiness and, state, national and international
achievement test scores of the student population. For individuals, obtaining addi-
tional advanced math credits during high school might be a ticket to better chances
to attend and succeed in college, to enroll and get credits in high-paid majors, to
work in more economically rewarding occupations; in short, to enjoy higher income
in adulthood. Understanding what influences the course-taking choices of high school
students as well as the benefits of obtaining additional math credits is paramount.
In this study, I examine the private economic benefits of mathematics credits earned
during high school; however, as previously expressed, the social benefits might also
be sizable.
Research indicates that the number of high school mathematics credits is a strong
predictor of: (a) higher achievement test scores during high school1; (b) increased
college admission test scores2; (c) greater chances of college entry and completion3;
(d) better financial market participation and credit management4, and, (e) higher
earnings in adulthood5.
Even when the number of studies that examine the association between high
school math credits and education and labor market outcomes is relatively large, most
1Attewell & Domina, (2008); Lee, Croninger & Smith (1997); Long, Cogner & Iatarola (2012);
Gamoran & Hannigan (2000) ; Gamoran (1987); Jones (1987); Lee, Burkam, Chow-Hoy, Smerdon
& Goverdt (1998); Welch, Anderson & Harris (1982); Hoffer, Rasinski & Moore (1995); Rock &
Pollack (1995); Madigan (1997); Bozick & Ingels (2008); Laing, Engen & Maxey (1987)
2Alexander & Pallas (1984); Sebring (1987)
3Schneider, Swanson & Riegle-Crumb (1998); Attewell & Domina (2008); Long, Cogner &
Iatarola (2012); Dougherty, Mellor & Jian (2006); Horn & Kojaku (2001); Adelman, 1999; Adelman
2006; Alexander, Riordan, Fennessey & Pallas, 1982; Clotfelter, Hemelt & Ladd, 2016
4Cole, Paulson, & Shastri (2015)
5Altonji (1995); Levine & Zimmerman (1995); Rose & Betts (2004); Joensen & Nielsen (2009);
Goodman (2012)
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studies do not identify and estimate parameters with a causal interpretation. The
main motivation of this paper is to contribute to the extant literature that examines
the impact of mathematics course taking during high school on education and labor
market outcomes by exploiting shocks to teachers labor supply as determinants of
course taking behavior. By using the variation in math credits induced by shocks to
teacher labor supply, in this study I attempt to provide a causal interpretation of the
parameter estimates.
The identification strategy consists on exploiting shocks to teachers labor supply
as determinants of math course-taking choices during high school. In the US K-12
education system, there is a longstanding problem of teacher shortages, especially
in math and science. In response, many states have implemented financial incentive
programs aimed to increase the supply of teachers in hard-to-staff schools. Through-
out this paper, I call these programs STEM teacher recruitment programs, or just,
STEM programs.
The hypothesized mechanism through which STEM programs induce students
to earn additional math credits is the following. When states implement STEM
programs, new teachers are recruited to work in some of the most disadvantaged
schools. The schools that receive the additional teachers might expand the number
and types of courses offered to students. Given the increase in the courses choice set,
some individuals might be induced to enroll, and subsequently, to earn credits from
subjects that were not available before the implementation of the STEM programs.
The results indicate that, for each additional year of advanced math (i.e., algebra
2 and above), there is an increase in total labor income of about 3 percent. Also,
the probability of attending college increases by 8 pp, the probability of attending a
4-year college or university rises by 11 pp, and, finally, the probability of obtaining a
bachelors degree increases by 9 pp. All these results are consistent with the current
literature.
3
This study offers various contributions to at least three different bodies of lit-
erature. For the literature that examines the returns to high school math credits,
this paper is the first that exploits variations in supply-side features of the educa-
tion system as determinants of education choices. This assertion is relevant since,
unlike other papers in the literature, I present evidence of the link between state-level
programs aimed to recruit and retain teachers (a policy lever) and high school math-
ematics course taking behavior. If states want to increase the number of math credits
students earn during high school, an alternative might be to design and implement
financial incentives for college students with a teaching commitment component, es-
pecially in hard-to-staff schools. Moreover, in contrast to comparable papers in this
literature6, I do control for credits earned in other subjects while estimating the re-
turns to math credits. The decisions to control - or not - for credits in other subjects
have important implications when interpreting the results.
For the literature that examines the impact of teacher recruitment programs on
teachers’ labor supply decisions, even though this study does not evaluate specific
programs, I do provide an overall estimate of the effect of such programs on the
probability to teach. Also, this study provides a comprehensive picture of the different
financial aid programs utilized to recruit and retain math and science teachers in the
US. Finally, to the literature that examines the effects of high school math credits on
college attendance and bachelors degree attainment, to my knowledge, this is the first
study that presents evidence of such effects using instrumental variables estimators.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section (1.2), I state the
research questions and contribution; section (1.3) is devoted to the current literature
on the effects of math credits on various measures of earnings. Section (1.4) is devoted
to the identification strategy, sample description, definitions of treatment, controls,
instruments and outcomes; and the econometric models. The results are presented
6Joensen and Nielsen, (2009); Goodman, (2012)
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in section (1.5); also, a characterization of the compliant sub-population is provided.
Section (1.6) addresses a number of threats to identification. Finally, in section (1.7)
conclusions are provided.
1.2 Research Questions and Contribution
The main research question of this paper is, what are the effects of high school
mathematics credits on total labor income? I also examine the impact of high school
math credits on college attendance and bachelor’s degree attainment. Since I utilize
Instrumental Variables estimators, I can only hope to recover a measure of the
impact of math on income, only for the population of individuals induced by the
instrument to change their course taking behavior; in other words, compliers.
This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of high school mathematics
courses on education and labor market outcomes by utilizing an institutional feature
of the US teacher labor market: the widespread problem of teacher shortages and the
responses from states to address this issue. By compiling a complete list of financial
incentives aimed at increasing the supply of teachers in hard-to-staff schools and
shortage subjects such as mathematics and science, this study provides two important
conclusions. First, I estimate a causal effect of mathematics credits on education and
labor market outcomes by instrumenting for mathematics credits with state-level
financial incentives aimed to attract teachers. Second, the study also examines the
impact of financial incentives on the probability of teaching; given that the literature
on the impact of financial incentives on teacher recruitment and retention is slim,




Many studies in many different countries have demonstrated that better-educated
individuals earn higher wages, experience less unemployment and work in more pres-
tigious occupations than their less-educated counterparts (Card, 1999). Most of these
studies have focused on the number of years of education as the variable of interest.
Less attention has been given to the study of which components of the education
black box impact labor market outcomes.
Only a handful of studies have attempted to estimate the causal impact of high
school math courses on earnings. In all cases, the authors do not distinguish which
estimands their estimators are associated to; in other words, these studies do not use
the parameters of interest commonly utilized in the program evaluation literature such
as the Average Treatment Effect (ATE), Treatment on the Treated (TT), Treatment
on the Untreated (TUT), and, Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE.)
Altonji (1995) uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey of the High School
Class of 1972 (NLS72) to identify the effect of high school curriculum on wages. As an
instrument for course-taking in each subject he uses the high school average number of
courses taken in that subject. He defined the outcome as wages which were calculated
as earnings divided by hours worked in 1977, 1978 and 1979. He finds that one more
year of the combination of science, math, English, social studies and foreign language
leads to an increase of wages of only 0.3 percent.
Levine & Zimmerman (1995) used two data sources: the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY-79) and the 1980 cohort of the High School and Beyond
(HSB) survey, to examine the impact of the number of high school math courses on
log weekly wages around 10 years after high school graduation. They also used the
high school average number of math and science courses taken as instruments. All
the IV models led to statistically insignificant effects; -0.017 for men and -0.060 for
6
women7.
By using the sophomore cohort (1980) of the High School and Beyond (HSB)
data, Rose & Betts (2004) estimated the effect of high school mathematics courses on
earnings. The outcome was the natural log of annual earnings in 1991, approximately
10 years after high school graduation. This study also used the high school aver-
age number of math courses as an instrument. Credits earned in algebra/geometry
increased earnings by about 8%. No statistically significant effects were found for
intermediate algebra (-0.107), advance algebra (-0.77) and calculus (-0.132)8.
In a two-sample instrumental variables (TSIV) framework, Goodman (2012) iden-
tified the impact of mathematics courses taken during high school on earnings using
the differential timing of state-level increases in high school graduation requirements
as a source of exogenous variation. The outcome was the natural log of total earn-
ings from last year. He found that each additional year of math increases black
males’ earnings by 5-9 %. The impacts on white males are around the same mag-
nitude but statistically insignificant. The results for black (0.035) and white (0.005)
women are also statistically insignificant. Finally, by exploiting a national curricular
reform in Denmark, Joensen & Nielsen (2009) identified the causal effect of advanced
high school mathematics courses on earnings. The authors concluded that math and
chemistry - together - increased earnings by around 20 percent.
Currently there is a gap in the literature that investigates the impact of math
course taking on labor market outcomes. First, unlike the returns to years of schooling
literature which includes hundreds of studies and many countries, the number of
studies that seek to measure the impact of math courses on labor market outcomes is
very limited. Second, most of the extant studies - Altonji (1995), Rose & Betts (2004),
7Even when the estimates are statistically insignificant, they are quite large since they are raw
estimates from regressing the dependent variable log weekly earnings on the treatment, the number
of math courses.
8The numbers in parentheses are the coefficients coming from the IV estimation of the impact of
math credits on log earnings.
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Levine & Zimmerman (1995) - use an ill-conceived instrument - the per-high school
mean of the number of mathematics courses taken - to instrument for math course
taking. There are a number of reasons why the average number of math courses at
the high school level might be correlated with labor market outcomes, thus violating
the exclusion restriction. For example, if the high school is located in an affluent
neighborhood with many resources, including teachers, it is likely that the per high
school average courses taken in math is correlated to local economic conditions; since
income of person i is also correlated with local economic conditions the IV estimates
would be biased upward. Under these conditions the instrument is not valid.
Third, Goodman’s (2012) estimates restrict the sample to individuals with a high
school degree; since high school graduation is an outcome that might be correlated
with the reforms and course taking decisions, conditioning on high school graduation
(a potential outcome), might bias the results upward9. Fourth, none of the studies
in the literature present evidence of the strength of the instruments. At the very
minimum, the F-statistic of a test of the joint significance of all the coefficients of the
excluded instruments must be presented. If the F-statistic is included, in the case of
one endogenous regressor, it should be at least 10 (Staiger & Stock, 1997). Finally,
none of the studies state clearly which parameter they are estimating (e.g, Average
Treatment Effect).
This paper attempts to provide solid evidence of the impact of high school math-
ematics credits on education and labor market outcomes via the following contribu-
tions: first, by constructing a data set of all the state-level financial incentives aimed
at increasing the supply of teachers to hard-to-staff schools and to subjects with high
shortage rates such as mathematics and science, I am able to measure the impact of
these exogenous changes on mathematics credits and earnings as well as other out-
9Let R be the reform dummy which for exposition purposes is equal to 1 if individuals were
exposed to a reform and 0 otherwise; let HS be an indicator of high school graduation. Since
E[ε|R,HS = 1] > E[ε|R] = 0 then the IV estimates will be biased upward.
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comes and to recover the 2SLS estimates of the impact of mathematics credits on
college attendance, bachelor’s degree attainment and earnings. To my knowledge this
is the first paper - in the returns to math credits literature - that utilizes state level
variation in financial aid incentives for teachers as an instrument for math credits.
Second, I also provide estimates of the aggregate impact - across states - of STEM
teacher recruitment programs on the probability of teaching. Similar to the returns
to math credits literature, the literature that examines the impact of financial incen-
tives on teacher recruitment and retention is sparse. The estimates of the impact
of STEM programs on the probability of teaching are fairly consistent across all the
data sets utilized in this paper. Third, I provide a local interpretation of the param-
eter estimates; I do not provide a measure of the Average Treatment Effect on the
Treated (ATET), instead, I estimate a weighted measure of Local Average Treatment
Effects (LATE’s). Fourth, evidence of the relationship between the instrument and
earnings in larger data sets is provided10. This provides strong evidence that the
impact of STEM programs on earnings is not idiosyncratic to NLSY 97. Finally, I
address potential violations to the exclusion restriction assumption.
1.4 Identification Strategy
The purpose of this study is to identify and estimate the impact of high school
mathematics credits on education and labor market outcomes. It is important to
place the estimates in the context of the parameters of interest of the program evalu-
ation literature (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). Because I use 2SLS estimators, I am only
able to recover a weighted measure of Local Average Treatment Effects (LATE’s)11;
i.e., the average gain in total labor income per each additional year of advanced math-
10Whereas the IV estimates use NLSY97 data ≈ 9, 000 individuals, the reduced form equation was
also estimated using the Survey of Income and Program Participation 2008 ≈ 400, 000 individuals
each, and American Community Survey, 2009 ≈ 1, 500, 000 individuals.
11As Angist and Pischke (2009) argue, when the 2SLS estimator is calculated using covariates, the
parameter of interest represents a weighted average of causal effects for instrument-specific compliers.
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ematics credits only for the group of individuals who are induced by the instruments
to change their course taking behavior. Since by definition LATE is only recovered
in a model with no covariates in which both treatment and instrument are binary
variables, the 2SLS estimates presented in this paper represent weighted averages of
LATE’s that result from marginal changes in both - instruments and treatment.
As previously mentioned, in this paper I do not provide measures of other es-
timands such as the Average Treatment Effect (ATE), Treatment on the Treated
(TT), Treatment on the Untreated (TUT), Marginal Treatment Effects (MTE) or
Quantile Treatment Effects (QTE). In a separate paper, I estimate ATE, TT, TUT
and MTE of high school advanced mathematics credits on total labor income (Sosa,
2017a). In this paper, when I refer to the impact of math credits on education and
labor market outcomes, the parameter I estimate is a weighted average of LATEs,
and consequently, only pertains to the group of individuals who are induced by the
instrument to change their choices.
1.4.1 Identifying Variation
To identify the effect of high school mathematics credits on education and labor
market outcomes I use a feature of the US education system - teacher shortages
especially in math and science -, and the corresponding policy response from state
governments when trying to address this issue.
I use a national data set created by Sosa (2017b) that includes all state-sponsored
financial incentive programs aimed at increasing the supply of teachers, especially in
math and science and/or critical geographic shortage areas. I call these programs,
STEM programs (Sosa, 2017b). Forty one states have implemented at least one
program between 1983 and 2016; 87 unique programs have been identified. There is a
huge variation across programs in terms of program characteristics such as duration,
participants and expenditures, among others.
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The mechanism by which STEM programs might influence high school mathe-
matics course-taking behavior is the following. Given the teacher shortages problem,
especially in high-poverty neighborhoods, schools and school districts have struggled
to hire qualified math and science teachers. Therefore, not all students have equal
access to the same number of math teachers per student. Some schools have more
resources and can afford hiring extra teachers. Other schools are located in better
neighborhoods and might have fewer positions than the number of teachers willing to
teach at these schools.
Conversely, some schools might not even have a trigonometry or calculus teacher.
The STEM programs try to recruit and retain math and science teachers to work in
hard-to-staff schools. Some students that, before the STEM program implementation,
did not have access to qualified math teachers, once the STEM program is in place
and additional teachers work in their new positions, might have been exposed to a
higher number of math teachers, and, thus, to new course offerings and, consequently,
alternative course-taking choices. I fully describe the construction of the instruments
and exclusion restrictions later in the paper. For a complete description of the STEM
Programs Data Set please refer to Sosa (2017b).
1.4.2 Data
The principal source of individual-level data is the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY) 1997 cohort, which includes high school transcript information,
total labor income as well as a rich set of controls. NLSY 97 is a nationally rep-
resentative sample of around 9,000 individuals who were 12 to 16 years old as of
12/31/1996.12 The participants are re-surveyed on a biannual basis. Thus, NLSY 97
12Quote from NLSY web page March 1, 2016: ”A transcript information is available on the
NLSY97 data file for 6,232 respondents, or about 69 percent of the 8,984 respondents who partici-
pated in the initial round of the NLSY 97. The respondents for whom transcripts were not obtained
mainly include those who did not sign written consent forms to contact their schools, respondents
whose schools would not or could not provide transcripts, and respondents who were home-schooled
and thus did not have transcripts.”
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allows researchers to construct an individual-level panel that spans from 1994 to 2013.
The NLSY 97 data includes high school transcript information that was collected in
two separate waves, the first in 2000, and the second in 2004.
Around 70 percent of the individuals in the NLSY 97 sample have high school
transcript information.13 One key element of the transcript data are the Carnegie
units in mathematics and science. The National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES) defines a Carnegie unit as the number of credits a student receives for a
course taken every day, one period per day, for a full school year.14
Treatment, Outcome and Controls
Recently, researchers and policy commentators have been interested in the role
of advanced mathematics on college access and success and career readiness. In
particular, they agree that Algebra 2 is important not only because it is a pre-requisite
for college preparation courses such as Pre-Calculus, Calculus, AP calculus and AP
Statistics, but also because it benefits students’ general development by improving
logical thinking, cognitive capacity, and complex problem solving.
In this study, the treatment is the total number of advanced mathematics cred-
its earned during high school. I define advanced math as the sum of Carnegie
units earned in Algebra 2 through Pre-Calculus, Calculus, AP/IB and Advanced
Mathematics-Other. The main outcome is total labor income15 at age 28. The ratio-
nale behind this age is that all members of the sample turn 28 within the observation
period. In order to boost the sample size, instead of using measures of income at
exactly age 28, I use a weighted measure around this age. The numerator of the
weights is the inverse of the distance between each year and 28; for example, the
weights for 27 and 29 years are 1, whereas the weights for 26 and 30 years are 1/2
13http://www.bls.gov/nls/y97hstran.htm
14https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/glossary.aspx?nav=y
15The verbatim question is ”During last year, how much income did you receive from wages, salary,
commissions, or tips from all jobs, before deductions for taxes or anything else?”
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and the weights for 25 and 31 years are 1/3, and so on and so forth. I chose 2 for the
weight at exactly 28. The denominator is the sum of all these quantities.
In addition to labor income, in this paper, I also examine the impact of math
credits on college outcomes such as Ever attended any college, Ever attended
a four-year college, and Ever Received a Bachelors Degree. To control for
variation in total labor income due to variation in demographic characteristics, in
all the models, I included: a dummy for female, a dummy for white, age in years
as of 12-31-1996 (age at the beginning of the study), the average of non-missing
values of household gross income between 1996 and 1999 (in 1997 real USD), the
average of non-missing values of household income to poverty ratio between 1996 and
1999, household size in 1997, a dummy that indicates whether the household had
both biological parents in 1997, state-level number of Carnegie units (years) of math
required to obtain a high school diploma in 1997, number of years of exposure to a
high school math reform16. State and cohort17 fixed effects were also included.
Analysis Sample
The NLSY 97 sample includes 8,984 individuals of which 6,120 have transcript
information. After dropping records with missing values of income the resulting sam-
ple included 4,841 individuals. By dropping missing observations on the following
variables: average household gross income between 1996 and 1999 (545 observations),
average household income to poverty ratio between 1996 and 1999 (17 observations),
and the number of years of math required to obtain a high school diploma (60 ob-
servations), the final sample size for all the analyses is 4,219. None of the remaining
16Reform indicates whether a state changed the number of years of mathematics required for high
school graduation between 1995 and 2005. Exposure to math reforms was based on the first year
of high school enrollment using the following rules: if the reform year occurred before first year of
enrollment, exposure to math reforms is equal to 4; if the reform year occurred after the last year of
high school enrollment, exposure to math reforms is equal to zero; finally, if the reform year occurred
in between the first and last years of enrollment, exposure to math reforms equals the difference
between the last year of high school enrollment and reform year.
17Cohort is defined as the year individuals entered high school.
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controls have missing values. The weights utilized are the 1997 weights.
Instruments
In this paper I call instruments individual-level measures of exposure to STEM
programs. When the instruments are interacted with state dummies, I call these
variables exclusion restrictions. The first instrument is the number of years of po-
tential exposure to STEM programs while individuals were enrolled in high school.
Throughout this paper this variable is called expo. First, I calculated the first and
last years of potential enrollment in high school; the first year of enrollment is equal
to the birth year plus 1718 and the last year of high school enrollment is the first year
of enrollment plus 3. In this way, the instrument does not depend on actual enroll-
ment which is endogenous but only on potential enrollment which depends on the
year individuals were born. For each individual in the sample, I created a row vector
enrollmentis which is a 1X34 vector with zeros in the years of no enrollment and ones
in the years of potential enrollment. The 34 columns refer to all the years between
1983 to 2016 utilized in the STEM programs data. Thus, expo was calculated by the
following formula:
expo = enrollmentis ∗ A′s (1.1)
It is important to notice that some STEM programs - e.g, scholarship-loans -
will induce individuals to alter their course taking behavior a few years after they
are implemented since they serve individuals who are currently pursuing a teaching
degree. Only after they graduate from college, they work as math and science teachers
in hard-to-staff schools. Other STEM programs (loan forgiveness, salary bonus, and
tuition reimbursement) place teachers at schools immediately.
18Conditional on enrolling in high school, the average age at the year of first enrollment in high
school is a little bit above 16.
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This is an important distinction that will be included in the process of publica-
tion of this paper. For this version, as I will show in the results section, the strength
of association between the exclusion restrictions and the treatment is strong, there-
fore, sufficient to estimate the impact of mathematics credits on education and labor
market outcomes.
Recall that As is a 1X34 row vector with ones on the years in which state s had
STEM programs from 1983 to 2016; 0 otherwise. To assess whether, not only the
presence of STEM programs but also the intensity of the programs induced variation
on math credits and total labor income, I also calculated instruments based on the
number of recipients (Rs) and expenditures (Es) using the following formulas:
expo recipients = enrollmentis ∗R′s (1.2)
expo expenditures = enrollmentis ∗ E ′s (1.3)
In fact, I calculated potential exposure with all possible variations of the instru-
ments as described in section 4.4. The formula was similar:
expo z = enrollmentis ∗ z′s (1.4)
Here zs represents any of the following instruments: recipients per 1,000 teach-
ers, recipients per 1,000 secondary school teachers, recipients per 1,000 students,
recipients per 1,000 high school students, expenditures per teacher, expenditures
per secondary school teacher, expenditures per student and expenditures per high
school student. Because of space limitations, I only include five instruments in
this paper: in1 = expo, in2 = expo recipients, in3 = expo expenditures, in4 =
expo recipients/1, 000teachers, and in5 = expo expenditures/teachers. In section
7 (Robustness checks) I only use expo (in1).
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Since the instruments are time-varying measures of exposure to STEM programs
(years, recipients, expenditures), and also since some instruments also consider the
size of the education system per state-year (number of teachers, number of students,
etc), the instruments already consider the impact of STEM programs on the flow of
teachers, and how this flow induces variations on math credits and income.
Descriptive Statistics
[ Table 1 here ]
Table 1 includes summary statistics of the controls utilized in all the models. The
analysis sample consists of N=4,219 individuals of whom 50% are women; about 73%
are white with an average age at the beginning of the study of about 14.68 years. The
average gross income per household between 1996 and 1999 is about $56,141, and the
household income to poverty ratio, also between 1996 and 1999 was about 3.56. The
average household size in 1997 was about 4.36 and 55 percent of the households had
both biological parents. All the summary statistics are weighted.
[ Table 2 here ]
Table 2 includes descriptive statistics of math credits, total number of credits19,
total labor income at age 28, state-level high school math graduation requirements
in 1997, exposure to math reforms between 1995 and 2005, college attendance and
bachelor’s degree attainment, as well as the number of potential years of exposure to
STEM programs.
On average, the number of Carnegie units of advanced math credits is about 1.03
and the average total number of academic credits is about 16.05. The mean income
(total labor income) at age 28 is about $26,894. On average, the number of years
19The rationale for including total number of credits is that, the interpretation of the estimates is
different depending on whether or not the total number of credits are included.
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of math required to obtain a high school diploma in 1997 was 2.4 and individuals
were exposed 0.65 years to changes in high school math graduation requirements.
Moreover, the average number of years of potential exposure during high school is
2.14. It is noteworthy that the potential exposure to STEM programs varies greatly
from 0 to 4 with a standard deviation of 1.82 years. Finally, 77% of the sample
attended college; 48% attended a 4-year college, and 32% received a bachelor’s degree.
1.4.3 Econometric Model
Exclusion Restrictions
States implemented STEM teacher recruitment programs in different years. Since
the data (NLSY 97) includes individuals from different cohorts20, exposure to these
programs varies within state and across cohorts. In regard to STEM programs, since
there is a huge heterogeneity in benefits (loan forgiveness, financial aid for teachers,
etc), individual eligibility requirements, participating schools’ eligibility requirements,
etc, the most sensible way to predict mathematics credits from exposure to STEM
programs, is by interacting the variable expo (and the other measures of exposure)
with state dummies. In this way, the effects of exposure to STEM programs on math
credits are allowed to vary by state. By including state fixed effects in the first stage
equation and in the outcome equation, these interactions capture the within-state
across-exposure variation; thus, I use the interactions of exposure and state dummies
as exclusion restrictions.21
20Individuals in NLSY 97 were first surveyed when they were 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 years old as of
12/31/1996.
21Exclusion restrictions are the components of the first stage equation that do not ”belong” in the
outcome equation.
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Instrumental Variables (IV/2SLS) Equations
To identify the impact of high school mathematics credits on income, I use vari-
ation that is both within-state and across potential exposure to STEM teacher re-
cruitment programs. In order to measure the impact of math credits on income, I
estimated the following equations in an IV/2SLS framework:
First Stage
Mathi = Xiα +
∑
s
expo zisSisηs + δc + δs + εi (1.5)
Outcome Equation
ln(Incomei) = Xiβ + ρM̂athi + δc + δs + µi (1.6)
In equations (1.5) and (1.6), Xi is the matrix of controls; δc and δs are,
correspondingly, cohort and state fixed effects. The cohorts are defined based on the
year individuals enrolled for the first time in high school.22 In equation (1.5), expo z
represents each of the five measures of exposure previously described (e.g. years of
potential exposure, potential exposure to recipients, etc.). The exclusion restriction
is the term
∑
s expo zisSis in equation (1.5). The variable and parameter of interest
are, correspondingly, Mathi and ρ; the outcome is ln(Incomei). Finally, εi and µi
are error terms. By including state fixed effects in both, the first stage and outcome
equations identification of ρ results from within-state and across-time variation in
exposure to STEM teacher recruitment programs.
22Cohorts are 1994 or before, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 or after.
18
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Impact of potential exposure to STEM programs on Math Credits
and Income
To measure the impact of potential exposure to STEM programs (and other






expoisSisηs +Xiα + +δc + δs + εi (1.7)
[ Table 3 here ]
Table 3 includes the parameter estimates of equation (1.7). For expositional
reasons, I included a trimmed version of table 3; the complete table is located in the
Appendix associated with this paper. In all the columns the dependent variable is
advanced math; the controls are the same as those described in section (1.4). In
each column I utilize a different instrument. For instance, in column 1, I use expo;
in column 2, the instrument is exposure to STEM programs’ recipients; in column 3,
the instrument is exposure to expenditures; in column 4 the instrument is exposure
to recipients per 1,000 teachers, and, in column 5, the instrument is exposure to
expenditures per teacher.
As Table 3 indicates, the impact of expo and the other instruments, on math credits
varies considerably by state. In most cases, the impact is positive, although some
states present negative effects. For each column, I tested the null hypothesis that all
the coefficients of the interactions of the instrument and state dummies are jointly
equal to zero. Because in the 2SLS models I include both math credits and total
credits as endogenous variables, I use the multivariate F-statistic described in
Angrist and Pischke (2009). This F-statistic allows measuring the strength of
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association between each endogenous variable and the exclusion restrictions when
there is more than one endogenous variables. For the five columns, the multivariate
F-statistics were at least 11. These results rule out a weak instruments problem.
A potential concern when clustering the standard errors at the state level is to find
large effects in each state. These effects might be mechanically large due in part to
clustering. Nevertheless, this study is not concerned to provide state-by-state
results. Instead, the important results rely on the average (national) measure of the
impact math on total labor income. For the first stage regression, the most
important part is the AP F-Statistic, instead of individual coefficients by state.
In addition to assessing the impact of the exclusion restrictions on math credits, I
also tested whether the instruments influence total academic credits. Table 4
includes the parameter estimates of the impact of the interactions of the
instruments and state dummies on total academic credits.
[ Table 4 here ]
Table 4 presented here is also a trimmed version of the complete table which can be
found in the Appendix. Overall, Table 4 indicates that there is a strong and positive
effect of exposure to STEM programs on total academic credits. In summary, the
evidence presented indicates that exposure to STEM programs during high school is
a strong predictor of both math and total credit accumulation.
To measure the impact of exposure to STEM programs on total labor income, I





expo zisSisηs +Xiα + +δc + δs + εi (1.8)
In equation (1.8), ln(Incomei) is the natural logarithm of total labor income at age
28.
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[ Table 5 here ]
Table 5 includes the parameter estimates of equation (1.8). For expositional
purposes, I included a trimmed version of table 5; the complete table is located in
the Appendix. The impact of exposure to STEM programs varies greatly by state
and is positive and statistically significant in most cases.
1.5.2 Impact of Math Credits on Income, College Attendance and Bach-
elor’s Degree Attainment
Impact of Math Credits on Income
Table 6 includes the main results of the paper. To model the impact of math credits
on total labor income, I proceeded as follows. First, I assume (momentarily) that
math credits and total credits are exogenous and estimated equation (1.6) using
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). In column 1, the treatment is math, and, in column
2, the treatment variables are math and total credits. In column 3, I assume that
math credits are endogenous and estimate equations (1.5) and (1.6) using the 2SLS
estimator. In column 4, building upon column 3, I assume that total credits are
exogenous and include it as control. Finally, in column 5, I assume that both, math
and total credits are endogenous.
[ Table 6 here ]
The estimates of the impact of math credits on income at age 28 are included in
Table 6. Each coefficient of math (and its corresponding standard error), or
combination of coefficients of math and total academic credits, represents a separate
regression. Table 6 includes 25 separate regressions.
Column (1) indicates that each additional Carnegie unit of math is associated with
an increase in income of about 13%. When the total number of credits is included,
the coefficient of math decreases to 10.2%. Since the estimates in columns (1) and
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(2) are obtained via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the results are likely to be
biased due to the endogeneity of math credits and total credits.
In column (3), each panel represents a different 2SLS estimate that depends on the
instrument utilized. For instance, in panel A, the instrument is number of potential
years of exposure to STEM programs. The parameter estimate of math is about
0.0520 (0.258). In panel B, the instrument is the potential exposure to recipients,
and the coefficient of math is about 0.0805 (0.0653). When the instrument is
potential exposure to expenditures, as in panel C, the coefficient of math is 0.0809
(0.0638). In panel D, the instrument is potential exposure to recipients per 1,000
teachers and the parameter estimate of math is 0.00154 (0.0613), and, finally, in
panel E, the instrument is potential exposure to expenditures per teacher, and the
coefficient of math is 0.0103 (0.0671). The intention to present coefficients and
standard errors in parentheses is due to the fact that, for panels B and C, the
standard errors are borderline to statistical significance whereas in panels A, D and
E, the coefficients are statistically insignificant.
Column (3) of Table 6 includes parameter estimates of the impact of math credits on
income when the total number of credits is excluded. The decision of including the
total number of credits is relevant for the following reasons. First, the interpretation
of the coefficient of math credits changes depending on whether we control for other
subjects’ credits. Second, whereas some studies in the literature control for credits
earned in other subjects (e.g., Altonji, 1995; Levine and Zimmerman, 1995; Rose
and Betts, 2004), other studies do not control for such credits (Joensen and Nielsen,
2009; Goodman, 2012). Specifically, the estimates in Table 6 Column (3) compare
to the coefficients in Joensen and Nielsen (2009) and Goodman (2012). The
coefficients of table 6, columns 4 and 5, compare to the parameter estimates from
Altonji (1995), Levine and Zimmerman (1995) and Rose and Betts (2004).
In Table 6 column (3), panels B and C, I found that for each additional Carnegie
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unit (year) of math during high school, there is an increase in total labor income of
about 8 percent. These results are consistent with Goodman’s (2012) estimates
which are between 5-9% for males but not with the estimates for females. Also, the
estimates in Joensen and Nielsen (2009) are much larger than those in this study
(about 20%); this could be due to differences in education contexts between the US
and Denmark.
Including credits earned in other subjects changes the interpretation of the
coefficient of math. In columns (4) and (5), I control for the total number of credits.
Altonji (1995) included courses taken in math, science, foreign language, commercial
courses, industrial arts, social studies, and fine arts. Levine and Zimmerman (1995)
included math and science courses, and, Rose and Betts (2004) included credits
earned in math subjects such as vocational, pre-algebra, algebra/geometry,
intermediate algebra, advanced algebra, and calculus. Even when none of the
previous studies included total number of credits, I will compare the estimates of
columns (4) and (5) to those in Altonji (1995), Levine and Zimmerman (1995) and,
Rose and Betts (2004).
In Table 6, column (4), I control for total credits but view them as exogenous.
When using the instruments: expo years, expo recipients, expo expenditures, expo
recipients/1,000 teachers, and, expo expenditures/teacher, the corresponding
parameter estimates are 0.051 (0.276), 0.0253 (0.0730), 0.0312 (0.0698), -0.0137
(0.0826) and -0.00231 (0.0886). Again, the first instrument provides large estimates
and standard errors. For the other four instruments, the increase in income that
follows from an additional year of math varies between -1.3% and 5% although
imprecisely measured.
The estimates that are comparable to those in Altonji (1995), Levine and
Zimmerman (1995) and Rose and Betts (2004) are those in table 6, column 5 since
both math credits and total credits are considered endogenous and, therefore,
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instrumented for using the interactions of the instruments and state dummies. For
the instruments, expo, expo recipients, expo expenditures, expo recipients/1,000
teachers, and, expo expenditures/teacher the corresponding coefficients of math
credits are 0.0831 (0.302), 0.0322 (0.0876), 0.0386 (0.0858), 0.0144 (0.0955) and
0.0281 (0.102). The estimates are smaller than the coefficients of algebra/geometry
in Rose and Betts (2004), but larger to those in Altonji (1995) and Levine and
Zimmerman (1995). My preferred set of specifications is column 5 because, in all
cases, math credits and total credits are considered endogenous.
The main results of the paper are: for each additional Carnegie unit of advanced
math earned during high school, holding the total number of credits constant, there
is an increase in total labor income between 1.4% to 8%. More specifically, three out
of five instruments provide a consistent return of about 3%.
Impact of Math Credits on College Attendance and Bachelor’s Degree
Attainment
A potential mechanism that explains the strong positive relationship between math
credits during high school and total labor income at age 28 is college attendance
and degree attainment. Individuals who are induced to obtain additional math
credits may be more likely to attend, and subsequently, to graduate from college.
Given that the instruments produce variation in math credits, in other words, the
first stage relationship is not zero, in this section, I examine the impact of advanced
mathematics credits on college attendance and bachelor’s degree attainment.
I estimate the impact of math credits on three (binary) college outcomes: ever
attended college, ever attended a 4-year college and, bachelor’s degree attainment.
First, I estimated a probit model with endogenous variables via the Stata command
ivprobit. With the estimated coefficients, I calculated the probability of a positive
outcome for all members of the sample P̂i[Y = 1|math,X,Z]. Next, I calculated a
new variable which adds 1 unit to the actual number of math credits (math+ 1),
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and calculated the probability of a positive outcome for each person in the sample
P̂i[Y = 1|math+ 1, X, Z] conditional on math+ 1 and, holding all other variables
constant. Finally, calculated the difference between these two probabilities
P̂i[Y = 1|math+ 1, X, Z]− P̂i[Y = 1|math,X,Z] for all i. The average of
P̂i[Y = 1|math+ 1, X, Z]− P̂i[Y = 1|math,X,Z] across all i represents the average
marginal derivative of the impact of math on Y . The standard errors were obtained








[P̂i[Y = 1|math+ 1, X, Z]− P̂i[Y = 1|math,X,Z]] (1.9)
Table 7 includes the average marginal derivatives for the three college outcomes.
[ Table 7 here ]
The results indicate that for each additional Carnegie unit of math, the probability
to attend college increases by 0.0792 (0.0389), the probability to attend a 4-year
college raises by 0.1127 (0.0472) and, the probability to obtain a bachelor’s degree
increases by 0.0882 (0.0488). Even though these results might seem large, they are
consistent with the current, although scarce literature that examines the impact of
high school math credits on college outcomes. For instance, Aughinbaugh (2012), by
implementing a household fixed-effects identification strategy in NLSY97 data,
examined the impact of advanced high school math credits (algebra 2 and up) on
college attendance. She found that students who take advanced math during high
school are 17 percent points more likely to attend college and 20 percentage points
more likely to start college at a 4-year institution.
In addition, Long, Conger and Iatarola (2012), by using propensity score matching
techniques in data from the state of Florida, examined the impact of high school
curriculum on a number of education outcomes. They found that students who take
23Due to time limitations, this process was only performed with the first instrument: expo years.
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level 3 math (mix of honors, upper-level, AP, International Baccalaureate (IB)) are
10 to 15 percentage points more likely to attend a 4-year college. Finally, Levine
and Zimmerman (1995) found smaller results. They examined the impact of the
number of math and science courses on the probability to attend and to graduate
from college. They found that, for each additional math course taken during high
school the probability to attend college increases by 0.02 for males and 0.027 for
females. Also, the probability to graduate from college increases by 0.027 for men
and 0.046 for women.
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I examine how the parameter estimates of the impact of advanced
math on income change when using different model specifications. The preferred
specification was presented in Table 6. In Table 9 the model specification does not
include the two household income measures, household gross income between
1996-1999 and household income to poverty ratio between 1996-1999.
[ Table 9 here ]
As Table 9 indicates, the 2SLS estimates in panel A are much bigger than the
corresponding OLS estimates. In panels B and C the estimates are slightly smaller
than their OLS counterparts. Panels D and E present more credible results in which
the parameter estimates vary between 0.5% and 5%. The rationale of this
specification is to gauge the sensitivity of the estimates and standard errors when
the variables that measure household income when individuals were enrolled in high
school were not included.
Compared to the preferred specification (table 6), by not controlling for household
income variables we incur in an omitted variable bias problem which it is not solved
by the instruments at hand. If the error term in equation (6) has the form
µi = famincomei + νi, where famincomei and νi are orthogonal, by not including
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famincomei, we could still solve the problem of the correlation between νi and
mathi but the correlation between famincomei and mathi will induce bias in the
parameter estimates. By including family income variables, I net out the impact of
math on individual income from the impact of the family income on individual
income.
[ Table 10 here ]
Since the variables household gross income 1996-1999 and income to poverty ratio
1996-1999 by construction depend on whether the household includes two parents or
only one parent (widow, separated or divorced), these variables might have
measurement error. In the third model specification, I interacted the variable both
biological parents with both variables, household gross income 1996-1999 and
income to poverty ratio 1996-1999. The results are included in Table 10. In this
specification, the sample size is the same as in the preferred specification (4,219).
When using expo as the instrument, panel A shows that for each additional year of
advanced math there is an increase of total labor income between 1% and 3%. The
standard errors are quite large. When the instruments are exposure to STEM
program recipients and exposure to expenditures, as shown in panels B and C, the
2SLS estimates vary between 3% to 8%. Unlike, panel A, the standard errors are
much smaller. Interestingly, panels D and E include negative 2SLS estimates. This
specification provides very similar results to those from the first (preferred)
specification.
[ Table 11 here ]
Finally, in table 11 instead of discarding the observations for which the variables
household gross income 1996-1999 and household income to poverty ratio 1996-1999
are missing, I replaced the missing values by zeros. The sample increased to 4,771
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and the results indicate that, for panel A, the increase of income for each additional
year of advanced math is about 30%. Similar to table 9, table 11-Panel B indicates
that the 2SLS estimates are slightly below their corresponding OLS estimates. In
addition, panels D and E present 2SLS estimates that vary between 2% and 5%.
Even when replacing missing by zeros might increase efficiency by increasing the
sample size, by including these observations the parameter estimates vary greatly
across the different instruments. Assuming that these missing values are randomly
distributed the parameter estimates in table 6 are the most credible.
Impact of math credits on total labor income via college attendance and
degree attainment
In this section, I attempt to measure the proportion of the effect of math on income
that is due to the effect of math on bachelor’s degree attainment. The idea is to
combine information on returns to obtaining a bachelor’s degree with the impact of
math credits on the probability of bachelor’s degree attainment presented in this
paper.
Define Ei[m̂ath] to be the earnings of individual i who obtains the average amount
of advanced math credits in high school. For simplicity, assume24 that there are
only two groups in the population: high school graduates and bachelor’s degree
recipients. Then, earnings take the form:
E[Y |m̂ath]i = E[Y |m̂ath]BAPr[BA|m̂ath] + E[Y |m̂ath]HSPr[HS|m̂ath]
For simplicity define E[Y |m̂ath]BA = EBA, E[Y |m̂ath]HS = EHS as the average
earnings of four-year college graduates and high school graduates respectively. Also,
Pr[BA] and Pr[HS] are the probabilities of being in each group. The previous
equation can be transformed to:
24This assumption is reasonable because it is unlikely that the instrument will induce high school








Since the returns to education literature estimates that each year toward a
bachelor’s degree raises earnings by about 10% (Card, 1999; Carneiro, Heckman and
Vytlacil, 2011), then EBA/EHS = 1.4 assuming 4 years of college. We want to
calculate the increase in earnings that is due to increases in the probability of
receiving a bachelor’s degree. Adding one year of advanced math credits we have:
Ei[m̂ath+ 1]
EHS





= 1.4(Pr′[BA]− Pr[BA]) + (Pr′[HS]− Pr[HS])
By assumption:Pr′[BA]− Pr[BA] = −(Pr′[HS]− Pr[HS]) because there are only











= 0.4(0.0882) = 0.035
The increase in earnings that is channeled via the increases in the probability of
attaining a bachelors degree would be about 3.5%. In table 6, the preferred
estimates are about 3%. Thus, the effect of math on income can be explained
through the effect of math on bachelor’s degree attainment.
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1.5.3 Compliant sub-population
In this paper I estimate weighted Local Average Treatment Effects (LATEs); in
other words, the average effect of an additional credit of math courses only for the
population of compliers. Compliers are defined as individuals who are induced by
the instrument to change their course-taking behavior. Unlike compliers, another
set of people are called always-takers since no matter if states implement STEM
teacher recruitment programs or the number of years they have been exposed to
such programs; they always will choose a certain level - presumably high - of math
courses. The last group, called never-takers will not change the number of math
courses - probably low - regardless of whether or not States implemented teacher
recruitment programs or the number of years they have been exposed to such
programs. In general, it is not possible to identify individual compliers. However, it
is plausible to characterize the complier sub-population.
Given that, the estimates in this study are weighted Local Average Treatment
Effects (LATE), in order to understand what are the characteristics of the
individuals for which the results in this paper are relevant, I characterize the
sub-population of compliers.
Complier Characteristics; Abadie’s (2003) Kappa Weighting Method
I use Abadie’s (2003) Kappa weighting method to determine the average






In equation (1.10), E[xi|complier] represents the average of xi only for compliers; κi
are the weights that allow the characterization of the complier sub-population.
Since neither the instrument nor the treatment are binary, in order to estimate the
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kappa weights I recoded both as binary. The kappa weights are obtained as follows:
κi = 1−
Di(1− zi)




In (1.11) zi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual has ever been exposed
to STEM teacher recruitment programs and 0 otherwise; Di is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the number of math credits is larger than or equal to its mean; 0
otherwise. By using Abadie’s kappas, I estimated the mean of several variables and
compared them with the mean of the same variables for the entire population.
[ Table 8 here ]
Table 8 includes the means of some variables for the entire sample and for the
sub-population of compliers. The third column is the ratio of the two. These results
should be interpreted as follows: for example, the probability of randomly choosing
a women from the group of compliers is 53% whereas the probability of randomly
choosing a women from the general population is 50%; thus, it is slightly more likely
to find a women in the population of compliers than in the entire sample. The
proportion of white individuals in the sub-population of compliers is 60% whereas
the same proportion for the entire sample is about 73%. Compliers are slightly
younger than the entire sample; their families have more family members; the
proportion of families with both biological parents is almost the same as in the
entire population; they enjoy less household income between 1996 and 1999; and the
income to poverty ratio between 1996 and 1999 is slightly smaller for compliers.
Roughly speaking, the compliers are more likely to be non-white and to come from
more disadvantaged backgrounds. These preliminary results are consistent with the
underlying mechanism through which the instruments induce students to earn
additional math credits. Some STEM programs are intended to increase the supply
of teachers in low-performing and hard-to-staff schools. These schools serve a
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disproportionately non-white and poorer population when compared to schools that
don’t receive STEM programs participants.
1.6 Robustness checks
In this section I address some threats to the validity and generalizability of the
results. First, is the effect of STEM programs on total labor income also present
outside NLSY 97? The STEM programs should impact earnings when examined in
alternative data sets.
Second, the hypothesized mechanism through which STEM programs impact high
school math credits is via the increase in the number of teachers available. A
natural question is, what is the impact of STEM programs on the probability of
teaching of a random individual? In other words, do STEM programs increase the
supply of teachers? If STEM programs do not increase the number25 of available
teachers, it would be hard to argue that students will increase their math
course-load, and consequently, there would be a violation of the exclusion restriction
since there exists another mechanism - different from increasing math credits -
though which STEM programs influence earnings.
Third, another potential violation of the exclusion restriction is the possibility that
states implemented STEM teacher programs because economic conditions such as
poverty or unemployment were good or bad. A similar argument is that states
implemented STEM teacher programs because the wages in (STEM) occupations
were good. In this case, the implementation or elimination of STEM programs
would not be exogenous, and therefore, these decisions would be correlated to
economic conditions, and consequently, there would exist an alternative mechanism
that explains the impact of STEM programs on income, different from the increase
25STEM programs might also change the distribution of teacher quality of the teaching body;
although it would be hard to think that quality can go up via STEM programs.
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in math credits.
Fourth, a final mechanism that is not addressed in this paper is that STEM
programs not only increase the number of teachers but also the composition of
teacher characteristics. For instance, if STEM programs place not only more
teachers but also better teachers and the new teachers provide students with
additional motivation and information regarding their college application processes,
this would violate the exclusion restriction. If this is the case, the increase in income
would not be driven exclusively by increases in math teachers and the corresponding
increases in math credits, but also by other factors such as motivation and
information, which excellent teachers tend to provide to their students.
Unfortunately, the available data does not allow me to address this potential
violation of the exclusion restriction.
1.6.1 Is the effect of STEM programs on income idiosyncratic to NLSY?
How can we be sure that the impact of STEM teacher recruitment programs on
income prevails when using larger data sets? We could think that the sample from
which the estimates of this paper are drawn includes some idiosyncratic features
that prevent the generalization of the results. The NLSY 97 sample includes less
than 9,000 individuals out of which the estimation sample utilizes 4,219. In this
section, I address this concern by measuring the impact of STEM teacher programs
on different measures of earnings at different stages in the life cycle, by estimating
the reduced form equations on larger data sets. To measure the impact of STEM
programs on earnings, I use two sources of data: Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) and the American Community Survey (ACS).
SIPP 2008
The SIPP is a study administered by the Census Bureau which surveys households
to form a continuous series of national panels. Each panel includes a nationally
33
representative sample interviewed over a period of about four years. The main goal
of the SIPP is the examination of the distribution of income and participation in
government programs. Even though the SIPP permits longitudinal analyses, I use a
cross-section of the base year 2008. As measure of earnings, I use total household
monthly income. The data also includes controls such as year of birth, gender, race,
state and poverty level.
ACS 2009
The American Community Survey (ACS) also provides information on education and
income. In this study, I use data from 2009. The output is personal yearly wages,
and the controls are educational attainment, year of birth, gender, race, state and
poverty level.
Impact of exposure to STEM programs during high school on earnings
For the two samples, SIPP 2008 and ACS 2009, I estimated the following equation26:
ln(Earningsi) = expoisη +Xiα + γs + γc + εi (1.12)
In equation (1.12) the treatment is expo which is defined as the number of years
of potential exposure to STEM teacher recruitment program for individual i. To
calculate expo, I followed the same method as in section (1.4).27 In ACS 09, the
measure of earnings is personal yearly wages and the matrix Xi includes female,
white, black, Asian (the reference category is other), birth year and poverty; the
number of years required for graduation in 1997 and the number of years exposed to
changes to these requirements. For SIPP 08, the measure of earnings is household
26The equation with interactions of expo and state dummies was also estimated; the estimates are
located in the Appendix.
27The vector of potential high school enrollment is based on the birth year; the result is a 1X34
row vector with ones on the years of potential enrollment and 0 otherwise. The 34 columns refer to
the 34 years from 1983 to 2016 for which I have information of STEM programs.
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monthly income; the matrix Xi includes female, white, birth year, poverty, high
school graduation requirements in 1997 and number of years exposed to changes to
high school graduation requirements.
To measure the impact of potential exposure to STEM teacher recruitment pro-
grams on earnings at different stages in the life cycle, I estimated equation (1.12)
for the following samples: between 28 and 29 years old (to be consistent with the
NLSY97 results), between 30 and 35 years old, and between 36 and 40 years old.
[ Tables 4-5 Appendix here ]
Table 4 in the Appendix includes the parameter estimates of equation (1.12) for
ACS. For the cohort 28-29, each additional year of potential exposure during high
school to STEM programs is associated with an increase in personal yearly wages
of about 0.021%. For the cohorts 30-35 and 36-40, the corresponding estimates are
0.0083% and 0.00016%. When using SIPP 08, as table 5 in the Appendix indicates,
the increases in monthly household income for the cohorts 28-29, 30-35 and 36-40,
associated with a unit increase in expo are, respectively, 0.15%, 0.046%, and 0.13%.
The estimates vary widely by state as indicated in tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix.
The main conclusion of this section is that potential exposure to STEM teacher
programs does influence earnings in bigger and more robust data sets. For ACS 09,
the estimate for the cohort of 28-29 years old is about 0.02% and for SIPP 08, the
corresponding result is about 0.16%. These estimates rule out the possibility that the
impact of exposure to STEM programs on earnings, is specific to NLSY 97.
1.6.2 Do STEM programs increase teachers’ labor supply?
The working hypothesis of this paper is that the mechanism through which STEM
programs influence mathematics credits is via increasing the number of teachers avail-
able. Assuming all else remains the same, (e.g., current math teachers are not assigned
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to teach other subjects or current teachers do not decrease the number of hours they
teach), the influx of new teachers should increase course offerings within receiving
schools. This might increase students’ math course taking. Some students (compli-
ers) will be induced to take math courses that they otherwise would not take. If STEM
programs do not increase teachers’ supply, then, there is a violation of the exclusion
restriction since the impact of STEM programs on earnings cannot be channeled via
increases in math credits.
To measure the impact of STEM programs on the probability of teaching I esti-
mate the following equation:
Teachi = expo collegeisη +Xiα + γs + γc + εi (1.13)
I estimate equation (1.13) using NLSY 97, ACS 09, and SIPP 08. For NLSY 97,
there are two outcomes - represented by Teachi. First, Teachi is a dummy variable
that indicates whether or not individual i has ever taught. Second, Teachi indicates
whether or not individual i taught during 2013 (last observation period). For ACS
09, Teachi equals 1 if individual i, during 2009, has one of the following occupa-
tions: Elementary and Middle School Teacher, Secondary School Teacher, Special
Education Teacher, Other Teachers and Instructors and Teacher Assistants; 0 other-
wise. For SIPP 08, Teachi indicates whether the occupation of individual i is one of
the following: Preschool and kindergarten, Elementary and middle school, Secondary
school teachers, Special education teachers, Other teachers and instructors, Teacher
assistants, Other education occupations.
The treatment is expo college which measures the potential years of exposure to
STEM programs during college and is defined similar to expo with the only difference
that the first year of college enrollment is calculated by adding 19 to the birth year.
The matrix Xi includes the same controls as in the previous section. State fixed
effects were included.
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[ Tables 8-10 Appendix here ]
As table 8 in the Appendix indicates, for NLSY 97, the impact of expo college
on ever teaching is positive, although statistically insignificant of about 1 percentage
point; whereas when the outcome is teacher in 2013 the results are much smaller,
about 0.18 percentage points. For ACS 09, as Table 9 in the Appendix indicates, the
impacts of exposure during college on teaching for the three groups [28-29], [30-35]
and [36-40] are positive, statistically significant of about 0.6, 0.5 and 0.26 percentage
points respectively. Table 10 in the Appendix includes the parameter estimates of
the impact of exposure during college on teaching using the SIPP 08 sample; the
coefficients for the [28-29] and [30-35] groups are positive and statistically significant
of about 1.1 and 1 percentage points respectively. For the group of 36-40, the impact
is still positive but insignificant of about 0.4 percentage points.
In the Appendix, in tables 13-15, the effects are allowed to vary by state; in
most cases the impacts are positive, and, in some states, statistically significant. In
summary, potential exposure during college to STEM programs is associated with
a higher probability of teaching. The impacts vary across samples, but consistently
they lie between 0.1 and 1.1 percentage points. In fact, when the effects vary by
state, the estimates are much bigger. Since some STEM programs intend to recruit
new teachers, while individuals are enrolled in college via incentives such as loan
forgiveness, signing bonuses, etc. the impacts of exposure to these programs while
in college are observed in the data, not only in NLSY but also in bigger and more
robust data sets.
Impact of STEM programs on the number of teachers
To examine the impact of STEM programs on the per-state number of teachers,
I built a panel dataset from 1983 to 2016 with the following variables: state, year,
STEMst (1 indicates whether state s has at least one active STEM program in year
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t; 0 otherwise), number of teachers in K-12, number of secondary teachers, number
of students in K-12 and number of high school students. The data was obtained from
the public files of the National Center of Education Statistics (NCES), Common
Core of Data (CCD). By exploiting the panel nature of these variables, I estimated
the following equation using the state fixed-effects estimator:
yst = β0 + β1STEMst + β2Xst + γs + γt + νst (1.14)
In equation (1.14), yst represents one of the following three outcomes: total num-
ber of teachers, total number of secondary teachers and total number of elementary
teachers; Xst includes two controls: the total number of students and the total number
of high school students. State and year fixed effects were included.
[ Table 11 Appendix here ]
Table 11 in the Appendix includes the parameter estimates of equation (1.14). The
impact of STEM programs on the number of elementary teachers is negative of about
-25 (-0.09%); the impact on the number of secondary teachers is positive although
insignificant of about 1,443 (6.9%28) and the impact on the total number of teachers
is also positive and insignificant of about 1,357 (2.6%). Table 11 in the Appendix
includes the estimates of equation (1.14) when the outcome is the natural logarithm
of the three different measures of the number of teachers. The results indicate that
only for secondary teachers the estimate is positive although statistically insignificant.
In summary, STEM programs increase the number of teachers available, especially
secondary school teachers. These results will contribute to the literature on the impact
of financial incentives aimed to recruit and retain teachers. Even though this study
does not address any specific financial aid program, it provides an aggregate measure
of the impact of financial incentives on both the probability of teaching and on the
28When compared to the mean.
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number of teachers.
1.6.3 Did states implement STEM teacher programs because economic
conditions were good or bad?
Were states’ decisions to implement STEM teacher programs influenced by the
wage rates of occupations that inherently use high levels of mathematics? For ex-
ample, if some occupations were booming, and thus, the wage rates were high, some
state officials might be induced to implement STEM teacher recruitment programs
to increase the number of teachers in the market and, consequently, to better pre-
pare their student population. Similarly, were states’ decisions to implement or to
eliminate STEM programs influenced by the state’s economic conditions such as the
unemployment rate and percent in poverty? For instance, if the economy is healthy
and states have more money to spend on education, do they do it by increasing the
supply of teachers?
In any event, if states’ decisions to implement STEM programs were based either
on the wage rates of math-oriented occupations or state-level economic conditions, the
instrument would not be valid. The impact of STEM programs on earnings would
be driven by the correlation of STEM programs with other factors rather than by
increases in math credits, thus violating the exclusion restriction.
To empirically address these two questions, I built a panel of states between 1983 to
2016 with the following variables: mean hourly wage rates, median hourly wage rates,
mean annual wages and median annual wages for all occupations. Also, I calculated
the same variables for the following occupations: Engineering, Mathematics, Business,
Health, Education and Law. All the wages data were obtained from the BLS and
adjusted for inflation ($2011 USD). In addition to the wage data, I also included the
percent in poverty from the Census Bureau and the unemployment rate from the
BLS. Finally, I merged the variable STEMst which as previously mentioned, is equal
to 1 in the years that states had at least one STEM program active and 0 otherwise.
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In this analysis I model states’ choices to implement STEM programs as a function
of states’ economic measures. To do so, I estimate the following equation by using
the within fixed effects estimator:
STEMst = δ0 + δ1Econst + γs + γt + µst (1.15)
In equation (1.15), Econst represents each one of the economic variables detailed
above. In addition to STEMst, I also led this variable one and two years into the
future; in this way, I would capture any ramp-up effect. As table 16 Appendix
indicates, there is no statistically significant effect of any of the economic indicators
included on states’ decisions to implement or eliminate STEM programs. The only
statistically significant parameter is the contemporaneous effect of percent on poverty
on STEM. Again, since the two variables are measured in the same year, it is unlikely
that an increase in the proportion of poor people in the state, would lead to state
governments to implement STEM programs.
[ Tables 16-17 Appendix here ]
When Econst represents field-specific wages - as shown in table 17 Appendix -
the results are mixed. There is a positive effect of wages in Business occupations on
the probability to implement STEM programs. For Law the effect is negative. No
statistically significant effect was found for Engineering, Math, Health and Education.
In conclusion, there is no discernible effect of economic conditions on states’ decisions
to implement STEM programs.
1.6.4 Do STEM programs induce more teachers but not different teach-
ers?
If a STEM program besides increasing the quantity of math teachers, also raises
the quality of teachers, this could be problematic. In an extreme case, assume that
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a state implements a STEM program which for various reasons did not increase the
number of teachers. Instead, it changed the composition of teachers such that, the
new group of teachers is highly motivated, has access to more resources, and, has up-
to-date knowledge. Also, the new set of teachers also has more updated information
about college application procedures and financial aid options than the pre-STEM
teachers. Most likely, individuals exposed to the post-STEM teachers would change
their behaviors in ways that will lead them to higher earnings later in life, without
increasing their math credits. In this case, the STEM program influenced earnings
via another mechanism other than boosting the number of math credits; this is a
direct violation of the exclusion restriction.
If STEM programs induce variations in both, the quantity and quality of teachers,
then an alternative interpretation of the results is pertinent. As long as the impact of
STEM programs on earnings is channeled via the gain in math credits, either because
there are more teachers, or because there are better teachers who induce individuals
to earn more math credits, the results are valid. Unfortunately, with the data at hand,
it is not possible to test whether STEM programs have changed the distribution of
teacher characteristics.
1.7 Conclusions
By exploiting variations in the supply side of the education system as determinants of
education choices (Card, 2001), this study contributes to the literature that examines
the impact of high school math credits on education and labor market outcomes
in a number of ways. First, this study shows that programs that aimed to recruit
teachers to work in shortage (geographic and subject) areas do impact high school
math choices. Second, this study presents evidence of the private economic returns
of high school math credits ( 3%). Third, this paper also provides evidence of the
causal impact of high school math credits on college attendance (8 pp), 4-year college
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attendance (11 pp) and bachelor’s degree attainment (9pp). Finally, although it is
not the primary purpose of this study, this paper presents estimates of the aggregate
impact of STEM teacher recruitment programs on the probability of teaching (0.5%-
1%).
The main result of the paper is that each additional Carnegie unit of advanced
math increases total labor income at age 28 by about 3%. To get an idea of the relative
magnitude of the estimates in this study, I compare them with the conventional
wisdom from the returns to education literature. In particular, the returns to college
education is a well-studied topic.
By using NLSY79, Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011) estimated the returns
to college education by comparing earnings of college graduates versus earnings of
high school graduates. They utilized various instruments such as the the presence
of a college in the county of residence at 14, local earnings and local unemployment
in the area of residence at 17, and average tuition in public 4 year colleges in the
county of residence at 17 (interacted with AFQT, mothers education and number of
siblings). In their preferred specification, the return to one year of college education
is 9.51%. Other estimates vary between 5.6% and 17.36%.
Also, Card (2001) reviewed the literature of the returns to college education and
included 11 studies that exploited variations on the supply side of the school sys-
tem as predictors of education choices. The IV estimates of the return to a year of
college education vary between 0.06 to 0.245 although the majority of the estimates
lie between 0.10 and 0.15. Finally, in a Bookings Institution study, Greenstone and
Looney (2011) compared the returns to a college education to other investments such
as the stock market, bonds, gold and Treasury bills. They concluded that investment
in college provides the best return of all of about 15%. For comparison purposes,
I consider that the return to one year of college education varies between 10% and
15%.
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Taking the estimates in Table 6 one additional Carnegie unit of math yields a
return of 3%. Let’s recall that the treatment variable is advanced math which
includes Algebra 2, trigonometry, pre-calculus, calculus, statistics, AP-calculus and
AP-statistics. These courses are college preparatory, and, in many cases college stu-
dents take them. Thus, since obtaining an extra year of advanced math content,
knowledge and skills during high school yields a 3% return, this estimate is consistent
with the return to the average return to a year worth of college education: between
10% and 15%. I acknowledge that I am comparing high school math versus col-
lege education which by definition reference different populations of individuals. The
main goal of this comparison is to place the results obtained in this study within the
range of a well identified and consistently estimated parameter: the returns to college
education.
The results obtained in this paper are consistent with some studies in the literature
in terms of both, magnitude and precision. As previously mentioned, from Table 6,
column (3), the returns to math credits when total credits are excluded is about 5%.
This estimate is consistent with Goodman’s (2012) estimates for males (5%-9%), but
smaller than the coefficients in Joensen and Nielsen (2009) of about 20%. When
including total credits, as Table 3, column (5) the results indicate that the return to
math credits is about 3%. This value is smaller than the returns to algebra/geometry
in Rose and Betts (2004) of about 8%, but inconsistent with all other math courses.
Finally, the results differ from those in Altonji (1995) and Levine and Zimmerman
(1995).
In addition to the estimates of the economic returns to high school math credits,
this study also provides evidence of the impact of math credits on college outcomes.
The impacts on: college attendance (8 pp), 4-year college attendance (11 pp), and,
bachelor’s degree attainment (9 pp) are also consistent with the literature. Aughin-
baugh (2012) found that students who take advanced math increase their probability
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to attend college by 17 percentage points, and the probability to attend a 4-year col-
lege by 20 percent points. Long, Conger and Iatarola (2012) also found increases in
the probability to attend a 4-year college of about 10 to 15 pp when taking advanced
math.
Finally, unlike Goodman (2012) who studies the impact of high school math re-
forms on mathematics course-taking and earnings - an imposition of a constraint -,
this study examines the opposite: the effects of a relaxation of a constraint faced
by some students: the availability of teachers, courses, course-sections, etc. Since
some states invest heavily on recruiting and retaining teachers in shortage areas, the
estimates presented in this study are more similar to the studies presented in Card
(2001) than to studies in the current returns to math credits literature.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics Analysis Sample N= 4,219. Controls.
Variable Mean Sd Min Max
Demographics
female 0.50 0.50 0 1
white 0.73 0.44 0 1
age as of 12-31-1996 14.68 1.10 13 16
Family




3.56 3.05 0.01 32.27
ratio 1996-1999
household size 1997 4.36 1.42 2 16
both bio parents in house-
hold
0.55 0.50 0 1
Cohort
cohort1995 0.28 0.45 0 1
cohort1996 0.25 0.43 0 1
cohort1997 0.21 0.41 0 1
cohort1998 0.08 0.28 0 1
cohort1999 0.01 0.12 0 1
All the means are calculated using the 1997 weights.
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Table 1.2:
Summary Statistics Analysis Sample N= 4,219. Treatment, Outcome,
High School Graduation Requirements and Math Reforms and Instru-
ment.
Variable Mean Sd Min Max
Mathematics Credits
Advanced math credits 1.03 1.11 0 7.50
Total Credits
Total Academic Credits 16.05 6.20 0 33.50
Income age 28
income age 28 $26,894 $19,194 $2.70 $128,535
College attendance and BA/BS
attainment
Ever attended any college 0.77 0.42 0 1
Ever attended a 4-year college 0.48 0.50 0 1
Received BA/BS diploma 0.32 0.47 0 1
HS Math Graduation Require-
ments
and Reforms
high school graduation req (mathemat-
ics)
2.40 0.58 1 4
years exposed to math reforms 0.65 1.35 0 4
Instrument
expo: years of potential exposure to
STEM programs
2.14 1.82 0 4
(during high school)
All the means are calculated using the 1997 weights.
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Table 1.3:
First Stage: Impact of interactions of potential years of exposure to STEM programs time-varying
characteristics and state dummies on advanced mathematics credits controlling for demographics,
household characteristics, high school math graduation requirements, and state and cohort fixed effects.
Please refer to the Appendix for the complete table.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
expo expo expo expo recip/ expo
years recipients expend. 1,000 teach exp/teacher
in*state 7 0.224*** 0.00282*** 6.74e-07*** 0.107*** 0.0257***
(0.0359) (0.000578) (1.37e-07) (0.0217) (0.00561)
in*state 19 0.0233 0.00121 1.64e-07 -0.000307 0.000790
(0.0594) (0.00241) (3.24e-07) (0.110) (0.0160)
in*state 34 0.147*** 6.85e-05*** 1.91e-08*** 0.00533*** 0.00154***







N 4,219 4,219 4,219 4,219 4,219
Math 1.026 1.026 1.026 1.026 1.026
AP F stat 11.39 101.89 95.8 115.54 106.9
p-value 0.0015 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
State-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OLS regressions in which
the dependent variable is advanced math credits; the treatment variables are the interactions of in and state dummies.
in1-in5 measure potential years of exposure to: (1) STEM programs, (2) recipients, (3) expenditures, (4) recipients/1,000
teachers, and (5) expenditure/teacher. State and cohort fixed effects were also included. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis
of joint significance of the coefficients of the interactions of in and state dummies. All regressions use the 1997 weights.
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Table 1.4:
First Stage: Impact of interactions of potential years of exposure to STEM programs time-varying
characteristics and state dummies on Total Credits controlling for demographics, household char-
acteristics, high school math graduation requirements and state and cohort fixed effects. Please refer
to the Appendix for the complete table.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
expo expo expo expo recip/ expo
years recipients expend. 1,000 teach exp/teacher
in*state 7 0.853*** 0.0112*** 2.67e-06*** 0.390*** 0.0891***
(0.167) (0.00269) (6.41e-07) (0.111) (0.0282)
in*state 19 2.068*** 0.0667*** 8.99e-06*** 2.979*** 0.389***
(0.296) (0.0120) (1.62e-06) (0.580) (0.0825)
in*state 34 0.438*** 0.000189** 4.54e-08** 0.0122* 0.00270







N 4,219 4,219 4,219 4,219 4,219
Total credits 16.05 16.05 16.05 16.05 16.05
State-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OLS regressions in which
the dependent variable is total credits; the treatment variables are the interactions of in and state dummies. in1-
in5 measure potential years of exposure to: (1) STEM programs, (2) recipients, (3) expenditures, (4) recipients/1,000




Reduced Form: Impact of interactions of potential years of exposure to STEM programs time-
varying characteristics and state dummies on ln(Income age 28) controlling for demographics,
household characteristics, high school math graduation requirements and state and cohort fixed ef-
fects. Please refer to the Appendix for the complete table.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
expo expo expo expo recip/ expo
years recipients expend. 1,000 teach exp/teacher
in*state 4 -0.0547* 0.0505*** 3.51e-06*** 0.747*** 0.132***
(0.0289) (0.00274) (1.87e-07) (0.0945) (0.0158)
in*state 5 -0.0218 0.00131*** 1.49e-07*** 0.0434*** 0.0119***
(0.0136) (7.52e-05) (7.87e-09) (0.0156) (0.00416)
in*state 6 0.0297 0.000147* 8.12e-08* 0.00297 0.00205
(0.0187) (8.37e-05) (4.69e-08) (0.00434) (0.00230)
in*state 7 -0.104*** -0.00115*** -2.76e-07*** -0.0611*** -0.0140***
(0.0250) (0.000343) (8.21e-08) (0.0154) (0.00348)
in*state 8 0.0446*** 0.00230 3.25e-07 0.00437 -9.26e-05







N 4,219 4,219 4,219 4,219 4,219
Mean Income $26,894 $26,894 $26,894 $26,894 $26,894
State-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OLS regressions in which
the dependent variable is ln(income age 28); the treatment variables are the interactions of in and state dummies.
in1-in5 measure potential years of exposure to: (1) STEM programs, (2) recipients, (3) expenditures, (4) recipients/1,000
teachers, and (5) expenditure/teacher. State and cohort fixed effects were also included. All regressions use the 1997
weight.
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Table 1.6: Impact of mathematics credits on log income. N=4,219
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A. instrument: expo years
math 0.130*** 0.102*** 0.0520 0.0501 0.0831





Panel B. instrument: expo recipients
math 0.130*** 0.102*** 0.0805 0.0253 0.0322





Panel C. instrument: expo expenditures
math 0.130*** 0.102*** 0.0809 0.0312 0.0386





Panel D. instrument: expo recipients/1,000 teachers
math 0.130*** 0.102*** 0.00154 -0.0137 0.0144





Panel E. instrument: expo expenditures/teacher
math 0.130*** 0.102*** 0.0103 -0.00231 0.0281





State-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05,
***p<0.001. Regressions are weighted. Monetary measures in 2011 dollars. In all
the 2SLS equations the exclusion restrictions are the interactions of the instruments
and state dummies.State and cohort dummies were included in all the models.
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Table 1.7:
Impact of mathematics credits on college attended and bachelors
degree attainment.
(1) (2) (3)
Ever college Ever 4-year college BA attainment
dPr[Y = 1|X,Z]/dmath 0.0792 0.1127 .0882
Bootstrap s.e. (0.0389) (.0472) (.0488)
Average marginal derivatives of three measures of college outcomes. In column 1,
the outcome is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not individuals ever at-
tended any college. In column 2, the outcome is a dummy variable that indicates
whether or not individuals attended a 4-year college and, in column 3, the outcome
is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not individuals obtained a bachelors
degree. I utilized the ivprovit Stata command to estimate the coefficients of the
probit model of the impact of interactions of in1 (expo) and state dummies on the out-
come, controlling for the same background variables as before. With the coefficients,
I predicted for all the members of the sample, (1) the probability of positive outcome,
Pri[y = 1, X,math], and, (2) by increasing the number of math credits by one unit, I
predicted the probability of a positive outcome Pri[y = 1, X,math+1]. The difference
is the derivative evaluated at each individual. The average marginal derivative is the
average of Pri[y = 1, X,math+ 1]−Pri[y = 1, X,math] across all the members in the
sample. The standard errors were obtained by bootstrapping 50 repetitions.
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Table 1.8:
Characteristics of compliers using Abadie’s (2003) kappa





Female 0.53 0.50 1.07
White 0.60 0.734 0.811
Age as of 12/31/1996 14.60 14.68 0.994
Family
hh income 96-99 $54,529 $56,140 0.97
hh income poverty ratio 96-99 3.46 3.56 0.97
hh size 1997 4.38 4.36 1.00
both bio parents 0.54 0.55 0.98
The values of E[x|complier] and E[x] were obtained by following a variation
of the method proposed in Abadie (2003). Since Abadie’s (2003) method ap-
plies when the endogenous variable and the instrument are binary I calculated
dummy variables of math and expo. For math, the dummy is equal to 1 if
the math is greater or equal to its mean; for the instrument, the dummy is




Impact of mathematics credits on log income. N=4,771. Specification
2: Exclude household gross income 1996-1999 and household
income to poverty ratio 1996-1999.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A. instrument: expo years
math 0.145*** 0.104*** 0.307 0.305 0.319





Panel B. instrument: expo recipients
math 0.145*** 0.104*** 0.182 0.116 0.133





Panel C. instrument: expo expenditures
math 0.145*** 0.104*** 0.187 0.131 0.149





Panel D. instrument: expo recipients/1,000 teachers
math 0.145*** 0.104*** 0.00838 0.00616 0.00538





Panel E. instrument: expo expenditures/teacher
math 0.145*** 0.104*** 0.0437 0.0552 0.0514





State-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05,
***p<0.001. Regressions are weighted. Monetary measures in 2011 dollars. In all
the 2SLS equations the exclusion restrictions are the interactions of the instruments
and state dummies.State and cohort dummies were included in all the models.
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Table 1.10:
Impact of mathematics credits on log income. N=4,219. Specification
3: Include interactions of both biological parents and household
gross income 1996-1999 and household income to poverty ra-
tio 1996-1999.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A. instrument: expo years
math 0.131*** 0.105*** 0.0302 0.0139 0.0119





Panel B. instrument: expo recipients
math 0.131*** 0.105*** 0.0886 0.0437 0.0373





Panel C. instrument: expo expenditures
math 0.131*** 0.105*** 0.0862 0.0460 0.0398





Panel D. instrument: expo recipients/1,000 teachers
math 0.131*** 0.105*** -0.0350 -0.0304 -0.0185





Panel E. instrument: expo expenditures/teacher
math 0.131*** 0.105*** -0.0189 -0.0100 0.00247





State-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05,
***p<0.001. Regressions are weighted. Monetary measures in 2011 dollars. In all
the 2SLS equations the exclusion restrictions are the interactions of the instruments
and state dummies.State and cohort dummies were included in all the models.
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Table 1.11:
Impact of mathematics credits on log income. N=4,771. Specification
4: Set missing values of household gross income 1996-1999 and
household income to poverty ratio 1996-1999 to zero.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A. instrument: expo years
math 0.134*** 0.0964*** 0.275 0.288 0.307





Panel B. instrument: expo recipients
math 0.134*** 0.0964*** 0.127 0.0582 0.0970





Panel C. instrument: expo expenditures
math 0.134*** 0.0964*** 0.132 0.0715 0.112





Panel D. instrument: expo recipients/1,000 teachers
math 0.134*** 0.0964*** 0.0181 0.00160 0.0244





Panel E. instrument: expo expenditures/teacher
math 0.134*** 0.0964*** 0.0325 0.0297 0.0503





State-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05,
***p<0.001. Regressions are weighted. Monetary measures in 2011 dollars. In all
the 2SLS equations the exclusion restrictions are the interactions of the instruments
and state dummies.State and cohort dummies were included in all the models.
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CHAPTER II
Estimating Marginal Treatment Effects of High
School Mathematics Credits on Income
2.1 Introduction
Several studies have attempted to measure the impact of high school mathematics
credits on labor market outcomes (Altonji, 1995; Levine & Zimmerman, 1995; Rose
& Betts, 2004; Joensen & Nielsen, 2009; Goodman, 2012; Gaertner, Kim, DesJardins
& McClarty, 2014; Kim, Kim, DesJardins & McCall, 2015). In all cases the starting
point is the following equation:
Yi = α0 + βMathi + Xiγ + εi (2.1)
If equation (2.1) is estimated via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the estimate
of β is inconsistent since Mathi is endogenous, i.e., it is correlated with εi. This
literature has addressed this problem by using instrumental variables approaches.
Therefore, these studies have provided estimates of the Local Average Treatment
Effects (LATE) that are, by construction, instrument-specific (Angrist and Pischke,
2009). The problem with this approach as stated in Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil
(2011) is that people induced by the instrument to change their choice might not be
the same people that change their choice in response to a policy change; the returns
might be different for these two groups.
There is another problem that this literature has overlooked: β is assumed to be
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constant in the population, and, consequently, implicitly these studies assume that
individuals act as if they don’t know their idiosyncratic returns or, if they know,
they do not use this information when choosing the optimal level of math credits. As
pointed out by Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011), selection on gains complicates
the estimation of the impacts of education on earnings.
The idea of heterogeneous returns to education is not new to the literature. Card
(2001) used heterogeneous returns to education to explain why the 2SLS estimates
are generally larger than the corresponding OLS estimates. He concluded that the
marginal returns to education among low-education groups tend to be relatively high,
reflecting their high marginal cost of schooling.
A concept that is suited to measure heterogeneous effects is the Marginal Treat-
ment Effect (MTE) which was introduced in the literature by Björklund and Moffitt
(1987) and extended in Heckman & Vytlacil (1999, 2001, 2005, 2007). Moffitt (2008)
estimated marginal treatment effects of higher education in the UK by using power
series or splines. Carneiro, Heckman & Vytlacil (2011), provided two methods for
estimating marginal treatment effects of college attendance in the US: the first is
based on a normal selection model, and the second utilizes Local Instrumental Vari-
ables (LIV). In addition, Heckman and Li (2004) utilized marginal treatment effects
to identify heterogeneous returns to college in China. For a comprehensive treatment
of marginal treatment effects theory and applications please refer to Heckman and
Vytlacil (2007).
By borrowing the methods in Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011), and Heck-
man, Tobias and Vytlacil (2001), in this paper I estimate marginal treatment effects
of obtaining advanced mathematics credits during high school on income. The treat-
ment is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not individuals earned credits
in advanced mathematics during high school. Following the definitions of NLSY 97,
advanced mathematics include Algebra 2 through Pre-Calculus, Calculus, AP/IB and
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Advanced Mathematics-Other.
These methods allow me to estimate not only the marginal treatment effects
(MTE), but also other relevant parameters commonly presented in the literature of
returns to education such as the Average Treatment Effect (ATE), Treatment on the
Treated (TT), and, Treatment on the Untreated (TUT). The results indicate that for
each Carnegie unit of advanced mathematics earned during high school, the Average
Treatment Effect (ATE) is about 4.4%, the Treatment on the Treated (TT) is about
2.45% and the Treatment on the Untreated (TUT) is about 7.39%. The Marginal
Treatment Effect (MTE) varies between -0.01% and 10%.
Interestingly, the results indicate that individuals who are already enrolled in
advanced math courses would benefit the least from taking an additional year of
advanced math courses. Also, individuals who are not enrolled in advanced math
courses, would benefit the most from taking advanced math during high school. Fi-
nally, the results also indicate that obtaining an additional year of advanced math
courses is beneficial for all individuals.
These results are consistent with Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2001) who found
that, for a randomly chosen individual, the average gain from obtaining some form
of college is about 9%, whereas the average gain for those who actually select into
college is about 4%. Even when they do not report TUT, implicitly these estimates
need to be higher than 9%.
The paper is organized as follows. In section (2.2), I briefly describe the literature
that examines the returns to high school math credits. In section (2.3), I describe
the methods for estimating marginal treatment effects. Section (2.4) is devoted to
describing the data, the first stage and reduced form relationships and the parameter
estimates of ATE, TT, TUT and MTE from the normal selection model. Conclusions
are presented in section (2.5).
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2.2 Brief Review of the Literature on the Returns to High
School Math Credits
All the studies that have attempted to provide a causal impact of high school math-
ematics credits on earnings utilize instrumental variables. Although these studies do
not mention which parameter they are estimating, by using instrumental variables,
they provide an estimate of the Local Average Treatment Effect or LATE (Angrist &
Pischke, 2009). In other words, they gauge the impact of an additional unit of math-
ematics credits during high school on earnings only for the subgroup of individuals
who are induced by the instrument to change their course-taking behavior.
In this study, I depart from the traditional IV framework approach utilized in the
returns to math credits literature and, based on the work of Carneiro, Heckman and
Vytlacil (2011) and Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2001), I present four parameters
of interest in the treatment evaluation literature: Average Treatment Effect (ATE),
Treatment on the Treated (TT), Treatment on the Untreated (TUT) and Marginal
Treatment Effect (MTE). The rationale of presenting the results of previous studies
is to compare the magnitudes and place this study’s estimates in context.
An important difference of this study with respect to other studies in the returns
to high school math credits literature is that, instead of using a continuous treatment,
I use a binary treatment. In this way, I can use the methods presented in Carneiro,
Heckman and Vytlacil (2011) and Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2000).
In this section, I briefly describe the results of the studies that examine the causal
impact of high school mathematics credits on labor market outcomes1. For a complete
review of the literature please refer to Sosa (2017a).
Altonji (1995) concluded that one more year of the combination of science, math,
English, social studies and foreign language leads to an increase of wages of about
0.3%. Levine & Zimmerman (1995) found that the number of high school math
1Earnings or income
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courses does not impact individuals’ weekly wages ten years after high school grad-
uation. The magnitudes of the estimates was -0.017 for men and -0.060 for women;
both statistically insignificant. In addition, Rose & Betts (2004) estimated that cred-
its earned in algebra/geometry increased earnings by 8%. No statistically significant
effects were found for intermediate algebra (-0.107), advanced algebra (-0.77) and
calculus (-0.132).
Goodman (2012) calculated that each additional year of math increases black
males’ earnings between 5-9 %. The impact for white males is about the same magni-
tude but statistically insignificant. The results for women are small and statistically
insignificant at about 0.035 for black women and 0.005 for white women. Finally,
departing from the US context, Joensen & Nielsen (2009) concluded that taking ad-
vanced math credits coupled with advanced chemistry, increases earnings by about
20%.
In Sosa (2017a), I estimate that each additional Carnegie unit (year) of high school
advanced mathematics increases total labor income by about 3%. For comparison
purposes, I use Goodman (2012) and Sosa (2017a) as the references to benchmark
the estimates found in this study. The reasons behind choosing these two studies are
the following: first, they both provide convincing instruments; second, they depart
from the traditional instrument proposed by Altonji (1992,1995) - the per-high school
average number of math credits - and followed by Levine & Zimmerman (1995) and
Rose & Betts (2004). Finally, Joensen & Nielsen’s (2009) study was conducted in
Denmark, and, thus, might not be relevant to the US context.
2.3 Methods for Estimating Marginal Treatment Effects
In this section, I present the methods to identify and estimate four parameters of in-
terest in the program evaluation literature: Average Treatment Effect (ATE), Average
Treatment Effect on the Treated (TT), Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated
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(TUT), and, Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE). Specifically, I estimate these param-
eters in the context of the effects of high school math credits. To my knowledge, this
is the first study of marginal treatment effects of high school mathematics credits on
labor market outcomes.
Mostly, the methods presented in this paper are based on the study by Heckman,
Tobias and Vytlacil (2001) who presented the aforementioned four parameters - ATE,
TT, TUT and MTE in the context of returns to college education. The main takeaway
on their methods is that these parameters can be estimated using the normal selection
model. For the case of the Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE), I combine the methods
of Heckman et al (2001), with those of Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011). The
rationale behind this choice is due to the fact that, in Carneiro et al. (2011), it is
easier to interpret the MTE as a function of the propensity to receive the treatment
in a support bounded between 0 and 1.
Since the treatment is binary, the starting point in Heckman et al. (2001) is the
Generalized Roy Model. If individual i obtains a positive (> 0) number of advanced
math credits during high school, then D = 1; D = 0 otherwise. The selection equation
is:
D∗ = Zθ + UD where D = 1[Zθ + UD ≥ 0] (2.2)
In equation (2.2), D∗ represents a latent index of the propensity to obtain advanced
math credits during high school. The support of D∗ is (−∞,+∞). The potential
outcome equations are:
Y1 = Xβ1 + U1 and Y0 = Xβ0 + U0 (2.3)
It is worth noting that equations (2.3) are potential outcome equations instead
of outcome equations because we observe individuals only in one of the two states,
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D = 1 or D = 0 but not in both. For example, if individual i earned advanced math
credits during high school, and hence, D = 1, then, Y1 represents her measure of log
income, and, Y0 represents what would her log income be if she did not earn advanced
math credits during high school (D = 0). Combining the outcome and treatment in
the same equation we have Y = DY1 + (1−D)Y0 for all individuals.
In equations (2.3) X is a matrix of variables that influence income assumed to be
uncorrelated with (U1, U0). Also, in equation (2.2), Z includes some or all elements of
X but also, it includes at least one variable that induces individuals into the treatment
but is not included in any of the potential outcome equations. UD is an unobserved
scalar component that induces individuals into the treatment.
Define ∆ ≡ Y1−Y0. The ATE Average Treatment Effect is defined as the expected
gain from the treatment for a randomly chosen individual. The ATE conditional on
x is:
ATE(x) = E[∆|X = x] = x(β1 − β0)
Assuming that the joint distribution of X is FX(X) then, the unconditional ATE
is:
ATE = E[∆] =
∫




ATE(xi) = x̄(β1 − β0) (2.4)
The Treatment on the Treated (TT ) is the average gain from treatment for those
who actually select into the treatment.
TT (x, z,D[z] = 1) = E[∆|X = x, Z = z,D[z] = 1]
In the previous equation D[z] = 1 indicates that the treatment is equal to 1 and
also that it depends on the vector of instruments z.
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TT (x, z,D[z] = 1) = x(β1 − β0) + E[U1 − U0|UD ≥ −zθ,X = x, Z = z]
Assume that (UD, U1, U0) is independent from (X,Z) then
TT (x, z,D[z] = 1) = x(β1 − β0) + E[U1 − U0|UD ≥ −zθ]
Integrating over the joint distribution of (X,Z) conditional on D = 1 we have:
TT = E[∆|D[Z] = 1] =
∫
TT [X,Z,D[Z] = 1]dF (X,Z|D[Z] = 1)





DiTT [xi, zi, D[zi] = 1] (2.5)
Finally, the Marginal Treatment Effect, MTE is defined as the treatment effect
for individuals with a given value of UD.
MTE(x, uD) = E[∆|X = x, UD = uD]
MTE(x, uD) = x(β1 − β0) + E[U1 − U0|X = x, UD = uD]
MTE(x, uD) = x(β1 − β0) + E[U1 − U0|UD = uD]
The unconditional (of X) version is
MTE(uD) =
∫







MTE(uD) = x̄(β1 − β0) + E[U1 − U0|UD = uD]
Treatment parameters assuming joint normality

















The variance parameter in the selection equation has been normalized to unity.
The estimation procedure, according to Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2001) is as
follows:
1. Obtain θ̂ from a probit model on the decision to take the treatment, i.e.,estimate
equation 2.2 using a probit model.
D = 1[Zθ + UD ≥ 0]
2. Compute the appropriate selection correction term evaluated at θ̂ (i.e., λ̂1i =
φ[Ziθ̂]/Φ[Ziθ̂] when Di = 1 and λ̂0i = φ[Ziθ̂]/(1 − Φ[Ziθ̂]) when Di = 0). For
each individual in the sample calculate either λ̂1i or λ̂0i.
3. Run treatment-outcome specific regressions for the groups [i : Di = 1] and
[i : Di = 0] with the inclusion of the appropriate selection-correction term
obtained from the previous step.
Y1 = Xβ1 + σ1Dλ̂1 + U1
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Y0 = Xβ0 + σ0Dλ̂0 + U0
4. Given β̂1, β̂0, σ̂1D and σ̂0D obtained from step 3, and θ̂ from step 1, calculate
the following equations:
Conditional ATE
ATE(xi) = xi(β̂1 − β̂0)
Unconditional ATE

















DiTT [xi, zi, D[zi] = 1] (2.9)
Conditional TUT










(1−Di)TUT [xi, zi, D[zi] = 0] (2.10)
Conditional MTE
MTE[xi, UD = uD] = xi(β̂1 − β̂0) + (σ̂1D − σ̂0D)uD (2.11)
Unconditional MTE
MTE[UD = uD] = x̄(β̂1 − β̂0) + (σ̂1D − σ̂0D)uD (2.12)
Since the Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2001) study does not present charts of
marginal treatment effects, for comparison purposes I use the same unobserved com-
ponent of the propensity to participate in the treatment (US) as in Carneiro, Heckman
and Vytlacil (2011). Transforming (2.11) to correspond to Carneiro, Heckman and
Vytlacil (2011). Under Carneiro et al (2011), in the choice model IS is defined as the
net benefit from choosing S = 12. The latent variable IS is a function of a vector of
observable characteristics (Z) and an unobserved scalar component V in the following
way:
IS = µS(Z)− V (2.13)
Thus, we observe
S = 1 if IS ≥ 0; S = 0 otherwise (2.14)
Similarly to Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2001) each choice is associated with
a potential outcome equation:
2In Carneiro et al. (2011) S represents a binary treatment of whether or not individuals were
ever enrolled in college.
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Y1 = µ1(X) + U1 and Y0 = µ0(X) + U0 (2.15)
Again, in equations (2.15), X is a vector of observed characteristics that influence
income. In equation (2.13), Z is a vector of observable characteristics which might
include some (or all), elements of X but also includes at least one instrument, i.e., a
variable that induces individuals to change their advanced math credits but does not
belong to any of the potential outcome equations (2.15).
In the net benefit equation, (2.13), V is assumed to be a continuous random
variable with a cumulative distribution function FV . The rationale behind this trans-
formation is the following: whereas the support of V is (−∞,+∞), the support
of FV (V ) is [0, 1]. This transformation allows working with a more mathematically
tractable variable FV (V ) instead of V . Define US = FV (V ), then, the MTE is defined
as:
MTE(x, us) ≡ E[β|X=x, Us = us] (2.16)
According to Carneiro et al. (2011), in their context ”the marginal treatment effect
is the mean return to schooling for individuals with characteristics X and US = uS.”
(pp. 2727). In this paper, the marginal treatment effect is interpreted as the average
return of having earned advanced math credits during high school for persons who
are indifferent between obtaining or not advanced math credits.
By comparing equations (2.2) and (2.13) we know that UD = −V . Thus, equation
(2.12) becomes
MTE[V = v] = x̄(β̂1 − β̂0)− (σ̂1D − σ̂0D)V (2.17)
Similar to Carneiro et al (2011), I use the transformation US = FV (V ) to be
able to work with a more tractable variable US instead of V . Finally, the marginal
72
treatment effect formula that I use in this study is:
MTE[US = uS] = x̄(β̂1 − β̂0)− (σ̂1D − σ̂0D)F−1(uS) (2.18)
Implications of the joint normality assumption
The estimates generated in this study depend on whether or not the joint nor-
mality assumption holds in the population. Since the error terms are by construction
unobserved, no test can tell us whether or not the assumption of joint normality
holds. Even when this is a strong assumption, it is also true that this is the first pa-
per that explores marginal treatment effects in the context of returns to high school
math credits. In further versions of the paper, I am planning to estimate marginal
treatment effects by the semiparametric method of Local Instrumental Variables as
presented in Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011). For now, this paper is the first
step into the integration of the Marginal Treatment Effect framework and the returns
to high school math credits literature.
2.4 Estimated Marginal Treatment Effects
2.4.1 Data
Treatment, Outcome and Controls
The individual-level data for this paper were drawn from the National Longitudi-
nal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY 97) which is a nationally representative sample of
around 9,000 individuals who were 12 to 16 years old as of 12/31/1996. This survey
allows researchers to link individual choices such as high school mathematics course
taking behavior to labor market outcomes later in life. NLSY 97 includes transcript
information for about 70 percent of all individuals in the sample. Transcript informa-
tion has been made homogeneous across all schools and years via the Carnegie units
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system.
According to NCES, one Carnegie unit is defined as the number of credits a student
receives for a course taken every day, one period per day, for a full school year3. In
addition to high school Carnegie units, NLSY 97 also includes information about labor
market outcomes such as employment, income, earnings and wages. The dependent
variable or outcome in this paper is the total labor income, which is obtained by asking
”During last year, how much income did you receive from wages, salary, commissions,
or tips from all jobs, before deductions for taxes or anything else?”. Since this question
is asked repeatedly, I constructed a measure of income, in 2011 real USD, centered
around age 28. I chose 28 because all individuals in the sample turn 28 within the
observation period.
In this paper I define advanced mathematics (advanced math) as a dummy vari-
able equal to 1 if individual i obtained credits in advanced mathematics as defined by
NLSY 97; that is, in any of the following courses: Algebra 2 through Pre-Calculus,
Calculus, AP/IB and Advanced Mathematics-Other. As controls, in all the models, I
included: a dummy for female, a dummy for white, age in years as of 12-31-1996 (age
at the beginning of the study), the average of non-missing values of household gross
income between 1996 and 1999 (in 1997 real USD), the average of non-missing values
of household income to poverty ratio between 1996 and 1999, household size in 1997,
a dummy that indicates whether the household had both biological parents in 1997,
state-level number of Carnegie units (years) of math required to obtain a high school
diploma in 1997, number of years of exposure to a high school math reform4. State
3https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/glossary.aspx?nav=y
4Reform indicates whether a state changed the number of years of mathematics required for high
school graduation between 1995 and 2005. Exposure to math reforms was based on the first year
of high school enrollment using the following rules: if the reform year occurred before first year of
enrollment, exposure to math reforms is equal to 4; if the reform year occurred after the last year of
high school enrollment, exposure to math reforms is equal to zero; finally, if the reform year occurred
in between the first and last years of enrollment, exposure to math reforms equals the difference
between the last year of high school enrollment and reform year.
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and cohort5 fixed effects were also included.
The sample was restricted to individuals who ever enrolled in high school and who
had non-missing values of advanced mathematics, total labor income at age 28 as well
as in all the aforementioned controls. A total of 4,219 individuals were included in
the analysis sample.
Instrument / Exclusion Restrictions
In the formulation presented in section (2.3), the matrix Z includes some or all
elements in X but also includes at least one instrument, i.e., a variable that induces
individuals to modify their course taking choices but does not otherwise affect out-
comes. The instruments in this paper are state-level measures of shocks to teacher
labor supply. Specifically, as instruments, I use the implementation of state-level
financial incentive programs that induce current or future teachers and/or recent
college graduates into teaching in shortage subject areas such as math and science,
and/or geographic critical shortage areas (e.g., schools located in high-poverty neigh-
borhoods). Throughout this paper I call these programs STEM Programs. For a
comprehensive description of the STEM programs please refer to Sosa (2017b).
For clarity, I call instruments to individual-level measures of exposure to STEM
programs. When the instruments are interacted with state dummies, I call these
variables exclusion restrictions. The main instrument utilized in this paper is the
number of years of potential exposure to STEM programs while individuals were
enrolled in high school; this variable is called expo.
To construct expo, first, for each individual, I calculated the first and last years of
potential enrollment in high school; the first year of enrollment is equal to the birth
year plus 17 and the last year of enrollment is the first year of enrollment plus 3. In
this way, the instrument does not depend on actual enrollment which is endogenous
5Cohort is defined as the year individuals entered high school.
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but only on potential enrollment which depends on the year individuals were born.
For each individual, I created a row vector - enrollmentis - which is a 1X34 vector
with 0’s in the years of no enrollment and ones in the years of potential enrollment.
Also, for each state, I constructed a row vector As with ones on the years state s
had at least one active STEM program, and 0’s on the years state s did not have an
active STEM program. The 34 columns refer to all the years between 1983 to 2016
utilized in the STEM programs data. Thus, expo was calculated by the following
formula: expo = enrollmentis ∗ A′s.
In addition to expo, I also used other STEM program characteristics such as
number of recipients, expenditures, recipients per 1,000 teachers, expenditures per
teacher, recipients per 1,000 secondary teachers, expenditures per secondary teacher,
recipients per 1,000 students, expenditures per student, recipients per 1,000 high
school students, and, expenditures per high school student.
Let stems be any of the mentioned STEM program characteristics. For the sake
of explanation, let stems be expo recipientss which is a 1X34 row vector with zeros
in the years state s did not have any STEM program, and, the average number of
recipients on the years state s did have at least one active STEM program. Thus, to
calculate potential exposure to all STEM program characteristics I used the following
formula: expo stems = enrollmentis ∗ stem′s.
To abbreviate, for the remaining of the paper, I call exposure to STEM program
characteristics in1,...,in11. Please refer to table (2.1) for the definition of all the
instruments in1,...,in11. Please refer to Sosa (2017b) to learn more about the different
STEM Program characteristics like program type (e.g., loan forgiveness, scholarship,
etc), program focus (e.g., math and science, shortage geographic areas, minorities)
as well as the magnitude of the programs in terms of the number of participants and
expenditures. I also provide maps that capture the variation across states regarding
the aforementioned STEM program variables. Finally, in table (2.1), I define all the
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variables included in this paper.
Table 2.1: Definitions of the Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis
Variable Definition
Y Log of total labor income at age 28
D=1 if respondent obtained high school advanced math credits; 0 other-
wise.
X Female, white, age in years as of 12-31-1996, average household
gross income between 1996 and 1999, average household income
to poverty ratio between 1996 and 1999, household size in 1997,
household both biological parents in 1997, state-level years of math
required to obtain a high school diploma in 1997, years of exposure
math reforms.
Instruments
in1 Years of potential exposure to STEM programs during high school.
in2 Years of potential exposure to STEM program recipients.
in3 Years of potential exposure to STEM program expenditures.
in4 Years of potential exposure to STEM program recipients per 1,000
teachers.
in5 Years of potential exposure to STEM program expenditures per
teacher.
in6 Years of potential exposure to STEM program recipients per 1,000
secondary teachers.
in7 Years of potential exposure to STEM program expenditures per
secondary teacher.
in8 Years of potential exposure to STEM program recipients per 1,000
students.
in9 Years of potential exposure to STEM program expenditures per
K-12 student.
in10 Years of potential exposure to STEM program recipients per 1,000
high school students.
in11 Years of potential exposure to STEM program expenditures per
high school student.
All the analyses utilize the same controls. The exclusion restrictions are the interactions
of the instruments and state dummies. State and cohort fixed effects are also included.
77
2.4.2 Sample Characteristics
The NLSY 97 sample includes 8,984 individuals of which 6,120 have transcript
information. After dropping records with missing values of income the resulting sam-
ple included 4,841 individuals. By dropping missing observations on the following
variables: average household gross income between 1996 and 1999 (545 observations),
average household income to poverty ratio between 1996 and 1999 (17 observations),
and the number of years of math required to obtain a high school diploma (60 ob-
servations), the final sample size for all the analyses is 4,219. None of the remaining
controls have missing values.
Table (2.2) includes descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the empirical
analyses. The analysis sample consists of N=4,219 individuals of whom 50% are
women; about 73% are white with an average age at the beginning of the study of
about 14.68 years. The average household gross income between 1996 and 1999 is
about $56,141, and, the household income to poverty ratio, also between 1996 and
1999, is about 3.56. The average household size in 1997 was about 4.36 and, 55
percent of the households had both biological parents. All the summary statistics are
weighted.
On average, the number of Carnegie units of advanced math credits is about 1.02,
and 59% of the sample obtained advanced math credits. The mean income (total
labor income) at age 28 is about $26,894. Moreover, the average years of potential
exposure during high school is 2.14. It is noteworthy that potential exposure to STEM
programs varies greatly from 0 to 4 with a standard deviation of 1.82 years.
2.4.3 First Stage and Reduced Form
One condition for identification of marginal treatment effects is the existence of
at least one variable that influences individuals choices without being included in
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Analysis Sample N= 4,219
Variable Mean Sd Min Max
Treatment, Outcome, Instrument
Advanced math 1.02 1.11 0 7.50
Advanced math (binary) 0.59 0.49 0 1
income $26,894 $19,194 $2.70 $128,535
expo 2.14 1.82 0 4
Demographics
female 0.50 0.50 0 1
white 0.73 0.44 0 1
age as of 12-31-1996 14.68 1.1 13 16
Family
household gross income $56,141 $46,039 $233 $417,074
1996-1999
household income to poverty 3.56 3.05 0.01 32.27
ratio 1996-1999
household size 1997 4.36 1.42 2 16
both bio parents in household 0.55 0.50 0 1
All the means are calculated using the 1997 weight. The analysis sample includes
individuals who ever enrolled in high school who also have transcript information and
whose income at age 28 is non-missing. State and cohort fixed effects are also included
in the analyses but not shown in this table.
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the potential outcome equations. The exclusion restrictions (Z|X) are measures of
potential exposure to STEM program characteristics (e.g., expo) interacted with state
dummies.
In table (2.3), I estimated separate OLS regressions in which the dependent vari-
ables are, in column (1), advanced math, and, in column (2), the log of total labor
income. I only present estimates of the first stage and reduced form relationships for
the first instrument (expo). For more information about the F − statistics regarding
the association between Z|X and advanced math, please refer to Sosa (2017a). In all
cases (instruments), the F − statistics are much bigger than the rule of thumb of 10.
As table (2.3) indicates, the impact of expo on treatment and outcome vary greatly
by state and it is positive and statistically significant in most cases. For space lim-
itations, I present a trimmed version of the first stage and reduced form table; the
complete table is located at the end of this chapter.
Table 2.3:
First Stage and Reduced Form. Impact of interactions of expo-
sure to STEM programs and state dummies on advanced math and
log income. Please refer to the appendix for the complete table.
(1) (2)
advanced math ln(income)
expo*state 4 0.115*** 0.707***
(0.0202) (0.0531)





expo*state 50 0.0836*** 0.353***
(0.0193) (0.0391)
expo*state 51 0.304*** 1.159***
(0.0333) (0.0766)
N 4,219 4,219
State-level cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. OLS regressions in which the dependent variable are for column 1, a dummy
variable that indicates whether students earned a positive number of credits in ad-
vanced math, and 0 otherwise. In column 2, the dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of income at age 28. State and cohort fixed effects were also included. All
regressions use the 1997 weight.
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2.4.4 Parameter estimates from the normal selection model
As mentioned in section (2.3), in order to estimate ATE, TT, TUT and MTE,
under the assumption of joint normality of the error terms, I estimated an OLS
regression for each group D = 1 and D = 0 with the corresponding sample correction
term. Table (2.4) includes the parameter estimates of such regressions.










age as of 12-31-1996 -0.0296 0.0239
(0.130) (0.0916)
hh gross inccome 1996-1999 1.56e-07 -1.74e-06
(2.34e-06) (2.06e-06)
hh income to poverty ratio 0.0181 0.0483
1996-1999 (0.0261) (0.0299)
household size 1997 0.0101 0.0295
(0.0285) (0.0216)
both biological parents -0.0238 -0.0600
(0.102) (0.0992)
expo reforms -0.0708 -0.0294
(0.0755) (0.0725)










Column 1 includes the parameter estimates of the OLS regression of log income on X and
λ1 conditional on D = 1. Column 2 includes the parameter estimates of the OLS regression
of log income on X and λ0 conditional on D = 0.
The important contribution of table (2.4) is that, the parameter estimates of
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β1, β0, σ1D and σ0D along with θ are the basis for calculating ATE, TT, TUT and
MTE using the formulas presented in section (2.3). For instance, to calculate ATE,
I first calculated ATE(xi) = xi(β̂1 − β̂0) for all the members in the sample. Next, I
calculated the average across all individuals.
Similarly, to calculate TT, first, I calculated TT [xi, zi, D[zi] = 1] = xi(β̂1 − β̂0) +
(σ̂1D− σ̂0D) φ(ziθ̂)
Φ(ziθ̂)
, or equivalently, TT [xi, zi, D[zi] = 1] = xi(β̂1− β̂0) + (σ̂1D− σ̂0D)λ1i
for each individual with D = 1, and, next, I calculated the average across all treated




for all individuals with D = 0, and, next, I averaged it across all the
untreated.
In order to calculate MTE, first, I generated a grid of US ranging from 0.05
to 0.95 in intervals of 0.05. Next, for each i and US, I calculated MTE[xi, Us =
us] = xi(β̂1 − β̂0) − (σ̂1D − σ̂0D)Φ−1(us). This step resulted in 19 columns: MTE05,
MTE10,...,MTE95. Finally, the graph (figure (2.1)) showing MTE(US) is generated
averaging each of the 19 columns across all members of the sample. The 90% standard
errors were obtained by bootstrapping this process 50 repetitions6.
Similar to Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011) who divided by their estimates
by four in order to measure the average gain of one year of college, I also divided the
estimates in this paper by 20 since most states require 20 units to obtain a high school
diploma. By doing so, I assume that all of the credits are concentrated in advanced
mathematics.
It is important mentioning the parameter estimates of λ1 and λ0 in table (2.4).
These parameters are estimates of the covariances between the error terms in the out-
come equations (Equation 2.3) and the error term in the selection equation (Equation
2.2) in Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2001). In particular σ1D = Cov(U1, UD) and
σ0D = Cov(U0, UD). Since UD is positive in equation (2.2)), a higher value of UD
6According to the Stata Bootstrap Manual, N=50 is an adequate number of repetitions for normal
approximation confidence intervals.
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leads to a higher propensity to select into the treatment. Now, the fact that σ̂1D < 0
indicates that, for individuals who select into the treatment, an increase in UD is
associated with a decrease in U1, an unobserved component of income. Furthermore,
σ̂0D > 0 also indicates that, for individuals who do not select themselves into the
treatment, an increase in UD is associated with an increase in U0; in other words, for
individuals who are not taking advanced math courses, increasing the propensity to
obtain advanced math credits is associated with a higher unobserved component of
income.
2.4.5 Estimates of the Returns to Advanced Mathematics Credits: ATE,
TT, TUT, MTE.
The main results of the paper are presented in this section. These results were
obtained using the first instrument: expo. Table (2.5) includes the estimates of the
returns to advanced math credits for different groups. For each Carnegie unit of
advanced math, for a random individual in the population, the Average Treatment
Effect (ATE) is about 4.47%. For individuals who actually obtained advanced math
credits the effect (TT) is about 2.45%. Finally, for the group who did not earn
advanced math credits, the average effect (TUT) is about 7.39%.
The results are consistent with those in Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2011)
who examined the impact of college education on log wages. They found that for a
randomly chosen person, receiving some form of higher education leads to an increase
in hourly wages of about 9%. For individuals who select into college, the average
gain is about 4%. They conclude that ”individuals with unobservables making them
most likely to enroll in college receive the smallest return to a college education”,
Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2001, p.221).
In addition, the results presented in this study are consistent with other studies
in the literature of returns to high school math credits. For example, Goodman
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(2012) found that the returns to math credits for males varied between 5% and 9%.
In Sosa (2017a), I found that one Carnegie unit of advanced math increases total
labor income by about 3%. Let’s recall that both Goodman (2012) and Sosa (2017a)
present estimates of weighted Local Average Treatment Effects (LATE’s). Unlike all
other studies in the literature of returns to high school math credits, this is the first
study that provides measures of different estimands other than weighted LATE’s.
Table 2.5: Returns to one credit of advanced math
ATE = E(β) 0.0447
(0.0002345)
TT = E(β|D = 1) 0.0245
(0.000387)
TUT = E(β|D = 0) 0.0739
(0.0196)
The parameters ATE, TT and TUT are calculated according to
the formulas presented in this paper which are based on Heckman,
Tobias and Vytlacil (2001).
An important concern is whether the average gain to advanced math credits is
constant in the population. If this is the case, then individuals either do not know
their idiosyncratic returns to math credits, or if they do know, this information does
not play any role when choosing whether or not to take advanced math during high
school. When individuals act on the information about their idiosyncratic returns to
math credits, selection on gains complicates the estimation of returns to math credits.
On top of the endogeneity problem characterized by the correlation between Mathi
and εi in equation (2.1), we also have a selection on gains problem because of the
correlation between Mathi and β.
The framework presented in this study allows testing whether or not β is constant
in the population. This is accomplished by testing the null hypothesis of equality
of covariances: H0 : σ1D = σ0D. Table (2.6) includes the results of this test. By
84
bootstrapping the difference in covariances (σ̂1D − σ̂0D) 250 times, I calculated the
standard error. The conclusion is that I cannot reject H0.
Even when we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of covariances, and
consequently, constancy of MTE, the p-value (0.133) is very close to 0.1, therefore
we cannot conclude that MTE is constant. Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) summarize
the evidence regarding the constancy of MTE in different contexts. In their analysis,
studies such as Lee (1978), Farber (1983) and Duncan and Leigh (1985) do not reject
the null hypothesis of equality of covariances in the normal selection model. Most
studies, however, reject the null hypothesis, and conclude that MTE is not constant.
Table 2.6: Test of Constancy of MTE. H0 : σ1D = σ0D
σ̂1D − σ̂0D -0.7273
Bootstrap standard error (0.485)
P − value 0.133
Decision Cannot Reject H0
The standard error was calculated bootstrapping 250 repetitions.
Figure (2.1) shows the mapping of the marginal treatment effect onto the unob-
served propensity to receive the treatment, US. The 90% confidence intervals were
estimated by bootstrapping 50 repetitions. Since I transformed the unobserved com-
ponent of the propensity to receive the treatment from UD to US, higher values of US
decrease the propensity to receive the treatment, and viceversa, lower values of US
increase the propensity to receive the treatment.
Figure (2.1) reflects some important features. First, the average gain varies across
the distribution of the propensity to select into the treatment. On the one hand,
individuals with high values of US, those who are less likely to participate in the
treatment, are the ones who gain more. On the other hand, individuals with low
values of US; i.e., those with high propensity to obtain advanced math credits are the
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ones who benefit the least. Second, the average gain for individuals who are indifferent
between D = 1 and D = 0 varies between -0.05% and 10%. For individuals at the
margin the effects can be substantial, especially for those with high values of US.
Figure 2.1:
Marginal Treatment Effects of Advanced Mathematics Credits - Normal
Selection Model
Notes: The 90% confidence intervals were calculated using bootstrap.
The exclusion restrictions Z|X are the interactions of in1 (years
of exposure to STEM programs) and state dummies. State and




In this section I estimate three parameters of interest, ATE, TT, TUT and MTE
using the entire set of instruments (one by one) defined at the beginning of this
section. As table (2.7) indicates, the ATE ranges from 3.35% to 4.77%. Also, the
TT varies between 1.95% and 2.67%, and, finally, the TUT varies between 5.37% and
7.90%.
Table 2.7: Returns to one credit of advanced math. All instruments.
Instrument Definition: exposure to ATE TT TUT
in1 years of STEM programs 0.0447 0.0245 0.0739
(0.000235) (0.000387) (0.000456)
in2 Recipients 0.0456 0.0266 0.0729
(0.000239) (0.000414) (0.0215)
in3 Expenditures 0.0456 0.0267 0.0727
(0.000240) (0.000416) (0.000502)
in4 Recipients/1,000 teachers 0.0335 0.0195 0.0537
(0.000237) (0.00034) (0.000373)
in5 Expenditure/teacher 0.0378 0.0218 0.0609
(0.000235) (0.000359) (0.000407)




in7 Expenditures/sec teacher 0.0428 0.0241 0.0696
(0.000235) (0.000384) (0.000452)
in8 Recipients/ 1,000 students 0.0460 0.0260 0.0748
(0.000237) (0.000407) (0.000490)
in9 Expenditure/student 0.0436 0.0244 0.0712
(0.000235) (0.000387) (0.000456)




in11 Expenditure/HS student 0.0448 0.0258 0.0721
(0.000237) (0.000404) (0.000483)
The parameters ATE, TT and TUT are calculated according to the formulas presented in
this paper which are based on Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2001).
The small variation in ATE, TT and TUT across the different instruments is
remarkable. In contrast to Sosa’s (2017a) study in which the variation in weighted
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LATE’s across the first five instruments is very large, in this study, the parameters
estimates are more robust to the selection of the instrument. This is not surprising
since the weighted LATE estimates are instrument dependent (Angrist & Pischke,
2009) whereas the Marginal Treatment Effects framework presented here helps to
dissociate the instruments from the parameter estimates. Thus, it is a more robust
framework to examine the gains from advanced math courses.
In figures (2.2) to (2.6), I estimated the marginal treatment effects using instru-
ments 2 through 11. All the graphs follow the same pattern as shown in figure (2.1).
Regardless of the instrument utilized, the average gain of advanced math credits is
not constant in the population. In fact, it is a increasing function of US which implies
that, for those with high values of US, and, hence, those who are less likely to earn
advanced math credits, the gains are high whereas for those with low values of US,
i.e., those more likely to earn advanced math credits, the returns are close to zero.
Figure 2.2:
Marginal Treatment Effects of Advanced Mathematics Credits: Instru-
ments n2 and n3
Notes: The 90% confidence intervals were calculated using bootstrap.
The exclusion restrictions Z|X are the interactions of in2 & in3
respectively and state dummies. State and cohort fixed effects were
also included in the outcome equations and in the selection equation.
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Figure 2.3:
Marginal Treatment Effects of Advanced Mathematics Credits: Instru-
ments n4 and n5
Notes: The 90% confidence intervals were calculated using bootstrap.
The exclusion restrictions Z|X are the interactions of in4 & in5
respectively and state dummies. State and cohort fixed effects were
also included in the outcome equations and in the selection equation.
Figure 2.4:
Marginal Treatment Effects of Advanced Mathematics Credits: Instru-
ments n6 and n7
Notes: The 90% confidence intervals were calculated using bootstrap.
The exclusion restrictions Z|X are the interactions of in6 & in7
respectively and state dummies. State and cohort fixed effects were
also included in the outcome equations and in the selection equation.
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Figure 2.5:
Marginal Treatment Effects of Advanced Mathematics Credits: Instru-
ments n8 and n9
Notes: The 90% confidence intervals were calculated using bootstrap.
The exclusion restrictions Z|X are the interactions of in8 & in9
respectively and state dummies. State and cohort fixed effects were
also included in the outcome equations and in the selection equation.
Figure 2.6:
Marginal Treatment Effects of Advanced Mathematics Credits: Instru-
ments n10 and n11
Notes: The 90% confidence intervals were calculated using bootstrap.
The exclusion restrictions Z|X are the interactions of in10 & in11
respectively and state dummies. State and cohort fixed effects were
also included in the outcome equations and in the selection equation.
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2.5 Conclusions
This study is the first to estimate marginal treatment effects in the context of the
returns to high school math credits. Several conclusions and contributions are worth
mentioning.
First, the framework presented in this paper allows estimating different parameters
relevant to the program evaluation literature: ATE, TT, TUT and MTE. The average
gain in total labor income from obtaining advanced math credits during high school
varies between 3.35% and 4.77%. These results are consistent with the parameter
estimates obtained in Sosa (2017a) of about 3%.
Second, for individuals who are already enrolled in advanced mathematics credits
during high school, increasing one more year of advanced math yields a return of
about 2.45%. In other words, even when this group benefits the least, there is still
some gain to increase the amount of advanced math credits.
Third, for individuals who are not enrolled in advanced math credits, by adding
one year of advanced math credits to their transcripts, they have the potential to
increase earnings by about 7.39%. From the public policy perspective this result
is the most important because, the potential to benefit individuals from low-income
backgrounds who do not have access to advanced mathematics due to lack of resources,
teachers in particular, is very large.
Fourth, unlike Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011), this study suggests that:
(1) both treated and untreated individuals could benefit from one additional year
of high school advanced mathematics. (2) There is no selection on gains, in other
words, individuals with the highest potential gains do not select themselves into
the treatment. This might be associated with the fact that, whereas in Carneiro,
Heckman and Vytlacil (2011), individuals choose whether or not to attend college,
and therefore, most of them are high school graduates, in this study, individuals are
91
choosing whether or not to enroll in advanced math, thus, high school dropouts are
included.
Also, because marginal individuals in Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011) are
older than those in this study, they might be more prone to include future earnings
into their cost-benefits analyses of the decisions to attend college, when compared to
the cost-benefits analyses done by high school students when choosing which courses
to take. It is likely that high school students are not thinking on future earnings when
deciding whether or not to take algebra II.
Finally, unlike the previous literature on returns to math credits, this study ad-
vances our understanding of the distribution of average benefits across different groups
of the population. No other study in the returns to high school math credits literature
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Table 2.8: First Stage / Reduced Form Impact of
interactions of potential years of exposure to STEM pro-




expo*state 4 0.115*** 0.707***
(0.0202) (0.0531)
expo*state 5 0.293*** 1.502***
(0.0335) (0.0747)
expo*state 6 -0.0943*** 0.0297
(0.00973) (0.0187)
expo*state 7 0.170*** -0.104***
(0.0110) (0.0250)
expo*state 8 0.346*** 1.568***
(0.0318) (0.0719)
expo*state 10 0.0984*** 0.732***
(0.0200) (0.0521)
expo*state 11 0.141*** 0.705***
(0.0185) (0.0455)
expo*state 14 0.335*** 1.473***
(0.0339) (0.0753)
expo*state 15 0.351*** 1.499***
(0.0347) (0.0758)
expo*state 18 0.0906*** 0.561***
(0.0207) (0.0540)
expo*state 19 0.171*** 0.314***
(0.0217) (0.0518)
expo*state 20 0.164*** 1.526***
(0.0329) (0.0691)
expo*state 21 0.119*** 0.754***
(0.0196) (0.0517)
expo*state 25 0.425*** 1.542***
(0.0321) (0.0796)
expo*state 26 -0.137*** -0.152***
(0.0238) (0.0432)
expo*state 32 0.128*** 0.784***
(0.0196) (0.0539)
expo*state 33 0.0332*** 0.00890
(0.0108) (0.0279)
expo*state 34 0.0425*** 0.128***
(0.0101) (0.0226)
expo*state 35 0.00435 0.190***
(0.00826) (0.0233)
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expo*state 37 0.220*** 0.825***
(0.0169) (0.0416)
expo*state 39 0.118*** 0.687***
(0.0205) (0.0522)
expo*state 41 -0.0361*** -0.0365***
(0.000873) (0.00184)
expo*state 42 -0.320*** 0.0604
(0.0263) (0.0486)
expo*state 43 0.192*** 0.786***
(0.0163) (0.0411)
expo*state 44 0.0451*** -0.0375
(0.0117) (0.0243)
expo*state 45 0.284*** 1.540***
(0.0338) (0.0734)
expo*state 47 0.0687*** 0.154***
(0.0136) (0.0371)
expo*state 48 0.314*** 1.543***
(0.0344) (0.0765)
expo*state 49 0.258*** 1.598***
(0.0360) (0.0762)
expo*state 50 0.0836*** 0.353***
(0.0193) (0.0391)






age as of 12-31-1996 -0.159*** -0.159***
(0.0153) (0.0365)
hh gross income 1996-1999 2.29e-06*** 1.32e-06
(8.17e-07) (1.35e-06)
hh income poverty ratio 1996-1999 -0.0124 0.0193
(0.0115) (0.0190)
hh size 1997 -0.0280*** -0.00636
(0.00750) (0.0150)
both bio parents 0.152*** 0.0903***
(0.0157) (0.0315)
expo reforms -0.0857*** -0.118**
(0.0114) (0.0554)




State-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
OLS regressions in which the dependent variable are for column 1, a dummy variable that
indicates whether students earned a positive number of credits in advanced math, and 0
otherwise. In column 2, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of income at age 28.
State and cohort fixed effects were also included. All regressions use the 1997 weight.
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CHAPTER III
Financial Incentives for Teachers in STEM fields:
A National Data Set
3.1 Motivation
3.1.1 Teacher Shortages in the US
There is a longstanding view that there is a serious shortage of mathematics and
science teachers in the US K-12 public education system (Guthrie & Zusman, 1982;
Darling-Hammond & Skyes, 2003; Murphy, DeArmond, & Guin, 2003; Chin, Young,
& Floyd, 2004; Moin, Dorfield, & Schunn, 2005; NCCTQ, 2007; Podolsky and Kini,
2016). The teacher shortage problem has two dimensions. The first is geographi-
cal in which hard-to-staff schools are usually located in high-poverty neighborhoods;
these hard-to-staff schools and districts often have difficulties attracting and retaining
qualified and fully licensed teachers (Chin, Young, & Floyd, 2004; Podlsky and Kini,
2016; Ingersoll & Perda, 2010; Darling-Hammond & Skyes, 2003). Shortages also ex-
ist in subject areas such as mathematics and science (Chin, Young, & Floyd, 2004;
Podlsky and Kini, 2016; NCCTQ, 2007). Individuals with knowledge and experience
in these areas can earn significantly higher starting salaries in private job sectors.
A deeper look into the problem reveals that, the shortage problem does not emerge
because the supply does not match demand. The real problem lies in the unequal
distribution of high quality teachers with surpluses in some areas and shortages in
others (Darling-Hammond & Skyes, 2003). Ingersoll & Perda (2010) point out that
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teacher shortages result from an uneven production of new teachers across locales.
Darling-Hammond & Skyes (2003) state that there are longstanding shortages
in particular fields which result from more attractive earnings opportunities outside
teaching. For example, when compared with what could have been their salary outside
teaching, mathematics and science teachers suffer larger wage disparities than those
teaching English and social studies. The opportunity cost for college graduates trained
in mathematics and science is higher if they want to teach. Moin et al. (2005) point
out that, nationally, between 1993 and 1999, 39 percent of school districts reported
having math and science teacher vacancies.
Moreover, teacher pay is not only relatively low but, during the 1990’s has even
declined relative to other professions. Even after adjusting for the shorter work year
in teaching, teachers earn 15 to 30 percent less than college graduates who enter other
occupations (Darling-Hammond & Skyes, 2003). In a similar venue, Podlsky & Kini,
(2016) point out that even after adjusting for a shorter work year, beginning teachers,
nationally earn about 20% less than individuals with college degrees who enter other
occupations; the gap widens to 30% by mid career.
Another reason behind the teacher shortages is the pre-retirement teacher attri-
tion/turnover (Ingersoll & Perda, 2010). According to Darling-Hammond & Skyes
(2003), since 1990 the annual outflow of teachers has surpassed the influx by increas-
ingly large margins. As many as 20 percent of new teachers may leave teaching after
3 years and around 30 percent after five years. In addition, teacher turnover is 50
percent higher in high-poverty schools than in more affluent ones.
In sum, the evidence suggests that, the shortage problem is due to, (1) an un-
even distribution of teachers; while some regions have shortages other regions have
surpluses; (2) the shortage in fields like math and science is driven by wage differ-
entials that favor occupations outside teaching, therefore, increasing the opportunity
costs for individuals who have math and science knowledge and are willing to teach
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(Darling-Hammond & Skyes, 2003; Ingersoll and Perda, 2010). Also, (3) the wage dif-
ferentials between teaching and non-teaching occupations is another driver of teacher
shortages, and finally, (4), the high levels of attrition characteristic of the teaching
profession, especially within the first five years, contributes to the teacher shortages
problem.
Indeed, more research is needed to better understand the sorting mechanisms
of teachers within schools. If teachers are allocated into schools according to the
price choice theory, then it should suffice for school districts to increase the wages
high enough for teachers to fill up the positions. If teachers are sorted into schools
by other mechanisms not related with pecuniary compensation then other solutions
must be sought. Apparently, the responses by state governments to teacher shortages
imply that the price choice theory is the prevailing sorting mechanism of teachers
into schools. If this is the case, the shortages are artificially generated by the school
districts when they do not increase wages high enough.
3.1.2 States’ Response to Teacher Shortages
In response to teacher shortages, in recent decades, states have implemented a
wide range of initiatives aimed to recruit new teachers - especially in mathematics
and science (Arfin, 1986; Ingersoll & Perda, 2010; Darling-Hammond & Hudson,
1990). These programs include emergency certification, out of field assignments to
fill vacancies, alternative certification programs, scholarships, bonuses and student
loan forgiveness, among others (Moin et al., 2005).
Typically, the financial incentives are in the form of scholarship/loans, forgivable
loans and tuition reimbursement for new teachers (Chin, Young, & Floyd, 2004;
Podolsky & Kini, 2016), and signing bonuses for current teachers (Clotfelter, Glennie,
Ladd, & Vigdor, 2007; 2008). The program recipients must commit to teaching
in hard-to-staff schools and/or to teach in subjects areas such as mathematics and
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science (Chin, Young, & Floyd, 2004; Podolsky & Kini, 2016).
This study focuses on financial incentives implemented by states aimed to increase
teachers’ labor supply, especially in mathematics and science and critical shortage
areas. Some states might address the teacher shortage problem by using non-financial
incentives such as out of field certification programs. In these cases, this data do not
capture that activity. Instead, the data and analyses presented here only involve
financial incentives.
3.1.3 Research Questions and Contribution
Given the intense efforts made by state governments to recruit highly qualified
teachers across all locales and subjects, the research questions guiding this study are
the following:
1. Starting in 1980, which states have implemented financial incentive programs
aimed to recruit and retain teachers in STEM fields?
2. What is the purpose of each program?
3. What is the size of each program in terms of the number of recipients?
4. What is the size of each program in terms of expenditures?
5. What is the average duration of the programs?
6. What are the different types of programs (e.g., loans, scholarship, etc)?
7. What are the focus of the programs (e.g., math and science, shortage areas,
etc)?
8. When normalized to account for state education systems’ size (number of teach-
ers and students), what is the distribution of STEM program characteristics
across states?
9. Is there a geographic pattern across the US states in terms of the above vari-
ables?
This study intends to contribute to the literature of teachers’ labor supply de-
cisions by creating a data set that includes all state-sponsored financial incentive
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programs aimed to recruit and retain teachers, especially in mathematics and sci-
ence, and/or critical shortage areas. A goal of this study is the creation of a national
data set that allows researchers, by merging this data with other data sources, to
answer the following research questions:
• What is the impact of financial incentives for teachers on student education
outcomes such as academic achievement, high school graduation, college access
and success, etc.?
• What is the impact of financial incentives for teachers on teacher labor supply
decisions?
• What is the impact of financial incentives for teachers on the distribution of
teaching credentials across districts?
• Do financial incentives for teachers play a role in shaping equality of opportunity
to high quality teachers?
• Do financial incentives for teachers impact the stock of teachers at the state
and district levels?
The above questions, are only a small set out of all possible questions that re-
searches might answer with these data. One of the main contributions of this study
is to put forward this data set, and encourage researchers to use it in their research
endeavors.
This paper is organized as follows. In section (3.2), I review the literature of
financial incentives and teachers’ labor supply. In section (3.3), I describe the existing
data sources of financial incentives for teachers and present the process I followed to
construct a new data set of financial aid programs aimed at increasing the supply
of teachers in math and science and/or critical shortage geographic areas. In this
section, I also define the variables included in the data set. In section (3.4), I present
the main results of the paper such as the program characteristics at the program
level, and, variation of program characteristics across states. In this section, I also
include a visual representation of the distribution of program characteristics in a US
map. Conclusions are presented in section (3.5).
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3.2 Related Literature - Financial Incentives and Teachers’
Labor Supply
Even when many states have implemented financial incentive programs aimed
at increasing the supply of teachers, especially in under-privileged geographic areas
and/or in content areas such as mathematics and science, there is little evidence of
the impact of these initiatives (Berry & Hirsch, 2005).
To my knowledge, there are only three studies that assess the impact of finan-
cial incentives aimed at recruiting teachers to understaffed schools. Steele, Murnane
and Willett (2010) exploited a natural experiment in California to evaluate the im-
pact of the Governors Teacher Fellowship (GTF) on the probability to teach in low-
performing schools. The GTF was created in 2000 and subsequently eliminated in
2002, provided $20,000 to newly licensed teachers who work for four years at schools
in the bottom half of the state’s Academic Performance Index (API). The purpose
of the study was to estimate the impact of GTF on the decisions of new teachers to
begin their careers in low performing schools.
The sample included individuals who were enrolled in a teacher licensure pro-
gram during the academic years 1998-1999, 1999-2000, 2000-2001, 2001-2002 and
2002-2003, and who were also APLE1 recipients. Only students enrolled in post-
baccalaureate teacher licensure programs during the 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 aca-
demic years were eligible to apply. The outcome was a binary variable that indicates
whether or not individuals began working in low-performing schools within two years
after the licensure program’s first enrollment. The treatment variable was equal to 1
if individuals received the GTF, and 0 otherwise.
Since the acquisition of GTF is endogenous, they used eligibility to receive GTF
as instrument for receiving GTF. Eligibility was equal to 1 if individuals were enrolled
during the academic years 2000-2001 and 2001-2002; the active years of the program.
1APLE stands for Assumption Program of Loans for Education.
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The results indicate that receiving the GTF increased the probability of starting
working in a low-performing school by 28 percentage points.
Clotfelter, Glennie, Ladd and Vigdor (2008) examined the impact of the Math,
Science and Special Education (MSSE) Teacher Recruitment Program in North Car-
olina. Between 2001 and 2004, the state of North Carolina offered a $1,800 annual
salary bonus to certified math, science, and special education teachers who worked at
low-performing and high-poverty middle schools and high schools. By using a triple
difference-in-differences analyses within a discrete time hazard model, the authors
estimated the impact of the bonus program on the hazard rates of teachers.
The triple difference exploited three types of eligibility: schools, subjects and time.
The hazard rate was defined as the probability of ending a teaching spell during year
t + 1 conditional on having taught in year t. The results indicate that the bonus
program reduced turnover rates by about 17%.
Finally, Feng and Sass (2015) analyzed the impact of the Florida Critical Teacher
Shortage Program (FCTSP) on teacher attrition. One arm of the FCTSP provided
loan forgiveness to certified teachers who worked in designated shortage areas. The
other arm provided tuition reimbursement2 to teachers who pursued certification.
In 2011, the maximum amount of tuition reimbursement was $2,808, and the max-
imum amount forgiven, for up to four years, was $2,500 per year for undergraduates
and $5,000 per year for graduate students. Similarly to Cloftelter et al (2008), Feng
and Sass also estimated a difference-in-differences model within a discrete hazard
approach. The hazard rate represents the probability that a teaching spell ends at
period t+ 1 conditional on being active in period t. They also used subject and time
eligibility to perform the difference-in-differences approach. The results indicate that
the loan forgiveness arm of the program reduced the probability of leaving teaching
by 8.6% for science high school teachers, and, by 11% for middle and high school
2Tuition reimbursement was applied directly to tuition costs of the certification.
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math teachers.
In sum, the evidence presented suggests that there is a positive effect of the
above mentioned programs on recruitment and retention of teachers in shortage areas.
Teachers respond to financial incentives. Nevertheless, more research is still needed
to understand whether or not the financial incentives aimed at increasing teachers’
labor supply are effective in providing equality of access to high quality teachers to
all students, regardless of their socioeconomic background.
3.3 Construction of a National Data Set
3.3.1 Existing data on financial incentives for teachers
To my knowledge, there are only two institutions that collect information about
state-sponsored financial incentives aimed to recruit and retain teachers: The Educa-
tion Commission of the States (ECS) and the National Association of State Student
Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP). In both cases, the information is collected
and analyzed at the state level.
According to Aragon (2016) from ECS, most states have implemented financial in-
centives to improve teacher recruitment and retention. She divides the financial incen-
tives in three types: salary requirements (e.g., minimum salary and salary sched-
ules), diversified pay, i.e., differential payment aimed to attract teachers to work in
hard-to-staff schools and/or shortage subject areas, and, pay-for-performance, to
recognize excellence in teaching. Based on these categories, 7 states have implemented
a minimum salary requirement, 17 states have programs based on salary schedules3,
23 states have implemented diversified pay, and 16 states have pay-for-performance
programs.
Zinth (2008), also from ECS, conducted a 50-state analysis of state recruitment
3Differential pay according to credentials and experience
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efforts of high school teachers in STEM fields. She concluded that 37 states provide
loan-forgiveness, scholarship or tuition reimbursement to individuals seeking certifi-
cation who agree to teach in shortage subject areas such as Math and Science. Also,
she found that 12 states offer supplemental pay for teachers in STEM fields.
The information from ECS, although rich in content it was last updated in 2008.
In addition, the report is presented as a snapshot in time and not as a time series
and therefore, it is difficult to analyze the dynamics of creation or elimination of the
programs. In any case, as I will mention later in this paper, I utilized the ECS report
as the seminal list of all the financial incentives aimed at recruiting STEM teachers
in high school.
The National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP)
conducts an annual survey about state-sponsored financial aid programs. Unlike ECS,
NASSGAP collects the information in a year-by-year basis. Among other elements,
it collects program name, expenditures, recipients, and type. The reports span from
1977 to 2015. Unlike, ECS, the information from NASSGAP does not include program
description, eligibility requirements, participant commitments, and, law statutes.
Even though this paper utilizes information from ECS and NASSGAP, many
financial aid programs that I eventually found using the process described later in
the paper, were not included in either ECS or NASSGAP data sets.
3.3.2 A New Data Set of Financial Incentives for Teachers
For this study, I define STEM Teacher Recruitment Programs or just STEM
programs as any financial aid utilized to recruit teachers, with emphasis on, but not
limited to, mathematics and science and/or critical shortage geographic areas. First,
I identified the websites that contained information about state-sponsored financial
aid programs aimed at recruiting math and science teachers as well as teachers to
work in critical shortage geographic areas.
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Even though there might be additional websites with this information, in the
observation period from May 2016 to September 2016, this is the smallest set that
includes all the programs: Education Commission of the States www.ecs.org, www.
iteachamerica.org, www.mathteaching.org, www.teachtomorrow.org, www.teachingdegree.
org, www.collegegrant.net, www.credible.com, www.collegescholarship.org and
www.collegeinvestor.com.
The outcome of the first step is a list of all the state-sponsored financial aid
programs aimed at recruiting math and/or science teachers as well as teachers to work
in critical shortage geographic areas; in other words, a list of all STEM programs.
This list included only three variables: state, program name and program description.
Next, for each program, I searched for the following information: the first year of
implementation, last year the program was active or observed on the internet, the per-
year budget allocated4, and, the per-year number of recipients. For some programs,
I also collected contact information, eligibility requirements, and responsibilities. In
this search process I relied on www.google.com, www.yahoo.com, and www.bing.com.
This process led me to informational websites like the ones described above, web-
sites of higher education state institutions (e.g., Alabama Commission On Higher Ed-
ucation http://www.ache.alabama.gov/, California Student Aid Commission http:
//www.csac.ca.gov/), state legal statutes (e.g., Louisiana http://law.justia.com/
codes/louisiana/2011/rs/title17/rs17-427-2, Missouri http://law.justia.com/
codes/missouri/2015/title-xi/chapter-173), state departments of education (e.g.,
Mississippi http://www.mde.k12.ms.us/OTC/SLF$,Oklahoma$http://www.okhighered.
org/state-system/overview/part3.shtml), and state assistance authorities (e.g.,
North Carolina http://www.ncseaa.edu/pdf/FTNC_Current_Announcement.pdf).
Finally, I complemented the information with reports from the National Association
of State Student Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP).
4The budget allocated includes overhead costs. Therefore, the recipients did not necessarily
receive all the money
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Even when the search was conducted exclusively using the Internet, which appear
in the mid 1990’s, most historical records and documents have been digitalized and
made available to the public. Thus, if a STEM program was implemented during the
early 1980’s or 1990’s the probability to find it on the Internet is still very high.
Finally, the program-level data set includes the following variables: state, program
name, program description, the first year of implementation, the last year observed,
the average per-year expenditures, and the average per-year number of recipients.
It is noteworthy that, for the programs with more than one year of information on
expenditures and recipients, after adjusting for inflation5, I calculated the average
across all available years. The program level data set can be found in this link. All
the programs found were implemented as early as 1983; therefore, the time frame I
use in this paper covers all the years between 1983 and 2016.
3.3.3 Examples of STEM Programs
There is a sizable variation across all programs regarding program types, assigned
budgets, the number of participants and eligibility requirements. For example, in
2001 Alabama implemented the Mathematics and Science Scholarship-Loan Program
for Alabama Teachers (MSSPAT) which is awarded to Alabama residents attending
an Alabama university and seeking a teaching degree in math or science. Recipients
must commit to teaching for five years in a critical shortage school.
In 2007, Arizona launched the Mathematics, Science, and Special Education
Teacher Student Loan Program to defray in-state tuition, instructional materials and
mandatory fees for students pursuing a teaching degree. Loans may be taken out for
five years, and are forgiven on a one year of loan basis for one year of service in a
public school teaching mathematics or science.
California implemented the Assumption Program of Loans for Education (APLE),
5In 2011 real USD
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which is a competitive teacher incentive program that encourages outstanding stu-
dents to become teachers in subject areas where teacher shortages have been iden-
tified. Examples of these fields are 7th to 12th grade mathematics and life/physical
sciences. In order to be eligible for loan reimbursement, the prospective teacher must
agree to teach in a public school for four years.
Finally, Colorado, in 2001 started the Colorado Loan Incentive for Teachers (LIFT)
which is a program that offers up to $2,000 in loan forgiveness per year, for up to
four years for teachers who began teaching math, science, special education, or lin-
guistically diverse education on or after June 11, 2001.
Without being comprehensive, the programs above give the reader a notion of
the types of programs included in this study. Indeed, over the last three decades
many states have implemented financial incentives aimed at increasing the supply of
teachers. The complete list of all the programs can be downloaded here.
3.3.4 Definition of Variables - Program Level Data
Since the program-level data includes the start and end years of each program
as well as recipients and expenditures, for each program, I constructed the following
vectors. The vector expenditures is a 1X34 row vector that includes the elements
expenditures 1983, expenditures 1984, ..., expenditures 2016, which are equal
to the average expenditure per program for the years between the start year and end
year; 0 otherwise. Similarly, the vector recipients, is also a 1X34 row vector that in-
cludes the variables recipients 1983, recipients 1984,..., recipients 2016; these
elements are equal to the average number of recipients for the years the program was
active and 0 otherwise. Since the data includes all the states regardless of whether
or not they implemented STEM programs, I created a variable named stem program
which is equal to one if the state implemented at least one STEM program between
1983 and 2016 and 0 otherwise.
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Based on the variable program description, I coded the variable program type
which includes the following categories: 1) loan forgiveness is a financial aid pro-
gram in which the recipient already has debt and the hiring institution will pay some
or all the loan to the lender according to the program rules. Under this program type
individuals are expected to teach in public schools, especially in shortage areas. 2)
scholarship; this program type induces individuals into teaching by paying tuition
costs to obtain teaching degrees. There is no obligation for the recipient to teach.
3) scholarship loan, this is the most commonly utilized program in which states
finance college tuition and fees with the expectation that recipients will teach in pub-
lic schools for a number of years after college graduation. If the recipient does not
teach as agreed, the scholarship is converted into a loan which the recipient must pay.
4) tuition reimbursement, is a program type in which individuals are reimbursed
part of all their college or graduate tuition costs with the expectation that the recip-
ient will teach in a subject or geographic shortage area. Finally, 5) salary bonus is
utilized to induce current teachers into shortage subject or geographic areas. Each
program was assigned to only one category.
Again, based on the variable program description, I coded four dummy vari-
ables that provide information about the program focus. Unlike program type, one
program could have more than one focus. The program focus variables are: math
& science, critical shortage area, low performing schools and, minorities.
These variables are equal to one if, in the program description these themes (e.g., math
and science, low performing schools, etc) are mentioned; 0 otherwise.
In sum, the program-level data set includes the following variables: state, program
name, program description, start year, end year, duration6, average per-year
recipients, average per-year expenditures and the vectors recipients and
expenditures.
6Duration = end year - start year.
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3.3.5 Definition of Variables - State Level Data
Based on the program-level data, I created the state-level data by collapsing the
variables at the state level. In this process, the variables program name and pro-
gram description are no longer relevant. The variable program type was converted to
dummy variables. The variable star year is the earliest year in which states imple-
mented their first STEM program; end year is the latest year in which states have
at least one active STEM program. The variable duration is the difference between
end year and start year.
All the variables recipients 1983, ..., recipients 2016, expenditures 1983,
..., expenditures 2016, average per-year recipients, average per-year expenditures,
loan forgiveness, scholarship, scholarship-loan, tuition reimbursement, salary
bonus, math and science, critical shortage area, low performing schools,
and minorities were collapsed from program level to state level by adding rows
within each state.
Consequently, for example, the state-level variable recipients 2000 represents
the sum across all programs within each state of the average per-year number of
recipients in 2000. Similarly, the variable math and science represents the num-
ber of different STEM programs focused on math and science each state has ever
implemented.
To account for the size of the states’ education systems, I combined the state-level
data of STEM programs with information from the National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES) - Common Core of Data (CCD). For each state-year between 1983
to 2016, I collected the following quantities: number of students K-12, number of
high school students, number of teachers and number of secondary school
teachers.
By combining the state-level STEM programs data with data from the CCD, I
calculated the following variables per state-year: recipients per 1,000 teachers,
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recipients per 1,000 secondary school teachers, recipients per 1,000 students,
recipients per 1,000 high school students, expenditures per teacher, expenditures
per secondary school teacher, expenditures per student and expenditures
per high school student. This is the link to the state-level data.
3.4 STEM Programs Characteristics
3.4.1 STEM Program Characteristics - Variation Across Programs
In this section, I describe the characteristics of the STEM programs both at the
program and state levels. Between 1983 and 2016, 41 states implemented at least one
STEM program; in total 87 unique programs were found. As table (3.1) indicates,
the most common program type is scholarship-loan (64%). This implies that most
participants obtain financial aid to pay their college education, especially to become
teachers. Once graduated, they are required to teach in a public school, most likely
math and science and/or in a shortage geographic area. This incentive intends to
increase the supply of new teachers by inducing individuals who are currently enrolled
in college or who will start college, to become math and science teachers in public
schools.
The second most common STEM program type is loan forgiveness (20%). This
program type serves mainly current teachers who want to pay their student debt by
teaching in a hard-to-staff school and/or teaching math and science.
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Program Types. N=87
Program Type N %
Loan Forgiveness 17 20
Scholarship 7 8
Scholarship/Loan 56 64
Tuition Reimbursement 1 1
Salary Bonus 6 7
Total 87 100
Source: STEM Programs - Program Level.dta.
There are seven STEM programs that are scholarships, six salary bonuses and
only one tuition reimbursement. Regarding program focus, table (3.2) includes the
proportion of programs, that focus on math and science, critical shortage areas, low
performing schools and minorities.
For instance, 47% of the programs focus on math and science; in other words,
they are intended to induce individuals to teach mathematics and science. Also, 41%
of the programs focus on critical shortage geographic areas. In fact, some programs
focus on both. The third focus, minorities, as its name indicates, induces individuals
from minority groups into teaching. Finally, only 4.6% of the programs focus on
low performing schools. Notably, the California Assumption Program of Loans for
Education, APLE, focuses on low performing schools as well as on math and science.
Table 3.2: Proportion of Programs with Specific Focus. N=87
Program Focus Mean Sd
Math and Science 0.47 0.50
Critical Shortage Areas 0.41 .50
Low Performing Schools 0.046 0.21
Minorities 0.10 0.31
Source: STEM Programs - Program Level.dta.
In table (3.3), I present combined information of program type and program focus.
Of the 17 loan forgiveness programs, 65% focus on math and science and 47% focus
on critical shortage areas. In addition, of the 56 scholarship-loan programs, 41%
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emphasize math and science; 39% aim to increase teachers’ supply in critical shortage
areas; 9% focus on minorities and 3.6% focus on low performing schools. The two most
popular program types - scholarship-loan and loan forgiveness - address shortages in
math and science as well as shortages in critical geographic areas.
Table 3.3: Program Type vs Program Focus. N=87
Program Math Critical Low Minorities N
Type and Science Shortage
Areas
Performing
Loan Forgiveness .65 .47 0 0 17
Scholarship .29 .14 0 .57 7
Scholarship/Loan .41 .39 .036 .089 56
Tuition Reimburse-
ment
0 1 0 0 1
Salary Bonus .83 .67 .33 0 6
Total .47 .41 .046 .10 87
Source: STEM Programs - Program Level.dta.
In order to gauge the size of the programs in terms of the number of recipients,
table (3.4) includes the distribution of program grantees across the 87 programs. As
shown, 54% of the programs serve, on average, 250 or less individuals per year. The
percentages above the first bracket is too scattered to note any pattern. Noticeably,
there are three programs with 2,000 grantees or more and eight with no information
about how many individuals they serve.
Moreover, between 1983 and 2016, some programs were implemented and elimi-
nated. For instance, as figure (3.1) indicates, 15 programs were observed for a period
of less than five years, 29 lasted less than 10 years; 8 were observed to last exactly 10
years; 22 programs lasted between 10 and 20 years, and, 18 programs lasted 20 years
or more. In fact, 5 programs were observed throughout the entire observation period.
Importantly, 1983 and 2016 are the censoring years, which means that, even when
some programs might have started before 1983, they are coded as starting in 1983.
Similarly, there might be programs that are active after 2016; nevertheless, for those
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Table 3.4: Average annual recipients. N=87
Average Annual Recipients N %










Source: STEM Programs - Program Level.dta.
Figure 3.1: Duration in Years of STEM Programs
programs 2016 is the last year they were observed in the data.
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Regarding when the programs were first and last observed, table (3.5) includes the
distribution of start and end years for all the programs. There are 3 programs that
started in 1983 or before. Also, in 1991, 11 programs started, and combining 2001,
2002 and 2003, 25 programs were born. These patterns require further explanation
because starting in 2001, many states were interested in increasing teachers’ labor
supply. A potential reason might be the passing of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB)
Law in 2001 which entered into effect in 2002. After this period, some states started
STEM programs but not with the 2001-2003 intensity. Regarding the end year of
the programs, 2014 seems to be the year in which many states decided to drop the
support for these programs as 32 programs disappeared. In addition, 25 programs
were last observed in 2016, which implies that they might still be active.
Table 3.5: Distribution of Start and End years. N=87
Year Start End Year Start End
1983 3 2001 9
1984 3 2002 9
1985 1 2003 7
1986 1 2004 2 2
1988 1 2005 3 1
1989 1 2006 3
1990 1 2007 3 1
1991 11 2008 2 2
1992 1 2009 4 2
1993 1 1 2010 6
1994 2 2011 1 2
1995 2 2012 1 5
1996 1 2013 4 2
1997 1 1 2014 1 32
1998 3 2015 3
1999 3 2016 25
2000 4 Total 87 87
Source: STEM Programs - Program Level.dta.
An alternate measure of the programs’ size is annual expenditures. Table (3.6)
shows the distribution of annual expenditures across the 87 programs. All the mon-
etary measures were inflation adjusted to represent 2011 real dollars. As table (3.6)
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indicates, almost half of the programs spent 0.5 Million or less per year. There is a
large variation across the programs regarding the budget allocated.
Table 3.6: Distribution of Annual Expenditures (2011 USD). N=87
Annual Expeditures (2011USD) N %
[0, $0.5M] 41 47
($0.5M, $1M] 9 10
($1M, $1.5M] 8 9
($1.5M, $2M] 4 5
($2M, $2.5M] 4 5
($2.5M, $3M] 5 6
($3M, $3.5M] 2 2
($3.5M, $4M] 1 1
($4M, $4.5M] 2 2
($4.5M, 5M] 1 1
($5M, $5.5M] 2 2
($5.5M, +] 8 9
Total 87 100
Source: STEM Programs - Program Level.dta.
3.4.2 STEM Program Characteristics - Variation Across States
The above mentioned tables and graphs refer to individual programs and do not
account for the size of the different education systems. For instance, having 250
grantees per year is a large number for Wyoming but a very small for New York
or California. In the following paragraphs, I discuss STEM program characteristics
normalized to account for state by year number of teachers and students. By doing
so, I compare STEM program characteristics across states.
Table (3.7) includes summary statistics of all the variables collapsed at the state
level. For instance, duration was calculated as the difference between the latest year
each state had an active STEM program minus the earliest year the same state had an
active STEM program. Recall that some states have more than one STEM program
and the start and end years of these programs within each state need not to coincide.
Of the 34 observed years, the ”life expectancy” of the programs is about 13 years. In
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this case, both the mean and the median coincide.
Some states have been working during a long time in recruiting teachers through
STEM programs. For instance, California, Delaware, Oklahoma and South Carolina
all have at least one active STEM program for at least 30 years. Other states (and
DC) don’t have any STEM programs for the same time period: Alaska, DC, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island and
Vermont.
The average number of recipients is about 892; however, the median is 136.
This implies that there are some states that invest in their STEM programs very
heavily. For example, New York’s programs serve about 12,000 individuals per year,
North Carolina’s programs impact about 5,400 individuals, and California’s program
impacts about 4,800 individuals each year. The programs of Idaho, Wyoming and
Hawaii impact less than 30 individuals per year.
The mean expenditures is about 4 Million and again, the median is about 0.5
Million. This implies that there are large states that invest heavily. The four states
with the highest investments are New York, North Carolina, Iowa and California. It is
important to consider that the budgets assigned might or might not include overhead
costs, thus, not all the money is assigned to program participants.
The variables recipients per 1,000 teachers, expenditures per teacher,
recipients per 1,000 secondary teachers, expenditures per secondary teachers,
recipients per 1,000 students, expenditures per student, recipients per
1,000 high school students, and, expenditures per high school student were
calculated as follows. First, the state-level variables, recipients 1983 ,..., recipients 2016,
expenditures 1983 ,..., expenditures 2016 were divided by the corresponding (by
year) measure of teachers 1983 ,..., teachers 2016, students 1983 ,..., students 2016,
secondary teachers 1983 ,..., secondary teachers 2016, and high school students 1983
,..., high school students 2016.
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Next, for each state, I calculated the average (mean of elements in the row)
of all non-missing values of the recipients per 1,000 teachers, expenditures
per teacher, recipients per 1,000 secondary teachers), expenditures per
secondary teachers, recipients per 1,000 students), expenditures per student,
recipients per 1,000 high school students), and, expenditures per high school
student. Table (3.7) includes the summary statistics using across-state variation.
The resulting statistics account now for the education system size across states.
For instance, for every 1,000 teachers around 6 individuals participate in STEM
programs, and, for each teacher, the expenditures in STEM programs is about $30
USD. For every 1,000 secondary teachers, about 16 individuals participate in STEM
programs. Also, for each secondary teacher, expenditures in STEM programs are
about $83, and for every 1,000 students, 0.37 individuals are STEM programs grantees.
Additionally, for each student, states spend about $2 in STEM programs and for each
1,000 high school students, about 1.27 individuals participate in STEM programs. Fi-
nally, for each high school student, states invest about $7 in STEM programs.
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Table 3.7: State Level Program Characteristics. N=87
mean sd min max p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Duration (years) 13 10 0 33 0 2 13 22 24
Annual recipients 892 2,025 0 12,229 0 23 136 807 2,686
Annual expenditures $4,098,705 $8,056,020 $0 $45,100,000 $0 $144,050 $538,598 $4,623,649 $9,365,375
Recipients 5.63 9.86 0.00 54.80 0.00 0.06 1.92 6.40 14.24
/ (1,000 teachers)
Expenditures $29.46 $45.88 $0.00 $191.82 $0.00 $0.46 $9.31 $37.48 $69.00
/ teacher
Recipients 16.16 28.58 0.00 150.31 0.00 0.18 3.91 16.47 37.57
/ (1,000 secondary teachers)
Expenditures $83.18 $131.86 $0.00 $523.63 $0.00 $1.50 $23.19 $130.69 $232.66
/ secondary teacher
Recipients 0.37 0.64 0.00 3.43 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.41 0.94
/ (1,000 students)
Expenditures $1.94 $3.01 $0.00 $12.49 $0.00 $0.03 $0.65 $2.81 $4.94
/ student
Recipients 1.27 2.30 0.00 12.91 0.00 0.01 0.48 1.44 3.40
/ (1,000 high school students)
Expenditure $6.66 $10.49 $0.00 $45.37 $0.00 $0.12 $2.18 $9.31 $17.45
/ high school student
Loan Forgiveness 0.33 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Scholarship 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Scholarship / Loan 1.10 1.20 0.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00
Tuition Reimbursement 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Salary Bonus 0.12 0.38 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Math and Science 0.80 0.85 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00
Critical Shortage Area 0.71 0.97 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00
Low Performing Schools 0.08 0.34 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Minorities 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Source: STEM Programs - State Level.dta.
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Furthermore, the variables loan forgiveness, scholarship, scholarship-loan,
tuition reimbursement, and salary bonus were calculated as follows. When the
data was at the program level, these variables were dummy variables. When the
data was transformed to state-level, these dummies were collapsed by adding the val-
ues of these dummies within each state. If, for instance, a state has two programs
in the loan forgiveness category, then its state-level value on the variable loan
forgiveness is equal to 2.
As table (3.7) indicates, the average number of loan forgiveness programs is about
0.33. The corresponding statistics for scholarship, scholarship-loan, tuition
reimbursement, and salary bonus are, respectively 0.14, 1.1, 0.02 and 0.12. Across
all the states, the conclusion is the same, the most popular program type is scholarship-loan,
followed by loan forgiveness.
The variables math and science, critical shortage areas, low performing
schools and minorities were calculated similarly to the program type variables.
When collapsing from program-level to state-level each variable was calculated as
the sum of the dummy variables within each state. Across all states, the number of
programs focused on math and science is about 0.8 and focusing on critical shortage
areas is about 0.71.
Table (3.8) presents state-level information regarding STEM program character-
istics. As mentioned, start refers to the earliest year in which each state implemented
at least one STEM program. Some states have implemented STEM programs since
the beginning of the observation period. For example, California (1983), Connecti-
cut (1983), Delaware (1984), Pennsylvania (1984), Oklahoma (1985), South Carolina
(1984) abd Washington (1983). The states with the largest program size in terms of
program recipients are: New York, North Carolina, California, Georgia and Florida.
Regarding average annual expenditures the states with the largest investments are
New York, North Carolina, Iowa, California, Mississippi, Georgia, Illinois, South Car-
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olina and Utah.
Table 3.8: Across States Distribution of STEM Programs
Characteristics
State
Start End Duration Recipients7 Expenditures8
Alabama 2001 2016 15 176 $846,652
Alaska 0 0 $0
Arizona 2011 2014 3 36 $193,677
Arkansas 1994 2014 18 827 $3,104,066
California 1983 2016 33 4,788 $16,591,672
Colorado 2001 2008 7 248 $443,040
Connecticut 1983 2014 12 383 $3,059,283
Delaware 1984 2016 32 34 $395,875
DC 0 0 $0
Florida 1991 2014 19 3,109 $4,580,539
Georgia 1995 2011 16 3,551 $9,365,375
Hawaii 2002 2004 2 23 $119,000
Idaho 1992 1993 1 28 $84,864
Illinois 1986 2016 30 1,207 $8,652,812
Indiana 1991 2014 23 214 $317,478
Iowa 2001 2016 13 639 $16,884,974
Kansas 2005 2007 2 36 $191,500
Kentucky 1991 2014 23 1,550 $4,623,649
Louisiana 2003 2005 2 33 $244,000
Maine 1998 2014 16 340 $1,099,799
Maryland 1991 2014 19 433 $2,027,210
Massachusetts 1999 2016 17 807 $6,403,656
Michigan 0 0 $0
Minnesota 0 0 $0
Mississippi 1991 2016 23 2,686 $9,713,505
Missouri 2003 2015 11 300 $538,598
Montana 2007 2016 9 120 $364,000
Nebraska 2000 2012 12 0 $3,429,000
Nevada 0 0 $0
New Hampshire 0 0 $0
New Jersey 0 0 $0
New Mexico 1994 2016 22 40 $144,050
New York 2000 2016 16 12,229 $45,119,421
North Carolina 2001 2014 12 5,428 $29,482,719
North Dakota 2001 2014 13 285 $298,125




Oklahoma 1985 2016 31 136 $494,325
Oregon 0 0 $0
Pennsylvania 1984 2008 24 2,168 $6,576,526
Rhode Island 0 0 $0
South Carolina 1984 2016 32 1,405 $8,651,061
South Dakota 2003 2016 13 117 $1,859,350
Tennessee 1991 2014 23 293 $1,290,925
Texas 2001 2016 15 820 $3,899,257
Utah 1996 2016 18 465 $8,426,077
Vermont 0 0 $0
Virginia 2002 2014 12 277 $928,490
Washington 1983 2014 23 87 $386,308
West Virginia 1991 2014 23 64 $269,828
Wisconsin 1998 2014 16 91 $244,258
Wyoming 1997 2015 18 24 $864,000
All monetary measures are presented in inflation adjusted in 2011 USD. The average annual recipients and
expenditures were calculated as the average of non-zero quantities across row after transforming from Program
Level to State Level data. Source: STEM Programs - State Level.dta.
Table (3.9) includes the number of programs by type that each state has imple-
mented. As previously mentioned, the most popular type is scholarship-loan. For
instance, North Carolina and Mississippi have implemented 5 scholarship-loan pro-
grams; Illinois, South Carolina and Missouri implemented 3 scholarship-loan pro-
grams. Other program types appear 2 times or less in each state.












Alabama 0 0 2 0 0
Alaska 0 0 0 0 0
Arizona 0 0 1 0 0
Arkansas 1 1 1 0 0
California 0 0 1 0 0
Colorado 1 0 0 0 0
Connecticut 0 1 1 0 0
Delaware 0 0 2 0 0
DC 0 0 0 0 0
Florida 0 0 2 1 0
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Georgia 0 0 2 0 0
Hawaii 0 0 1 0 0
Idaho 0 0 1 0 0
Illinois 1 0 3 0 0
Indiana 0 1 0 0 0
Iowa 1 0 1 0 1
Kansas 0 0 1 0 0
Kentucky 0 1 1 0 0
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 1
Maine 0 1 0 0 0
Maryland 1 0 2 0 0
Massachusetts 0 0 2 0 0
Michigan 0 0 0 0 0
Minnesota 0 0 0 0 0
Mississippi 1 1 5 0 0
Missouri 0 0 3 0 0
Montana 1 0 0 0 0
Nebraska 0 0 1 0 0
Nevada 0 0 0 0 0
New Hampshire 0 0 0 0 0
New Jersey 0 0 0 0 0
New Mexico 1 0 1 0 0
New York 0 0 2 0 0
North Carolina 0 0 5 0 2
North Dakota 1 0 0 0 0
Ohio 1 0 0 0 1
Oklahoma 1 0 1 0 0
Oregon 0 0 0 0 0
Pennsylvania 1 0 1 0 0
Rhode Island 0 0 0 0 0
South Carolina 1 0 3 0 0
South Dakota 0 0 2 0 0
Tennessee 1 0 2 0 0
Texas 1 0 1 0 0
Utah 0 0 2 0 1
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0
Virginia 0 0 1 0 0
Washington 1 0 1 0 0
West Virginia 0 1 0 0 0
Wisconsin 1 0 0 0 0
Wyoming 0 0 1 0 0
Each cell represents the number of programs each state has from each program type. Source: STEM
Programs - State Level.dta.
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Regarding program focus, table (3.10) presents the distribution of programs by
state. North Carolina and Mississippi have both three programs focused on increasing
teacher labor supply in math and science, and, New York, Utah, Maryland, Delaware,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Washington and Ohio have all two programs focused on math
and science teachers. Mississippi is the state with the largest number of programs
focused on critical shortage areas (4), followed by South Carolina (3), and, North
Carolina, Arkansas, Illinois, South Dakota, Alabama, Iowa, Georgia, Florida and
New Mexico have all two programs focused on critical shortage areas.
Table 3.10: Across States Distribution of STEM Program
Focus






1 2 0 0
Alaska 0 0 0 0
Arizona 1 0 0 0
Arkansas 2 2 0 1
California 1 0 1 0
Colorado 1 0 0 0
Connecticut 2 1 0 1
Delaware 2 0 0 0
DC 0 0 0 0
Florida 0 2 0 1
Georgia 0 2 0 0
Hawaii 1 0 0 0
Idaho 0 0 0 0
Illinois 1 2 0 1
Indiana 0 0 0 1
Iowa 1 2 0 0
Kansas 1 1 0 0
Kentucky 1 0 0 1
Louisiana 1 1 0 0
Maine 0 0 0 0
Maryland 2 0 0 0
Massachusetts 1 0 0 0
Michigan 0 0 0 0
Minnesota 0 0 0 0
Mississippi 3 4 0 0
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Missouri 0 0 1 1
Montana 1 1 0 0
Nebraska 0 1 0 0
Nevada 0 0 0 0
New Hampshire 0 0 0 0
New Jersey 0 0 0 0
New Mexico 0 2 0 0
New York 2 1 0 0
North Carolina 3 2 2 1
North Dakota 1 1 0 0
Ohio 2 1 0 0
Oklahoma 1 1 0 0
Oregon 0 0 0 0
Pennsylvania 1 1 0 0
Rhode Island 0 0 0 0
South Carolina 1 3 0 0
South Dakota 1 2 0 0
Tennessee 0 0 0 1
Texas 1 1 0 0
Utah 2 0 0 0
Vermont 0 0 0 0
Virginia 1 0 0 0
Washington 2 0 0 0
West Virginia 0 0 0 0
Wisconsin 0 0 0 0
Wyoming 0 0 0 0
Each cell represents the number of programs each state has from each program focus. Source: STEM Programs
- State Level.dta.
When STEM program characteristics are normalized to account for the size of
the states’ education systems the results are presented in table (3.11). Mississippi,
South Carolina, New York, California and Kentucky are the states with the largest
ratio of STEM program recipients per 1,000 teachers. In addition, the states with
the highest ratio of STEM program expenditures per teacher are Mississippi, Iowa,
South Carolina, Utah and New York. The states with the largest ratio of STEM
program recipients per 1,000 students are Mississippi, New York, South Carolina,
North Dakota and Kentucky. Finally, the states with the largest ratio of STEM
program expenditures per student are Iowa, Mississippi, South Carolina, New York
and Wyoming.
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Table 3.11: Across States Distribution of STEM Program
Normalized Characteristics
State









student 1000 hs stu-
dents
hs students
Alabama 1.18 $5.82 3.21 $15.95 0.08 $0.39 0.27 $1.34
Alaska 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00
Arizona 0.09 $0.46 0.29 $1.56 0.00 $0.02 0.01 $0.07
Arkansas 5.80 $23.69 13.74 $55.68 0.41 $1.68 1.44 $5.84
California 19.26 $66.76 67.14 $232.66 0.86 $2.96 2.97 $10.30
Colorado 1.27 $2.26 2.65 $4.74 0.08 $0.13 0.26 $0.46
Connecticut 2.79 $21.58 6.87 $50.41 0.21 $1.60 0.70 $5.44
Delaware 2.17 $36.51 4.33 $72.94 0.14 $2.37 0.48 $8.03
DC 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00
Florida 11.35 $14.50 29.99 $38.27 0.66 $0.86 2.35 $3.01
Georgia 14.24 $37.48 35.00 $92.13 0.94 $2.47 3.40 $8.95
Hawaii 0.18 $0.95 0.39 $2.01 0.01 $0.06 0.04 $0.20
Idaho 0.14 $0.42 0.30 $0.90 0.01 $0.02 0.02 $0.07
Illinois 6.40 $48.31 22.80 $172.22 0.40 $3.00 1.38 $10.43
Indiana 2.57 $3.81 5.85 $8.66 0.15 $0.22 0.51 $0.75
Iowa 4.46 $173.78 13.13 $498.67 0.32 $12.49 1.05 $40.67
Kansas 0.09 $0.49 0.18 $0.98 0.01 $0.04 0.02 $0.12
Kentucky 17.73 $58.70 70.09 $228.25 1.10 $3.63 3.87 $12.78
Louisiana 0.06 $0.45 0.20 $1.50 0.00 $0.03 0.02 $0.12
Maine 10.50 $34.01 33.25 $107.69 0.87 $2.81 2.80 $9.07
Maryland 3.14 $15.59 7.52 $37.08 0.21 $1.02 0.69 $3.42
Massachusetts 6.00 $47.65 16.47 $130.69 0.44 $3.51 1.49 $11.83
Michigan 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00
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Minnesota 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00
Mississippi 54.80 $191.82 150.31 $523.63 3.43 $12.05 12.91 $45.37
Missouri 1.06 $2.06 2.19 $4.26 0.08 $0.15 0.25 $0.50
Montana 3.41 $10.35 10.90 $33.07 0.25 $0.75 0.82 $2.48
Nebraska 0.00 $60.70 0.00 $162.22 0.00 $4.51 0.00 $14.58
Nevada 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00
New Hamp-
shire
0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00
New Jersey 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00
New Mexico 1.00 $3.81 3.59 $13.79 0.06 $0.25 0.22 $0.84
New York 28.70 $105.66 75.15 $276.67 2.18 $8.04 7.33 $27.00
North Car-
olina
10.61 $68.07 30.32 $193.25 0.71 $4.60 2.49 $16.00
North Dakota 14.18 $14.82 37.57 $39.29 1.18 $1.23 3.69 $3.86
Ohio 0.00 $10.61 0.00 $23.19 0.00 $0.66 0.00 $2.18
Oklahoma 2.80 $7.24 6.52 $16.76 0.18 $0.47 0.65 $1.70
Oregon 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00
Pennsylvania 6.69 $20.35 15.40 $46.84 0.40 $1.23 1.38 $4.21
Rhode Island 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00
South Car-
olina
28.84 $158.24 90.23 $496.88 1.83 $10.09 6.42 $35.44
South Dakota 3.77 $36.80 13.89 $137.02 0.28 $2.70 0.94 $9.31
Tennessee 2.42 $11.21 8.69 $40.26 0.15 $0.71 0.54 $2.51
Texas 0.99 $4.71 2.51 $11.94 0.07 $0.32 0.24 $1.14
Utah 10.88 $112.80 26.87 $279.18 0.48 $4.94 1.66 $17.53
Vermont 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00 0.00 $0.00
Virginia 1.26 $4.22 2.34 $7.82 0.09 $0.29 0.28 $0.95
Washington 1.21 $5.37 2.95 $13.14 0.06 $0.27 0.20 $0.90
West Virginia 2.21 $9.31 5.69 $23.93 0.16 $0.65 0.52 $2.21
Wisconsin 0.77 $2.06 1.97 $5.29 0.05 $0.14 0.16 $0.44
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Wyoming 1.92 $69.00 3.91 $140.78 0.15 $5.39 0.48 $17.45
All monetary measures are presented in inflation adjusted in 2011 USD. All measures were calculated as the average of non-zero quantities across row
after transforming from Program Level to State Level data. Source: STEM Programs - State Level.dta.
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3.4.3 STEM Program Characteristics - Variation Across States: Maps
The following analyses rely on maps generated using state-level information. Fig-
ure (3.2) shows across-state variation in duration, recipients and expenditures. For
duration, the pattern is clear; the states with the largest duration of STEM programs
are Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, South Carolina, West Virginia,
Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, California and Washington. Interestingly, most states are
near each other. Regarding annual recipients, the states with the greatest number of
STEM program recipients are located in the South (Texas) and South East as well as
California. Finally, in terms of expenditures, the states with the highest investments
in STEM programs are located in the East and South East.
Figure (3.3) shows the between-state variation in program type. For instance,
states with loan forgiveness STEM programs are located in the North (Oregon, Mon-
tana, North Dakota), the South (New Mexico, Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Colorado,
Tennessee and Mississippi), as well as in the Midwest (Wisconsin, Illinois, Iowa, Ohio),
and one state in the East (Pennsylvania). The states that concentrate most of the
scholarship-loan STEM programs are Illinois, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina
and South Carolina. This finding is important since most of the STEM programs
are scholarship-loans. Tuition reimbursement programs are located in Florida and
scholarships are located in Indiana, Kentucky, West Virginia, Arkansas, Mississippi
and Maine.
Figure (3.4) shows the variation across states in terms of program focus. Notably,
most states have at least one program focused on math and science. Some states have
more than one program devoted to attract math and science teachers (Washington,
Utah, Arkansas, Mississippi,Ohio, North Carolina and New York). Conversely, the
states that invest in STEM programs focused on critical shortage areas are concen-
trated mainly in the South-East and in the Mid-West. STEM Programs with focus
on low performing schools are scarce, and are located in California, Missouri and
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North Carolina. Finally, states with STEM Programs aimed to attract minorities
into teaching are located in the Mid-West.
In terms of the normalized number of recipients, figure (3.5) shows the between-
state variation in four measures: recipients per 1,000 teachers, recipients per 1,000
secondary teachers, recipients per 1,000 students and recipients per 1,000 high school
students. In the four cases, the states with the highest number of recipients per unit
of either teachers or students are located in the East and South-East, although there
are also states in the West like California and Utah.
Finally, regarding the normalized version of expenditures, figure (3.6) shows the
between state variation in expenditures per teacher, expenditures per secondary
teacher, expenditures per student and expenditures per high school student. In the
four cases, the states that invest the heaviest are located across all the mid-range
of the US (California, Utah, Wyoming, Nevada, Iowa, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri,
North Carolina and South Carolina and New York).
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Figure 3.2: Across-State variation on: Duration, Recipients and Expenditures
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Figure 3.3: Across-State variation on: Program Type
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Figure 3.4: Across-State variation on: Program Focus
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Figure 3.5: Across-State variation on: Recipients
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Figure 3.6: Across-State variation on: Expenditures
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3.5 Conclusions
This study serves two purposes. First, to inform the reader the process of gath-
ering the data and coding the variables of financial incentives aimed to recruit and
retain teachers in STEM fields and/or critical shortage areas. In doing so, I encourage
researchers to utilize and improve the data that is available to the public. A contri-
bution derived from this purpose is the promotion of research that involves financial
incentives of the nature described in this study. A suggested set of research questions
is offered in section (3.1).
Second, this study provides a comprehensive (national) view of all the financial
incentive programs aimed to recruit and retain teachers in STEM fields. The most
popular type of program is scholarship-loan and the two main focus are math and
science and critical shortage areas. There is a sharp variation on states’ approaches
to solve teacher shortages in math and science and/or critical shortage areas. On the
one hand, some states invest heavily and for a long period of time on these programs
whereas other states haven’t even started.
Geographically, there are some interesting patterns to discuss. The states with
the highest expenditures per unit of education system (e.g., students, teachers) are
located across the center of the US and are adjacent in most cases. In contrast, the
states with the largest ratios of recipients per unit of education system are mostly
located in the East Coast and California. Finally, whereas loan forgiveness programs
are located in the South and North, the Scholarship-Loan programs prevail in the
South-East.
Indeed, more research is needed to assess the role of financial incentive programs
for teachers on a number of education outcomes. Large sums of money are invested
in a yearly basis and programs are born and disappear often. Nevertheless, the
decisions to implement or eliminate programs could be done more systematically
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if these programs were evaluated appropriately in terms of the marginal costs and
marginal benefits to individuals and society.
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Table A.1: First Stage: Impact of interactions of po-
tential years of exposure to STEM programs time-varying
characteristics and state dummies on advanced math-
ematics credits controlling for demographics, house-
hold characteristics, high school math graduation re-
quirements, and state and cohort fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
expo expo expo expo re-
cip/
expo
years recipients expend. 1,000 teach exp/teacher
in*state 4 -0.301*** 0.0266*** 1.62e-
06***
-0.00625 -0.00210
(0.0154) (0.00590) (4.25e-07) (0.146) (0.0284)
in*state 5 -0.510*** 0.000699*** 7.23e-
08***
0.0998*** 0.0285***
(0.0142) (0.000151) (1.73e-08) (0.0226) (0.00701)





(0.0309) (0.000165) (9.21e-08) (0.00647) (0.00392)
in*state 7 0.224*** 0.00282*** 6.74e-
07***
0.107*** 0.0257***
(0.0359) (0.000578) (1.37e-07) (0.0217) (0.00561)
in*state 8 -0.404*** 0.0102*** 1.48e-
06***
0.0711*** 0.0137***
(0.0160) (0.00336) (4.82e-07) (0.0256) (0.00428)
in*state 10 -0.288*** 9.31e-05 2.72e-08 0.00183 0.00222
(0.0153) (9.28e-05) (2.71e-08) (0.0199) (0.00440)
in*state 11 -0.209*** 0.000112*** 4.19e-
08***
0.0105*** 0.00399***
(0.0102) (2.39e-05) (8.88e-09) (0.00237) (0.000938)
in*state 14 -0.446*** -0.000605 -1.29e-07 -0.402*** -0.0319***
(0.0144) (0.000559) (1.18e-07) (0.0634) (0.0114)
in*state 15 -0.416*** 0.0161*** 4.08e-
06***
0.0524 0.0294
(0.0151) (0.00337) (8.98e-07) (0.326) (0.239)






(0.0167) (4.90e-05) (2.08e-08) (0.00168) (0.000772)
in*state 19 0.0233 0.00121 1.64e-07 -0.000307 0.000790
(0.0594) (0.00241) (3.24e-07) (0.110) (0.0160)




(0.0188) (0.00216) (2.73e-07) (0.175) (0.0525)
in*state 21 -0.230*** 0.000351 8.41e-08 0.0125 0.00323
(0.0157) (0.000245) (5.83e-08) (0.0130) (0.00339)
in*state 25 -0.297*** 0.00148*** 1.62e-
07***
-0.0717*** 0.00304***
(0.0329) (0.000300) (3.25e-08) (0.00555) (0.00100)





(0.0629) (0.000313) (2.41e-07) (0.0198) (0.0165)
in*state 32 -0.241*** 0.0560*** 5.26e-
06***
0.00767 0.000574
(0.0164) (0.0120) (1.25e-06) (0.300) (0.0817)








(0.0329) (3.34e-06) (8.98e-10) (0.000643) (0.000184)





(0.0315) (1.60e-05) (4.02e-09) (0.00132) (0.000362)
in*state 35 -0.0510* -0.000150 -1.44e-07 -0.00181* -0.00168*
(0.0268) (0.000127) (1.21e-07) (0.000967) (0.001000)
in*state 37 -0.161*** 0.00201* 1.85e-07* 0.0752* 0.00603
(0.0184) (0.00112) (1.03e-07) (0.0416) (0.00421)
in*state 39 -0.293*** -1.19e-05 -3.63e-09 0.000859 0.000249
(0.0157) (3.81e-05) (1.25e-08) (0.00358) (0.00126)
in*state 41 -0.0244*** 0.000955*** 6.97e-
08***
0.0530*** 0.00319***
(0.00255) (0.000175) (1.38e-08) (0.0111) (0.000737)






(0.0626) (0.00115) (1.94e-07) (0.0108) (0.00196)
in*state 43 -0.240*** -0.000243 -5.75e-08 -0.0220* -0.00503*
(0.0178) (0.000219) (5.11e-08) (0.0114) (0.00291)
in*state 44 -0.0418 -3.72e-05 -7.86e-09 -0.0204 -0.00408
(0.0371) (6.13e-05) (1.28e-08) (0.0164) (0.00373)
in*state 45 -0.427*** 0.0233*** 1.16e-
06***
0.895*** 0.0275***
(0.0213) (0.00119) (5.87e-08) (0.0479) (0.00153)
in*state 47 0.184*** 0.000731*** 2.18e-
07***
0.0629*** 0.0191***
(0.0398) (0.000177) (5.22e-08) (0.0154) (0.00486)
in*state 48 -0.474*** 0.0389*** 3.20e-
06***
-1.039*** -0.242***
(0.0136) (0.00833) (7.48e-07) (0.321) (0.0797)




(0.0125) (0.0113) (1.07e-06) (1.122) (0.259)
in*state 50 -0.179*** -0.00177* -6.65e-07* -0.137** -0.0503**
(0.0660) (0.000920) (3.40e-07) (0.0525) (0.0209)
in*state 51 -0.419*** 0.144*** 1.51e-
06***
-7.524*** -0.203***
(0.0345) (0.0299) (3.26e-07) (0.985) (0.0266)
female 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.135***
(0.0390) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0386) (0.0388)
white 0.235*** 0.234*** 0.233*** 0.232*** 0.233***
(0.0484) (0.0489) (0.0492) (0.0495) (0.0497)
age as of
12-31-1996
-0.351*** -0.341*** -0.342*** -0.359*** -0.360***














(1.90e-06) (1.91e-06) (1.91e-06) (1.86e-06) (1.87e-06)
hh income
poverty
-0.0249 -0.0245 -0.0244 -0.0233 -0.0238
ratio 1996-
1999
(0.0273) (0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0264) (0.0266)
hh size
1997
-0.0564*** -0.0568*** -0.0568*** -0.0570*** -0.0571***
(0.0146) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0147)
both bio
parents
0.356*** 0.358*** 0.358*** 0.355*** 0.355***
(0.0371) (0.0368) (0.0369) (0.0373) (0.0373)
expo re-
forms
-0.118*** -0.131*** -0.130*** -0.134*** -0.133***




-0.553*** 7.185*** 2.890*** -53.21*** -51.66***
(0.0717) (1.448) (0.575) (7.004) (6.809)
Constant 9.125*** -21.92*** -4.725 219.9*** 213.7***
(0.682) (6.396) (2.923) (28.51) (27.77)
N 4,219 4,219 4,219 4,219 4,219
math 1.026 1.026 1.026 1.026 1.026
AP F stat 11.39 101.89 95.8 115.54 106.9
p-value 0.0015 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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State-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is advanced math credits; the treatment
variables are the interactions of in and state dummies. in1-in5 measure potential years of
exposure to: (1) STEM programs, (2) recipients, (3) expenditures, (4) recipients/1,000 teachers,
and (5) expenditure/teacher. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis of joint significance of the
coefficients of the interactions of in and state dummies. All regressions use the 1997 weight.
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Table A.2: First Stage: Impact of interactions of po-
tential years of exposure to STEM programs time-varying
characteristics and state dummies on Total Credits con-
trolling for demographics, household characteristics, high
school math graduation requirements and state and co-
hort fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
expo expo expo expo re-
cip/
expo
years recipients expend. 1,000 teach exp/teacher
in*state 4 -0.335*** 0.0165 -1.55e-06 -6.416*** -1.142***
(0.125) (0.0246) (1.73e-06) (0.766) (0.148)
in*state 5 0.617*** 0.000699 1.72e-08 0.365*** 0.109***
(0.0798) (0.000645) (7.26e-08) (0.115) (0.0354)





(0.137) (0.000725) (4.05e-07) (0.0320) (0.0191)
in*state 7 0.853*** 0.0112*** 2.67e-
06***
0.390*** 0.0891***
(0.167) (0.00269) (6.41e-07) (0.111) (0.0282)
in*state 8 1.345*** 0.0788*** 1.13e-
05***
0.562*** 0.104***
(0.108) (0.0185) (2.67e-06) (0.139) (0.0227)
in*state 10 -0.399*** 0.000118 3.10e-08 0.0370 -0.0105
(0.121) (0.000429) (1.26e-07) (0.0976) (0.0214)
in*state 11 -0.0448 0.000557*** 2.08e-
07***
0.0502*** 0.0182***
(0.0713) (0.000130) (4.85e-08) (0.0127) (0.00496)
in*state 14 0.530*** 0.00388 8.08e-07 -0.318 -0.0459
(0.0759) (0.00254) (5.38e-07) (0.349) (0.0589)
in*state 15 1.070*** 0.0178 2.33e-06 2.283 1.716
(0.0816) (0.0144) (3.78e-06) (1.552) (1.131)
in*state 18 0.271** 0.000352 1.48e-07 0.00785 0.00284
(0.131) (0.000233) (9.93e-08) (0.00890) (0.00403)
in*state 19 2.068*** 0.0667*** 8.99e-
06***
2.979*** 0.389***
(0.296) (0.0120) (1.62e-06) (0.580) (0.0825)
in*state 20 0.153 0.00856 -1.39e-07 -14.83*** -4.341***
(0.102) (0.00927) (1.16e-06) (0.822) (0.242)
in*state 21 -0.216* -0.000405 -1.03e-07 -0.0540 -0.0127
(0.127) (0.00119) (2.84e-07) (0.0684) (0.0175)
in*state 25 2.249*** 0.00209 2.23e-07 -0.647*** -0.0137***
(0.283) (0.00131) (1.43e-07) (0.0373) (0.00493)
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(0.351) (0.00167) (1.28e-06) (0.111) (0.0900)
in*state 32 -0.427*** 0.0304 -5.33e-06 -10.27*** -2.536***
(0.125) (0.0502) (5.08e-06) (1.454) (0.397)





(0.175) (1.66e-05) (4.50e-09) (0.00345) (0.000979)
in*state 34 0.438*** 0.000189** 4.54e-08** 0.0122* 0.00270
(0.156) (7.85e-05) (2.04e-08) (0.00665) (0.00182)
in*state 35 0.592*** 0.00229*** 2.18e-
06***
0.0145*** 0.0133**
(0.130) (0.000620) (5.91e-07) (0.00526) (0.00535)
in*state 37 2.026*** -0.00932* -8.77e-07* -0.468** -0.0506**
(0.151) (0.00539) (4.97e-07) (0.218) (0.0216)
in*state 39 -0.186 0.000437*** 1.46e-
07***
0.0608*** 0.0207***
(0.127) (0.000155) (5.07e-08) (0.0184) (0.00646)
in*state 41 -0.277*** 0.00719*** 5.47e-
07***
0.421*** 0.0254***
(0.0130) (0.000793) (6.29e-08) (0.0531) (0.00353)
in*state 42 0.665 0.0109 1.82e-06 0.0691 0.0102
(0.399) (0.00667) (1.12e-06) (0.0642) (0.0112)
in*state 43 1.118*** 0.00253** 5.87e-07** 0.103* 0.0219
(0.150) (0.00102) (2.38e-07) (0.0601) (0.0151)
in*state 44 -0.432** -0.000427 -9.14e-08 -0.187** -0.0417**
(0.175) (0.000290) (6.07e-08) (0.0858) (0.0192)
in*state 45 1.193*** 0.0483*** 2.41e-
06***
1.752*** 0.0535***
(0.109) (0.00556) (2.75e-07) (0.260) (0.00816)
in*state 47 0.456** 0.00204** 5.99e-07** 0.140* 0.0384
(0.222) (0.000931) (2.78e-07) (0.0820) (0.0255)
in*state 48 0.347*** 0.0354 4.88e-08 4.770*** 1.137***
(0.0650) (0.0355) (3.13e-06) (1.658) (0.406)
in*state 49 -0.547*** 0.0345 -3.17e-06 -95.58*** -21.53***
(0.0819) (0.0486) (4.54e-06) (5.282) (1.198)
in*state 50 -0.734*** -0.00697* -2.65e-06* -0.594** -0.230**
(0.252) (0.00360) (1.33e-06) (0.256) (0.101)
in*state 51 1.156*** 0.164 1.00e-06 -83.38*** -2.195***
(0.276) (0.131) (1.45e-06) (4.636) (0.123)
female 1.636*** 1.636*** 1.637*** 1.626*** 1.634***
(0.154) (0.153) (0.153) (0.151) (0.152)
white 1.089*** 1.087*** 1.085*** 1.089*** 1.089***




-2.524*** -2.447*** -2.454*** -2.569*** -2.597***




3.33e-05** 3.31e-05** 3.31e-05** 3.32e-05** 3.31e-05**




-0.161 -0.157 -0.157 -0.157 -0.156
(0.192) (0.194) (0.194) (0.193) (0.193)
hh size
1997
-0.366*** -0.365*** -0.365*** -0.368*** -0.369***
(0.0870) (0.0876) (0.0876) (0.0872) (0.0871)
both bio
parents
1.866*** 1.879*** 1.879*** 1.880*** 1.882***
(0.213) (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.209)
expo re-
forms
-1.657*** -1.707*** -1.702*** -1.728*** -1.721***




5.126*** 10.69* 4.557* -590.1*** -558.9***
(0.619) (6.331) (2.541) (32.95) (31.42)
Constant 41.10*** 17.84 42.47*** 2,423*** 2,298***
(4.943) (28.22) (13.30) (132.7) (126.8)
N 4,219 4,219 4,219 4,219 4,219
Total cred-
its
16.05 16.05 16.05 16.05 16.05
State-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is total credits; the treatment variables
are the interactions of in and state dummies. in1-in5 measure potential years of exposure to:
(1) STEM programs, (2) recipients, (3) expenditures, (4) recipients/1,000 teachers, and (5)
expenditure/teacher. State and cohort fixed effects were also included. All regressions use the
1997 weight.
149
Table A.3: Reduced Form: Impact of interactions of
potential years of exposure to STEM programs time-
varying characteristics and state dummies on ln(Income
age 28) controlling for demographics, household charac-
teristics, high school math graduation requirements and
state and cohort fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
expo expo expo expo re-
cip/
expo
years recipients expend. 1,000 teach exp/teacher
in*state 4 -0.0547* 0.0505*** 3.51e-
06***
0.747*** 0.132***
(0.0289) (0.00274) (1.87e-07) (0.0945) (0.0158)
in*state 5 -0.0218 0.00131*** 1.49e-
07***
0.0434*** 0.0119***
(0.0136) (7.52e-05) (7.87e-09) (0.0156) (0.00416)
in*state 6 0.0297 0.000147* 8.12e-08* 0.00297 0.00205
(0.0187) (8.37e-05) (4.69e-08) (0.00434) (0.00230)





(0.0250) (0.000343) (8.21e-08) (0.0154) (0.00348)
in*state 8 0.0446*** 0.00230 3.25e-07 0.00437 -9.26e-05
(0.0153) (0.00307) (4.42e-07) (0.0241) (0.00376)
in*state 10 -0.0298 5.01e-05 1.43e-08 -0.0428*** -0.000540
(0.0283) (4.84e-05) (1.42e-08) (0.0133) (0.00256)





(0.0178) (1.91e-05) (7.14e-09) (0.00214) (0.000761)





(0.0129) (0.000307) (6.51e-08) (0.0486) (0.00740)
in*state 15 -0.0246* 0.0292*** 7.76e-
06***
-0.0476 -0.0699
(0.0126) (0.00170) (4.17e-07) (0.203) (0.129)
in*state 18 -0.201*** 0.000156*** 6.64e-
08***
0.00544*** 0.00239***
(0.0300) (2.74e-05) (1.17e-08) (0.00115) (0.000467)
in*state 19 0.314*** 0.00986*** 1.33e-
06***
0.440*** 0.0609***
(0.0518) (0.00177) (2.40e-07) (0.0853) (0.0111)
in*state 20 0.00232 0.0185*** 2.27e-
06***
2.747*** 0.791***
(0.0173) (0.00110) (1.31e-07) (0.102) (0.0283)
150





(0.0289) (0.000139) (3.33e-08) (0.00831) (0.00190)
in*state 25 0.0187 0.00262*** 2.86e-
07***
0.00909* 0.00950***
(0.0496) (0.000161) (1.75e-08) (0.00509) (0.000648)





(0.0432) (0.000167) (1.29e-07) (0.0122) (0.00883)
in*state 32 0.0217 0.105*** 1.09e-
05***
0.319 0.0723
(0.0302) (0.00557) (5.50e-07) (0.210) (0.0487)
in*state 33 0.00890 1.84e-06 4.76e-10 5.79e-05 3.53e-05
(0.0279) (2.50e-06) (6.78e-10) (0.000570) (0.000145)





(0.0226) (1.00e-05) (2.61e-09) (0.000956) (0.000230)
in*state 35 0.190*** 0.000693*** 6.60e-
07***
0.00500*** 0.00488***
(0.0233) (8.91e-05) (8.53e-08) (0.000732) (0.000661)





(0.0277) (0.000548) (5.08e-08) (0.0257) (0.00219)





(0.0285) (1.68e-05) (5.52e-09) (0.00234) (0.000708)
in*state 41 -0.0365*** 5.39e-05 3.69e-10 -0.00594 -0.000351
(0.00184) (8.18e-05) (6.52e-09) (0.00663) (0.000374)
in*state 42 0.0604 0.000961 1.61e-07 0.00432 0.000931
(0.0486) (0.000690) (1.16e-07) (0.00705) (0.00114)
in*state 43 0.0237 0.000634*** 1.48e-
07***
0.0309*** 0.00753***
(0.0274) (0.000123) (2.90e-08) (0.00804) (0.00177)
in*state 44 -0.0375 -3.49e-05 -7.50e-09 -0.0190* -0.00361*
(0.0243) (3.34e-05) (7.03e-09) (0.0106) (0.00208)
in*state 45 0.0161 0.000402 1.86e-08 -0.000928 -5.14e-06
(0.0190) (0.000927) (4.58e-08) (0.0399) (0.00121)
in*state 47 0.154*** 0.000615*** 1.83e-
07***
0.0520*** 0.0162***
(0.0371) (0.000150) (4.45e-08) (0.0148) (0.00421)
in*state 48 0.0197* 0.0724*** 6.49e-
06***
0.927*** 0.203***
(0.0115) (0.00416) (3.43e-07) (0.223) (0.0471)




(0.0173) (0.00585) (5.31e-07) (0.660) (0.141)
in*state 50 0.353*** 0.00405*** 1.50e-
06***
0.217*** 0.0822***
(0.0391) (0.000424) (1.57e-07) (0.0340) (0.0117)
in*state 51 -0.365*** 0.247*** 2.47e-
06***
15.40*** 0.399***
(0.0474) (0.0162) (1.79e-07) (0.581) (0.0145)
female -0.370*** -0.374*** -0.374*** -0.371*** -0.371***
(0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0333) (0.0333)
white 0.105** 0.105** 0.104** 0.105** 0.106**
(0.0422) (0.0424) (0.0427) (0.0424) (0.0428)
age as of
12-31-1996
-0.159*** -0.149*** -0.150*** -0.169*** -0.167***




1.32e-06 1.33e-06 1.34e-06 1.28e-06 1.30e-06




0.0193 0.0189 0.0189 0.0202 0.0197
1996-1999 (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0194) (0.0193)
hh size
1997
-0.00636 -0.00693 -0.00693 -0.00582 -0.00583
(0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0149)
both bio
parents
0.0903*** 0.0910*** 0.0911*** 0.0891*** 0.0891***
(0.0315) (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0322)
expo re-
forms
-0.118** -0.131** -0.130** -0.134** -0.135**




0.189* 12.78*** 5.191*** 110.4*** 103.0***
(0.110) (0.785) (0.316) (4.136) (3.712)
Constant 12.19*** -38.27*** -7.902*** -428.6*** -398.9***
(0.635) (3.225) (1.447) (16.43) (14.72)
N 4,219 4,219 4,219 4,219 4,219
Mean
Income
$26,894 $26,894 $26,894 $26,894 $26,894
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State-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is ln(income age 28); the treatment variables
are the interactions of in and state dummies. in1-in5 measure potential years of exposure to:
(1) STEM programs, (2) recipients, (3) expenditures, (4) recipients/1,000 teachers, and (5)




Reduced Form American Community Sur-
vey 2009. Impact of the potential years of ex-
posure to STEM programs on the natural loga-
rithm of personal yearly wages controlling for de-
mographic characteristics, high school graduation
requirements and state and cohort fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3)
cohort 28-29 cohort 30-35 cohort 36-40
expo 0.0209*** 0.00826** 0.000163
(0.00574) (0.00389) (0.0154)
female -0.222*** -0.300*** -0.399***
(0.0164) (0.0128) (0.0128)
white 0.0204** 0.0196** 0.0101
(0.00995) (0.00790) (0.00798)
black 0.0108 0.0284** 0.0641***
(0.0193) (0.0123) (0.0116)
Asian 0.0267 0.0744*** 0.0918***
(0.0165) (0.0136) (0.0139)
birthday year -0.0291*** -0.0268*** -0.000525
(0.00888) (0.00194) (0.00169)
poverty 0.00369*** 0.00394*** 0.00416***
(3.89e-05) (3.61e-05) (4.04e-05)
N 54,465 159,168 146,922
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean Income $26,981 $32,456 $38,100
State-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. OLS regressions of the impact
of expo on ln(personal yearly wages) controlling for race, gender,
birthday year, poverty, high school math graduation requirements
and number of years of exposure to changes in high school math
graduation requirements. State and cohort fixed effects were in-
cluded. All regressions are weighted.
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Table A.5:
Reduced Form Survey of Income and Pro-
gram Participation 2008. Impact of the
potential exposure to STEM programs on the
natural logarithm of household monthly income
controlling for demographic characteristics, high
school graduation requirements and state and co-
hort fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3)
cohort 28-29 cohort 30-35 cohort 36-40
expo 0.156*** 0.0459** 0.133***
(0.0287) (0.0213) (0.0486)
female -0.100** -0.0708*** -0.0996***
(0.0406) (0.0157) (0.0139)
white 0.152* 0.220*** 0.163**
(0.0779) (0.0631) (0.0694)
birth year -0.0510 -0.0272*** -0.00934
(0.0305) (0.00699) (0.00586)
poverty 0.000131*** 5.70e-05 0.000207***
(3.63e-05) (3.89e-05) (3.32e-05)
N 10,068 29,512 31,702
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean Income $5,614 $6,064 $6,463
State-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. OLS regressions of the impact
of potential exposure to STEM programs on the natural loga-
rithm of household monthly income controlling for race, gender,
birth year, poverty, high school math graduation requirements
and number of years of exposure to changes in high school math
graduation requirements. State and cohort fixed effects were in-
cluded. All regressions are weighted.
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Table A.6: Reduced Form American Community
Survey 2009. Impact of the interactions of potential
years of exposure to STEM programs and state dum-
mies on the natural logarithm of personal yearly wages
controlling for demographic characteristics, high school
graduation requirements and state and cohort fixed ef-
fects.
(1) (2) (3)
cohort 28-29 cohort 30-35 cohort 36-40
expo*state 1 0.0742***
(0.00954)
expo*state 4 0.0138*** 0.0120***
(0.00195) (0.00245)




expo*state 8 -0.0270*** 0.0525*** -0.137***
(0.00246) (0.00229) (0.00424)
expo*state 10 0.0148*** 0.0228*** -0.0172***
(0.00201) (0.00220) (0.00438)
expo*state 11 -0.00979*** 0.0173***
(0.00246) (0.00205)
expo*state 13 -0.0593*** -0.249***
(0.00570) (0.00429)
expo*state 14 0.0321*** -0.00259 0.0839***
(0.00191) (0.00240) (0.00432)
expo*state 15 -0.0451*** 0.00310 -0.0143***
(0.00221) (0.00238) (0.00418)
expo*state 18 0.0536*** 0.0399*** -0.0697***
(0.00179) (0.00282) (0.00458)
expo*state 20 0.0875*** -0.0848***
(0.00721) (0.00371)
expo*state 21 0.0407*** 0.00592** -0.0150***
(0.00285) (0.00227) (0.00432)
expo*state 25 0.178*** 0.0397*** 0.0562***
(0.00169) (0.00253) (0.00455)









expo*state 37 0.00720*** -0.0202*** -0.0795***
(0.00191) (0.00237) (0.00437)
expo*state 39 -0.0724*** -0.000387 -0.0571***
(0.00184) (0.00300) (0.00443)
expo*state 41 0.00923*** 0.0113*** 0.0175***
(0.00171) (0.00242) (0.00412)
expo*state 43 0.0304*** 0.0216*** -0.0287***
(0.00163) (0.00244) (0.00442)
expo*state 45 0.00268* -0.0362***
(0.00146) (0.00217)
expo*state 48 -0.0409*** 0.00273 0.0238***
(0.00226) (0.00234) (0.00441)
expo*state 49 6.003*** -0.0215*** 0.0337***
(1.605) (0.00330) (0.00436)
expo*state 50 0.110*** -0.0213***
(0.00554) (0.00361)
expo*state 51 -0.0614*** 0.0174***
(0.00351) (0.00266)
female -0.222*** -0.300*** -0.399***
(0.0164) (0.0129) (0.0128)
white 0.0200* 0.0196** 0.00999
(0.00994) (0.00782) (0.00801)
black 0.0103 0.0282** 0.0637***
(0.0194) (0.0121) (0.0116)
asian 0.0262 0.0746*** 0.0913***
(0.0166) (0.0135) (0.0139)
bday year -0.0318*** -0.0267*** -0.000511
(0.00972) (0.00195) (0.00169)
poverty 0.00369*** 0.00394*** 0.00416***
(3.92e-05) (3.63e-05) (4.03e-05)
N 54,465 159,168 146,922
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean Income $26,981 $32,456 $38,100
State-level clustered robust standard errors in
parentheses.***p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. OLS regressions of
the impact of interactions of expo and state dummies on the natural
logarithm of personal yearly wages controlling for race, gender,
birthday year, poverty, high school math graduation requirements
and number of years of exposure to changes in high school math
graduation requirements. State and cohort fixed effects are included.
All regressions are weighted.
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Table A.7: Reduced Form: Survey of Income and
Program Participation 2008. Impact of the inter-
actions of potential exposure to STEM programs and
state dummies on the natural logarithm of household
monthly income controlling for demographic characteris-
tics, high school graduation requirements and state and
cohort fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3)
cohort 28-29 cohort 30-35 cohort 36-40
expo*state 4 0.348*** 0.0334***
(0.0114) (0.00626)
expo*state 5 0.191*** 0.0948*** 0.208***
(0.00709) (0.00572) (0.0180)
expo*state 8 -0.789*** 0.256*** 0.542***
(0.0227) (0.0122) (0.0295)
expo*state 10 0.429*** 0.0368*** 0.128***
(0.0122) (0.00623) (0.0196)
expo*state 11 0.0651*** -0.0418***
(0.0118) (0.00762)
expo*state 13 0.142*** 0.180***
(0.00842) (0.0246)
expo*state 14 0.0205** 0.0488*** 0.164***
(0.00810) (0.00584) (0.0217)
expo*state 15 0.144*** 0.0708*** -0.138***
(0.00389) (0.00631) (0.0181)
expo*state 18 -15.01** -0.0147 0.418***
(7.263) (0.0100) (0.0189)
expo*state 20 -0.0209 -0.235***
(0.0387) (0.0362)
expo*state 21 0.153*** 0.0455*** -0.0890***
(0.0126) (0.00713) (0.0210)
expo*state 25 -0.0636*** 0.0480*** -1.473***
(0.00987) (0.00492) (0.0277)




expo*state 37 0.267*** 0.0908*** -0.0226
(0.00506) (0.00602) (0.0240)
expo*state 39 0.0611*** 0.0772*** -0.135***
(0.00798) (0.00716) (0.0199)
expo*state 41 0.121*** -0.0884*** 0.447***
(0.00750) (0.00734) (0.0202)
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expo*state 43 0.183*** -0.0634*** 0.442***
(0.00818) (0.00708) (0.0185)
expo*state 45 -0.107*** -0.0873***
(0.0395) (0.00969)
expo*state 48 0.199*** -0.0638*** 0.0645***
(0.00642) (0.00703) (0.0190)
expo*state 49 -0.718*** -0.0106 0.344***
(0.0256) (0.0105) (0.0230)
expo*state 50 -0.101*** -0.123***
(0.0241) (0.0212)
expo*state 51 -0.874*** 0.263***
(0.0347) (0.0279)
female -0.0981** -0.0708*** -0.0994***
(0.0401) (0.0158) (0.0140)
white 0.153* 0.219*** 0.161**
(0.0788) (0.0626) (0.0689)
birth year -0.0522* -0.0247*** -0.00941
(0.0295) (0.00679) (0.00585)
poverty 0.000125*** 6.08e-05 0.000208***
(3.69e-05) (3.90e-05) (3.32e-05)
N 10,068 29,512 31,702
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean Income $5,614 $6,064 $6,463
State-level clustered robust standard errors in
parentheses.***p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. OLS regressions of
the impact of interactions of expo and state dummies on the natural
logarithm of household monthly income controlling for race, gender,
birth year, poverty, high school math graduation requirements and
number of years of exposure to changes in high school math gradu-




NLSY 97. Impact of potential years of exposure during
college on the probability of teaching. Teaching is mea-
sured with two dummy variables: ever been a teacher and,
individual is a teacher in 2013.
(1) (2)
teacher ever teacher in 2013






age as of 12-31-1996 -0.0257*** -0.00728
(0.00890) (0.00441)
hgc bio dad 0.0103*** 0.00307**
(0.00235) (0.00130)
hgc bio mom 0.0115*** 0.00369**
(0.00267) (0.00171)
household gross income 1997 9.34e-07** 6.32e-07**
(3.76e-07) (2.88e-07)
household income poverty ratio 1997 -0.000123** -8.89e-05**
(5.66e-05) (4.22e-05)
reforms expo -0.000855 -0.00164
(0.00811) (0.00362)
high school 0.0309 0.00980
math requirements (0.0387) (0.0214)
N 5,139 5,139
R-squared 0.199 0.080
Mean Teach 0.129 0.0396
OLS regressions that measure the impact of potential exposure during col-
lege on the probability of teaching. The first outcome is a dummy variable
that indicates whether individuals have ever taught; the second outcome is
a dummy variable that indicates whether the individual is teaching during
2013.The controls included are female, white, age as of 12-31-1996, parental
education, household income and poverty as well as high school math gradua-
tion requirements and changes to high school math graduation requirements.
State and cohort fixed effects were included. Standard errors are robust




ACS 09. Impact of potential years of exposure dur-
ing college on the probability of teaching.
(1) (2) (3)
cohort 28-29 cohort 30-35 cohort 36-40
expo college 0.00602*** 0.00503*** 0.00264***
(0.000603) (0.000583) (0.000896)
female 0.0458*** 0.0463*** 0.0475***
(0.00386) (0.00180) (0.00250)
white 0.0114*** 0.0130*** 0.0148***
(0.00369) (0.00325) (0.00161)
black -0.00338 0.00133 0.00404*
(0.00359) (0.00334) (0.00229)
asian -0.0216*** -0.0216*** -0.0114***
(0.00402) (0.00263) (0.00176)
birthday year -0.00727*** 7.13e-05 -0.000418
(0.00170) (0.000362) (0.000530)
poverty 0.000122*** 0.000115*** 9.93e-05***
(1.06e-05) (6.67e-06) (6.47e-06)
math reform -4.763*** 0.0445 -0.782
(1.121) (0.239) (1.046)
high school math 4.782*** -0.0526 0.397
requirements (1.121) (0.239) (0.523)
N 66,126 196,346 183,023
R-squared 0.069 0.066 0.063
Mean Teach 0.0427 0.0424 0.0409
OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable
that indicates whether the individual has one of the following occu-
pations: Elementary and Middle School Teacher, Secondary School
Teacher, Special Education Teacher, Other Teachers and Instructors
and Teacher Assistants. The treatment variable is the number of years
of potential exposure during college to STEM teacher programs. The
controls include female, white, black, Asian, birthday year, poverty,
high school math graduation requirements in 1997, changes to math
graduation requirements between 1996 and 2008 and state fixed ef-
fects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. All
regressions are weighted. ***p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.10:
SIPP 08. Impact of potential years of exposure
during college on the probability of teaching.
(1) (2) (3)
cohort 28-29 cohort 30-35 cohort 36-40
expo college 0.0113*** 0.00972*** 0.00401
(0.00207) (0.00203) (0.00414)
female 0.0513*** 0.0390*** 0.0471***
(0.00760) (0.00555) (0.00529)
white 0.0291* 0.00490 0.00995**
(0.0162) (0.00824) (0.00442)
birthday year 0.000884 -0.00239** 3.94e-05
(0.00440) (0.00105) (0.00150)
poverty -3.15e-05*** -4.37e-06 -2.06e-06
(7.09e-06) (5.70e-06) (5.00e-06)
math reform 1.906 -4.631** -0.0922
(8.706) (2.071) (0.985)
high school math -0.904 2.342** 0.0113
requirements (4.353) (1.036) (0.983)
N 10,303 30,186 32,485
R-squared 0.085 0.060 0.066
Mean Teach 0.0525 0.0422 0.0426
OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable
that indicates whether the individual has one of the following occu-
pations: Preschool and kindergarten, Elementary and middle school,
Secondary school teachers, Special education teachers, Other teach-
ers and instructors, Teacher assistants, Other education occupations.
The treatment variable is potential years of exposure during college to
STEM teacher programs. The controls include female, white, birth-
day year, poverty, high school math graduation requirements in 1997,
changes to math graduation requirements between 1996 and 2008 and
state fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state
level. All regressions are weighted. ***p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.11:
CCD. Impact of implementing a STEM teacher recruit-




STEM Program -24.55 1,443 1,357
(840.3) (898.5) (1,283)
total students 0.0249*** 0.00657 0.0613***
(0.00457) (0.00655) (0.0109)
high school students 0.0121 0.0433*** 0.0120
(0.0102) (0.0136) (0.0366)
N 1,428 1,428 1,428
R-squared 0.561 0.528 0.845
Number of states 51 51 51
Mean Elementary Teachers 26,830
Mean Secondary Teachers 20,761
Mean Total Teachers 55,170
Fixed Effects estimates in which the dependent variables are: the number
of elementary teachers, number of secondary school teachers and the total
number of teachers. The panel of state-year data spans from 1983 to
2013. The treatment variable, STEM Program is equal to 1 in the year in
which states implemented at least one teacher recruitment program and
zero otherwise. The controls are the state-year total number of students
and the state-year total number of high school students. Year effects were




CCD. Impact of implementing a STEM teacher recruit-
ment program on the log of the number of teachers.
(1) (2) (3)
ln Elementary ln Secondary ln Total
Teachers Teachers Teachers
STEM program -0.0173 0.000120 -0.0119
(0.0266) (0.0313) (0.0173)
total students 3.08e-07** 2.28e-07 3.79e-07***
(1.16e-07) (1.62e-07) (9.74e-08)
high school students -1.97e-07 8.56e-08 -3.60e-07
(2.71e-07) (3.39e-07) (2.29e-07)
N 1,428 1,428 1,428
R-squared 0.368 0.397 0.714
Number of states 51 51 51
Fixed Effects estimates in which the dependent variables are: the natural
logarithms of the number of elementary teachers, number of secondary
school teachers and the total number of teachers. The panel of state-year
data spans from 1983 to 2013. The treatment variable, STEM Program
is equal to 1 in the year in which states implemented at least one teacher
recruitment program and zero otherwise. The controls are the state-year
total number of students and the state-year total number of high school
students. Year effects were included. Robust standard errors were clus-
tered by state. ***p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.13: NLSY 97. Impact of the interactions of po-
tential years of exposure during college and state dum-
mies on the probability of teaching. Teaching is measured
with two dummy variables: ever been a teacher and, in-
dividual is a teacher in 2013.
(1) (2)
teacher ever teacher 2013
expo college*state 4 0.0213 0.00406
(0.0131) (0.00578)
expo college*state 5 0.0254 0.000159
(0.0207) (0.0101)
expo college*state 6 0.0187 0.0451***
(0.0113) (0.00680)
expo college*state 7 0.0114* -0.0275***
(0.00610) (0.00381)
expo college*state 8 0.0375* -0.00834
(0.0201) (0.0101)
expo college*state 10 0.0143 -0.000573
(0.0129) (0.00563)
expo college*state 11 0.0137 -0.00541
(0.0115) (0.00543)
expo college*state 12 0.000101 -0.00641
(0.0172) (0.00836)
expo college*state 14 0.0235 0.00513
(0.0209) (0.0102)
expo college*state 15 0.0105 -0.00577
(0.0210) (0.0103)
expo college*state 17 0.0417*** 0.0422***
(0.00576) (0.00251)
expo college*state 18 0.0409*** 0.0217***
(0.0124) (0.00521)
expo college*state 19 -0.00625 -0.0196***
(0.00667) (0.00337)
expo college*state 20 0.0128 0.00101
(0.0248) (0.0119)
expo college*state 21 -0.00157 -0.00891
(0.0129) (0.00569)
expo college*state 25 0.0371* 0.0235**
(0.0208) (0.0110)
expo college*state 26 -0.00892 -0.00929***
(0.00535) (0.00280)
expo college*state 27 0.0713*** -0.0412***
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(0.0142) (0.00968)
expo college*state 32 0.0358** 0.0113*
(0.0135) (0.00592)
expo college*state 33 0.0223 0.00605
(0.0205) (0.0102)
expo college*state 34 0.122*** 0.0725***
(0.0124) (0.00646)
expo college*state 35 0.0220* 0.0206***
(0.0113) (0.00671)
expo college*state 37 0.0107 -0.00575
(0.0105) (0.00551)
expo college*state 39 0.00999 -0.00162
(0.0129) (0.00549)
expo college*state 41 -0.0126*** -0.00730***
(0.000719) (0.000434)
expo college*state 42 -0.0893*** -0.0764***
(0.00618) (0.00337)
expo college*state 43 0.00652 0.00566
(0.0105) (0.00559)
expo college*state 44 0.0177** 0.0132***
(0.00707) (0.00361)
expo college*state 45 0.0300 -0.0114
(0.0219) (0.0104)
expo college*state 47 0.0466*** 0.0214***
(0.00919) (0.00423)
expo college*state 48 0.0340 0.000137
(0.0215) (0.0103)
expo college*state 49 0.00282 -0.00192
(0.0226) (0.0112)
expo college*state 50 0.0162 0.0105
(0.0213) (0.0100)






age as of 12-31-1996 -0.0247*** -0.00679
(0.00899) (0.00445)
hgc bio dad 0.0104*** 0.00308**
(0.00234) (0.00129)
hgc bio mom 0.0115*** 0.00375**
(0.00267) (0.00170)
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household gross income 1997 9.68e-07** 6.69e-07**
(3.74e-07) (2.90e-07)
household income poverty ratio 1997 -0.000130** -9.48e-05**
(5.61e-05) (4.26e-05)
reforms expo -0.00415 -0.00376
(0.00955) (0.00399)




Mean Teach 0.129 0.0396
OLS regressions that measure the impact of potential exposure during college on
the probability of teaching. The first outcome is a dummy variable that indicates
whether individuals have ever taught; the second outcome is a dummy variable
that indicates whether the individual is teaching during 2013. The controls in-
cluded are female, white, age as of 12-31-1996, parental education, household
income and poverty as well as high school math graduation requirememnts and
changes to high school math graduation requirements. State and cohort fixed
effects were included. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level.
All regressions are weighted. ***p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.14: ACS 09. Impact of the interactions of po-
tential years of exposure during college and state dum-
mies on the probability of teaching.
(1) (2) (3)
cohort 28-29 cohort 30-35 cohort 36-40
expo college*state 4 0.00777*** 0.00845*** 0.0132***
(0.000398) (0.000340) (0.000854)
expo college*state 5 0.00579*** 0.00574*** 0.00276***
(0.000415) (0.000373) (0.000660)
expo college*state 6 -0.00486*** 0.00413***
(0.000758) (0.00109)
expo college*state 7 0.0273***
(0.00120)
expo college*state 8 0.000759 0.00876*** 0.00502***
(0.000508) (0.000241) (0.000682)
expo college*state 10 0.00563*** 0.00441*** 0.00186***
(0.000460) (0.000303) (0.000637)
expo college*state 11 0.00561*** 0.00590*** -0.00256*
(0.000605) (0.000424) (0.00145)
expo college*state 12 0.00929***
(0.00188)
expo college*state 13 -0.00203* -0.00595***
(0.00106) (0.00139)
expo college*state 14 0.00624*** 0.00496*** 0.00593***
(0.000531) (0.000452) (0.000654)
expo college*state 15 0.00771*** 0.00574*** -0.00125**
(0.000454) (0.000283) (0.000610)
expo college*state 18 0.00589*** 0.00637*** -0.00100
(0.000455) (0.000274) (0.000631)
expo college*state 19 -0.00566***
(0.00190)
expo college*state 20 0.00783*** 0.00248***
(0.000364) (0.000393)
expo college*state 21 0.00496*** 0.00524*** 0.00188***
(0.000652) (0.000397) (0.000645)
expo college*state 25 0.00761*** 0.00738*** 0.00245***
(0.000432) (0.000313) (0.000620)
expo college*state 26 0.00336*
(0.00194)
expo college*state 32 0.00834*** 0.00662*** 0.0106***
(0.000282) (0.000231) (0.000881)
expo college*state 33 0.00800*** 0.00229***
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(0.000612) (0.000684)
expo college*state 34 0.00661*** 0.00526***
(0.000873) (0.00113)
expo college*state 35 0.0130*** -0.0356***
(0.00102) (0.00101)
expo college*state 37 0.00942*** 0.00613*** -0.000761
(0.000443) (0.000294) (0.000639)
expo college*state 39 0.00668*** 0.00389*** 0.00177***
(0.000493) (0.000350) (0.000619)
expo college*state 41 0.00456*** 0.00475*** 0.00984***
(0.000464) (0.000320) (0.000625)
expo college*state 42 0.0152***
(0.00209)
expo college*state 43 0.00213*** 0.00677*** 0.00216***
(0.000450) (0.000290) (0.000635)
expo college*state 44 0.0118***
(0.00110)
expo college*state 45 0.00854*** 0.000466
(0.000255) (0.000420)
expo college*state 47 0.00665***
(0.00126)
expo college*state 48 0.000737 0.00418*** 0.00426***
(0.000510) (0.000358) (0.000602)
expo college*state 49 0.00410*** 0.00380*** -0.00918***
(0.000364) (0.000250) (0.000672)
expo college*state 50 -0.00233*** 0.00175***
(0.000507) (0.000400)
expo college*state 51 0.0149*** -0.00500***
(0.000651) (0.000410)
female 0.0458*** 0.0463*** 0.0475***
(0.00386) (0.00179) (0.00251)
white 0.0113*** 0.0130*** 0.0148***
(0.00366) (0.00327) (0.00161)
black -0.00353 0.00120 0.00396*
(0.00357) (0.00337) (0.00230)
asian -0.0217*** -0.0218*** -0.0114***
(0.00407) (0.00264) (0.00176)
birthday year -0.00757*** 0.000228 -0.000404
(0.00210) (0.000364) (0.000540)
poverty 0.000122*** 0.000114*** 9.93e-05***
(1.05e-05) (6.70e-06) (6.48e-06)
math reform -5.019*** 0.183 -0.225
(1.383) (0.239) (0.356)
high school math 4.999*** -0.164 0.251
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requirements (1.385) (0.240) (0.355)
N 66,126 196,346 183,023
R-squared 0.069 0.067 0.063
Mean Teach 0.0427 0.0424 0.0409
OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable that in-
dicates whether the individual has one of the following occupations: Elemen-
tary and Middle School Teacher, Secondary School Teacher, Special Education
Teacher, Other Teachers and Instructors and Teacher Assistants. The treatment
variables are the interactions of the years of potential exposure during college to
STEM teacher programs and state dummies. The controls include female, white,
black, Asian, birthday year, poverty, high school math graduation requirements
in 1997, changes to math graduation requirements between 1996 and 2008 and
state fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. All
regressions are weighted. ***p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.15: SIPP 08. Impact of the interactions of
potential years of exposure during college and state
dummies on the probability of teaching.
(1) (2) (3)
cohort 28-29 cohort 30-35 cohort 35-40
expo college*state 4 0.0198*** -0.0177*** 0.00967***
(0.00203) (0.000646) (0.00311)
expo college*state 5 0.0154*** 0.0141*** 0.00458**
(0.000743) (0.000973) (0.00192)
expo college*state 6 -0.0166***
(0.00388)
expo college*state 7 -0.124***
(0.00770)
expo college*state 8 0.00262 0.0228*** 0.212***
(0.00167) (0.00163) (0.00191)
expo college*state 10 0.00601*** 0.0105*** 2.33e-05
(0.000828) (0.000723) (0.00219)
expo college*state 11 0.0131*** 0.0138*** -0.0122**
(0.000540) (0.000935) (0.00509)
expo college*state 12 0.00146
(0.0103)
expo college*state 13 -0.00402 -0.0316***
(0.00270) (0.00386)
expo college*state 14 0.00707*** 0.0103*** -0.0169***
(0.00115) (0.000725) (0.00218)
expo college*state 15 0.0142*** 0.0130*** 0.00448**
(0.000765) (0.000730) (0.00209)
expo college*state 18 0.0117*** 0.0310*** 0.0344***
(0.00103) (0.00112) (0.00210)
expo college*state 20 0.0812*** 0.00898***
(0.00907) (0.00194)
expo college*state 21 0.00740*** 0.00224 0.0204***
(0.00118) (0.00146) (0.00205)
expo college*state 25 -0.00247 0.00178*** 0.0151***
(0.00185) (0.000513) (0.00215)
expo college*state 32 0.0263*** 0.00927*** -0.0212***
(0.00233) (0.000553) (0.00284)
expo college*state 33 0.0104** -0.0163***
(0.00407) (0.00400)
expo college*state 34 0.0194***
(0.00406)
expo college*state 35 -0.0222**
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(0.00972)
expo college*state 37 0.00892*** 0.0180*** -0.00856***
(0.00136) (0.000637) (0.00208)
expo college*state 39 0.0157*** 0.0137*** -0.00130
(0.00142) (0.000892) (0.00246)
expo college*state 41 0.0178*** 0.00801*** -0.0181***
(0.00111) (0.000410) (0.00227)
expo college*state 43 0.00450*** 0.00366*** 0.00788***
(0.00127) (0.000751) (0.00220)
expo college*state 44 0.0328***
(0.00606)
expo college*state 45 0.0162*** -0.00402***
(0.00101) (0.00122)
expo college*state 47 -0.0317***
(0.00683)
expo college*state 48 0.0134*** -0.0159*** 0.0163***
(0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00220)
expo college*state 49 -0.211 0.00444*** 0.0334***
(0.919) (0.000739) (0.00260)
expo college*state 50 -0.00999*** 0.00520***
(0.00188) (0.00147)
expo college*state 51 -0.249 -0.000595
(0.919) (0.00140)
female 0.0514*** 0.0395*** 0.0467***
(0.00764) (0.00561) (0.00529)
white 0.0296* 0.00516 0.00978**
(0.0163) (0.00824) (0.00435)
birthday year 0.00148 -0.00222** 0.000186
(0.00557) (0.00107) (0.00152)
poverty -3.14e-05*** -4.20e-06 -1.60e-06
(7.13e-06) (5.73e-06) (5.04e-06)
math reform 1.012 -1.394* 0.00453
(3.680) (0.700) (1.002)
high school math -0.971 1.448** -0.0852
requirements (3.677) (0.704) (1.000)
N 10,303 30,186 32,485
R-squared 0.087 0.061 0.070
Mean Teach 0.0525 0.0422 0.0426
OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable that in-
dicates whether the individual has one of the following occupations: Preschool
and kindergarten, Elementary and middle school, Secondary school teachers,
Special education teachers, Other teachers and instructors, Teacher assistants,
Other education occupations. The treatment variables are the interactions of the
years of potential exposure during college to STEM teacher programs and state
dummies. The controls include female, white, birthday year, poverty, high school
math graduation requirements in 1997, changes to math graduation requirements
between 1996 and 2008 and state fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clus-




BLS. Impact of Economic Conditions on States’ decisions of imple-
menting a STEM teacher recruitment program.
(1) (2) (3)
STEM STEM lead 1 year STEM lead 2 years
annual median wages 0.000000457 0.000000748 0.00000174
(0.00000124) (0.00000148) (0.00000146)
annual mean wages 0.000000805 0.00000063 0.00000122
(0.000000989) (0.00000111) (0.00000111)
hourly median wages 0.000948 0.00155 0.00361
(0.00258) (0.00308) (0.00303)
hourly mean wages 0.00167 0.00131 0.00255
(0.00206) (0.00230) (0.00232)
Percent on poverty 0.0155* 0.0130 0.00835
(0.00865) (0.00967) (0.00968)
Unemployment rate 0.0140 0.00806 -0.00524
(0.0212) (0.0207) (0.0202)
Number of states 51 51 51
Fixed Effects estimates in which the dependent variables are: STEM is equal to 1 in the
year in which states implemented at least one STEM teacher recruitment program and 0
otherwise. In columns (2) and (3) STEM was led one and two years correspondingly. The
treatment variables are the per state-year wages across all occupations, annual median
wages, annual mean wages, hourly median wages and hourly mean wages, percent on
poverty and unemployment rate. The panel of state-year data spans from 1983 to 2013.
Each cell represents a separate fixed effects regression. Year effects were included. Robust
standard errors were clustered by state. ***p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.17:
BLS. Impact of Economic Conditions on States’ decisions of imple-
menting a STEM teacher recruitment program. The role of occupation
wages on states’ decisions to implement STEM programs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
hourly mean hourly median annual mean annual median
Engineering -0.00260 -0.000699 -0.00000124 -0.000000313
(0.0147) (0.0144) (0.00000704) (0.00000693)
Math 0.0125 0.0115 0.000006 0.00000553
(0.0115) (0.0102) (0.00000554) (0.00000489)
Business 0.0449** 0.0512** 0.0000216** 0.0000246**
(0.0204) (0.0247) (0.0000098) (0.0000119)
Health -0.00661 -0.0364 -0.00000314 -0.0000175
(0.0160) (0.0240) (0.00000769) (0.0000115)
Education 0.00666 -0.00235 0.00000321 -0.0000011
(0.0173) (0.0152) (0.00000831) (0.0000073)
Law -0.0119* -0.0153** -0.00000571* -0.00000735**
(0.00653) (0.00673) (0.00000314) (0.00000323)
Number of states 51 51 51 51
Fixed Effects estimates in which the dependent variables are: STEM is equal to 1 in the
year in which states implemented at least one STEM teacher recruitment program and 0
otherwise. The treatment variables are the per state-year wages the fields Engineering,
Math, Business, Health, Education and Law; these variables were measured hourly (mean
and median) and annually (mean and median). The panel of state-year data spans from
1983 to 2013. Each cell represents a separate fixed effects regression. Year effects were
included. Robust standard errors were clustered by state. ***p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Why are the OLS and 2SLS estimates so different?
Consider the following model assuming homogeneous returns.
yi = β0 + β1xi + εi (A.1)











In a constant returns world, i.e., β1 is the same for all individuals in the sample, an
OLS estimate of β1 would be biased upwards because, if we assume that εi captures
motivation, persistence, etc, then Cov(εi, xi) > 0.
Now consider the model of heterogeneous returns:
yi = β0 + β1ixi + εi (A.3)














Now suppose that the β1i takes the form:























Thus, assuming a positive correlation between returns and course taking ( γ1 > 0),
as stated in equation (9), the true value of the OLS estimate would be strictly greater





Since the LATE parameter estimates recover the effect of an increase on xi on yi
only for the population of compliers we can conclude that, (1) the constant returns
assumption is not valid in this study, and, (2) the compliers in this study are those
who have high returns.
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